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ABSTRACT 
Recent scholarship on Second Temple Judaism and Paul has maintained that both 
held “salvation” to be through God’s grace not human obedience. This study challenges 
this claim. Based on Josephus’ portrayal of the Jewish schools, the Second Temple period 
appears more diverse than recent scholarship has claimed. One of the key distinguishing 
factors, according to Josephus, is the relationship between divine and human action. This 
diversity is revealed in Sirach, the Hodayot, and Paul’s claims in Romans 7.7–8.13. Ben 
Sira argues that the divine-human relationship revolves around human obedience to the 
law. He utilises the two-ways tradition to develop his view. He describes God as re-acting 
to human obedience in judgment. The Hodayot, by contrast, emphasise God’s initiative 
and his saving actions. Humans are immeasurably corrupt creatures, but God, through his 
Spirit, predestines some, gives knowledge to them, and purifies them. These divine acts 
lead to human obedience. The study of Paul’s view on divine and human agency is 
extremely complex. Romans 7.7–8.13 is used as the way into Paul’s thought. In Romans 
7.7–25, Paul portrays the speaker as the human agent of the two-ways tradition. He 
argues that this view fails to explain the problem of Sin. In Romans 8.1–13, he contends 
that obedience becomes possible because God has acted in his Son to condemn Sin. 
Through the Spirit, God empowers believers to fulfil the righteous requirement of the 
law. This study challenges the idea that all of Judaism can be explained under a single 
view of salvation. Recognising the diversity allows one to situate Paul firmly within a 
Jewish context without distorting either the Jewish texts or Paul.
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INTRODUCTION 
1. Divine and Human Agency in Recent Discussion 
With the publication of Paul and Palestinian Judaism in 1977, Sanders began what 
has been described as a “Copernican revolution.”1 Prior to this work, NT scholars 
generally portrayed Judaism as crass legalism. Each individual attempted to meticulously 
keep the law, and each lived in perpetual fear of falling short at the Judgment by a mere 
one evil deed. Those who did manage to keep the law more often than not boasted 
egotistically before God. They demanded that God honour them, for they had successfully 
kept the law. Rejecting this Judaism as a false religion, NT scholars found in Paul true 
religion, and they read Paul as an opponent of this version of Judaism. The apostle of 
Christ came triumphantly to man’s rescue with his proclamation of righteousness by faith 
alone. He showed that salvation was wholly the work of God. Here the apostle and his 
former religion are set in the sharpest contrast, and the dividing issue is the divine-human 
relationship. On whom does salvation depend—God or man? This version of Judaism and 
Paul is what Sanders found in the scholarship prior to his volume.2 
Against this view of Judaism and the apostle’s relationship to it, Sanders argued that 
Judaism was not “works-righteous legalism.” He proposed instead “covenantal nomism” 
as the pattern of religion for Judaism.3 Salvation was by God’s grace, not human deeds. 
God graciously chose Israel as his people, gave to them the covenant, and this act 
determined that “all Israelites have a share in the world to come” (Sanh. 10.1 [Danby]). 
Obedience became, then, not the way into salvation, but the means to maintaining 
salvation. It was the response of any faithful covenant member. Obedience to the law 
belongs within the covenant relationship and was never far from God’s grace. In Sanders’ 
                                                 
1
 Hagner, “Paul and Judaism,” 75. 
2
 Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism, 33–59. Parenthetical references in the following are to 
Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism. 
3
 In addition to Sanders’ Paul and Palestinian Judaism, see also his “Covenant” and Judaism, 262–78. 
Sanders’ view of Judaism was not new, as he notes (Paul and Palestinian Judaism, 4–7) with reference to 
Montefiore (Judaism and St. Paul), Schechter (Aspects of Rabbinic Theology), Moore (Judaism) and Davies 
(Paul and Rabbinic Judaism). Aside from Davies, these scholars did not show the relevance of their 
analysis of Judaism for Pauline studies. Sanders brought the two together; whether or not he did so 
successfully is a matter of debate. 
  
2 
 
own words, “[C]ovenantal nomism is the view that one’s place in God’s plan is 
established on the basis of the covenant and that the covenant requires as the proper 
response of man his obedience to its commandments, while providing means of 
atonement for transgression” (75; cf. 236; 422). 
With this drastically different perspective on Second Temple Judaism, Sanders 
attempted a different reading of Paul. The opposition between grace/faith and works that 
so many earlier generations of scholars found in Paul simply could not be there. Instead, 
Paul’s problem with the law was not that it required doing, but because it was not Christ. 
Paul held that salvation was by Christ alone, and this meant that salvation could not be 
through the law. Sanders argued, 
Since salvation is only in Christ, therefore all other ways toward salvation are wrong, 
and attempting to follow them has results which are the reverse of what is desired. 
What is wrong with following the law is not the effort itself, but the fact that the 
observer of the law is not seeking the righteousness which is given by God through 
the coming of Christ (Rom. 10.2–4). Effort itself is not the sin; the sin is aiming 
towards any goal but being found ‘in Christ’ (Phil. 3.9). (482; emphasis original) 
While agreeing with other Jews about the goal, namely righteousness, Paul claims that the 
only true “righteousness” is that found by faith in Christ. He, therefore, rejects the 
righteousness of the law not because it requires obedience, but because “such a means 
leads to the wrong end (righteousness based on the law); and the end itself is wrong, since 
it is not salvation in Christ” (551). Paul also denies the salvific value of the Jewish 
covenant and claims instead that those who have faith in Christ are Abraham’s 
descendants. In his rejection of the covenant and the election and grace implied by it, “it 
is thus not first of all against the means of being properly religious which are appropriate 
to Judaism that Paul polemicizes (‘by works of the Law’), but against the prior 
fundamentals of Judaism” (551; emphasis original). “What Paul founds wrong in 
Judaism,” Sanders famously claimed is that “it is not Christianity” (552; emphasis 
original). 
In his later work, Paul, Judaism and the Law, Sanders maintained this contrast 
between Christ and the Torah as fundamental to Paul’s theology and rejection of the law. 
He also brought in an emphasis on the relationship between Jews and Gentiles. Sanders 
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argues that especially in Galatians, but also in Romans Paul does not oppose faith or 
works themselves but the refusal to accept Gentiles apart from law observance.4 The issue 
is about membership into the people of God. This is “the actual subject of the dispute” 
between Paul and the Christian missionaries in Galatia, not “the theological issue of grace 
and merit.”5 The theological content is not dismissed entirely. It is rather interpreted as a 
contrast between Christ and the law, and the sociological argument is elevated to equal 
status. 
Despite setting the law in opposition to Christ, Sanders maintained that the pattern of 
religion was fundamentally the same: salvation is by grace and one remains in the sphere 
of salvation through obedience. The point at which many find Paul and Judaism to 
diverge irreconcilably, namely grace and works, Sanders claimed instead that “Paul is in 
agreement with Palestinian Judaism” (Paul and Palestinian Judaism, 542). He continues, 
“There are two aspects of the relationship between grace and works: salvation is by grace 
but judgment is according to works; works are the condition of remaining ‘in’, but they 
do not earn salvation” (543; emphasis original). Although Paul and Judaism shared this 
similar view, Sanders held that Paul’s thought should not be described as “covenantal 
nomism.” Paul’s thought revolved around participatory categories, and covenantal 
nomism could not capture these ideas (514).6 Despite Paul thinking in fundamentally 
different categories, the relationship between “getting in” and “staying in” was basically 
the same. No substantial differences can be detected in the patterns. 
Sanders’ two volumes, especially Paul and Palestinian Judaism, have decisively 
altered the direction of Pauline research. Within four years, Dunn had dubbed the 
possibilities opened by Sanders’ work the “New Perspective on Paul.”7 In this lecture of 
the same title, Dunn began to develop an understanding of Paul built firmly on Sanders’ 
picture of Judaism. Dunn was unimpressed by Sanders’ interpretation of Paul, though, so 
                                                 
4
 Sanders, Law, 18–20, 47, 155. 
5
 Sanders, Law, 19. 
6
 He discusses Paul’s participation ideas in Paul and Palestinian Judaism, 453–72, 502–08. 
7
 Dunn, “New Perspective.” This article was originally given as a lecture in 1981 and published in 
1982. Page references are to the reprint in The New Perspective on Paul. 
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he sought to understand Paul within Sanders’ Judaism.8 Dunn thus agreed with Sanders 
that Judaism did not think salvation was by works. Recognising the importance of Paul’s 
antithesis between “faith in Christ” and “works of the law,” Dunn argued that the latter 
phrase should not be generalised to any human deed. It is rather a contextually specific 
phrase referring to the key distinguishing markers of the Jewish people: circumcision, 
food laws, and Sabbath regulations, or covenantal nomism when bound too close to 
Israel’s national identity.9 While Dunn’s subsequent works have clarified how he 
understands this phrase, he argues consistently that the phrase has nothing to do with 
legalistic works-righteousness.10 It cannot mean this simply because Judaism believed 
that salvation was by grace not works. 
Whereas Sanders set Christ and the Torah in opposition to one another as the 
distinction between Paul and Judaism, Dunn found this contrast in Paul’s claim that 
Gentiles can be among God’s people without Jewish identity markers and the exclusivity 
of Judaism.11 Paul’s gospel opened the way for Gentiles to be saved apart from 
observance of the Jewish Torah. They could come to faith in Christ as Gentiles. The 
antithesis between justification by faith or works of the law encapsulates Paul’s attempt to 
establish that salvation is possible outside the confines of Jewish exclusiveness.12 While 
the antithesis might have something to say about the individual’s standing before God, it 
is primarily about the ecclesiological relationship between Jews and Gentiles as the one 
                                                 
8
 Dunn, “New Perspective,” 93–95. Commenting on Sanders’ Paul, Dunn writes, “But this 
presentation of Paul is only a little better than the one rejected. There remains something very odd in Paul’s 
attitude to his ancestral faith. The Lutheran Paul has been replaced by an idiosyncratic Paul who in arbitrary 
and irrational manner turns his face against the glory and greatness of Judaism’s covenant theology and 
abandons Judaism simply because it is not Christianity” (93). 
9
 Dunn, “New Perspective,” 101; idem, “Works of the Law,” 117. 
10
 Dunn writes, “‘[W]orks of the law’ characterize the whole mind set of ‘covenantal nomism’—this 
is, the conviction that status within the covenant (= righteousness) is maintained by doing what the law 
requires (‘works of the law’). Circumcision and food laws in particular come into play simply (!) because 
they provided the key test cases for most Jews of Paul’s time” (“Yet Once More,” 208). See also idem, 
Theology of Paul, 358; “New Perspective on Paul: Whence, Whither, and How,” 22–26. 
11
 Dunn, “New Perspective,” 104; idem, “Noch einmal,” 411. 
12
 See Dunn’s interpretation of Galatians 2.15–16 in his Galatians, 132–41. Cf. Wright, “Paul of 
History,” 71: “[W]e must see justification by faith as a polemical doctrine, whose target is not the usual 
Lutheran one of ‘nomism’ or ‘Menschenwerke’, but the Pauline one of Jewish national pride.” 
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people of God.13 Paul’s problem with his fellow Jews, then, is not that they prioritise 
human action over divine action, but that they limit the scope of salvation. 
In contrast to those who found Paul’s soteriology to be radically different from 
Judaism, Dunn contends that one finds in Paul’s thought the same basic relationship 
between grace and obedience that one finds in Judaism. Against Sanders Dunn argues that 
covenantal nomism is an accurate description of Paul’s soteriology. He agrees with 
Hooker, who writes, “In many ways, the pattern which Sanders insists is the basis of 
Palestinian Judaism fits exactly the Pauline pattern of Christian experience: God’s saving 
grace evokes man’s answering obedience.”14 What Paul objects to is not “covenantal 
nomism” itself, but a form of covenantal nomism that ties the covenant and the law too 
closely to Israel’s ethnic and national identity.15 Once removed from this nationalistic 
context, Paul is quite comfortable with the pattern. 
While some scholars opposed Sanders’ interpretation of Judaism,16 for the most part 
Sanders’ view was warmly embraced and would come to be simply taken for granted by 
much of subsequent scholarship. Studies by Garlington and Yinger sought to support 
Sanders’ interpretation of the Jewish texts. Garlington explores the relationship between 
faith and obedience in the “apocryphal” texts.17 He contends that the two are not in 
opposition, but expressions of one another. The Jewish person did not obey in order to 
attain salvation since this was already given by grace through the covenant and election. 
Obedience has the precise function that Sanders claimed for it, namely, as the response of 
the covenant member to God’s grace. Based on his analysis of the uses of the phrase 
“judgment by deeds” in the Jewish texts, Yinger concludes that obedience did not earn 
salvation. Rather it was the evidence of one’s faithfulness to God.18 Both studies maintain 
that salvation according to the Jewish texts discussed is by God’s grace. 
                                                 
13
 See Dunn, “Justice of God;” idem, “Paul and Justification by Faith,” 365–69. 
14
 Hooker, “Paul and ‘Covenantal Nomism’,” 157. Cited by Dunn, Theology of Paul, 632n.29. 
15
 Dunn, “Theology of Galatians.” 
16
 See Carson, Divine Sovereignty, 86–95; Seifrid, Justification by Faith. 
17
 Garlington, ‘Obedience of Faith’. 
18
 Yinger, Judgment, 285–86. 
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Although giving broad support to Sanders’ interpretation of Judaism, many scholars 
have rejected his interpretation of Paul, and they have busied themselves with the task of 
making sense of Paul against the backdrop of a non-legalistic Judaism. The two works 
just noted fall squarely in this category. Both seek to demonstrate the continuity between 
Paul and Judaism on the relationship between obedience and salvation. Yinger argues that 
there is no conflict between justification by faith and judgment according to works in Paul 
because faith and works are simply not in opposition. Garlington and Yinger explicitly 
maintain that Paul’s pattern of religion is identical to covenantal nomism.19 Although the 
taxonomy “covenantal nomism” itself may not be entirely accurate, Yinger maintains that 
“the fundamental structure of grace and works, election and obedience, salvation and 
judgment, remains the same” even though “the role of the Spirit in enabling obedience, 
while not absent in Judaism, is certainly heightened significantly in Paul.” He continues, 
“Salvation . . . is given by God’s grace; and it is contingent upon continuance in the faith 
and obedience which are required by that relationship.”20 
The important work by Engberg-Pedersen begins from the premise that Sanders is 
correct about Judaism and that the “New Perspective” is accurate about the basic problem 
that Paul had with other Jews.21 The details of Engberg-Pedersen’s study need not detain 
us, for the primary reason to note him here is his refusal to discuss Paul’s statements 
about divine acts. This refusal stems from his claims about what constitutes “real options” 
for the post-Enlightenment person. Paul’s ethics, as well as those of the Stoics, are still 
valid options, but theological claims, while important for Paul, must be bracketed out and 
ultimately ignored.22 Engberg-Pedersen does not deny that Paul makes statements about 
divine action nor that these claims may have been important for Paul himself. For 
                                                 
19
 Garlington, ‘Obedience of Faith’, 264–65; Yinger, Judgment, 288–90. 
20
 Yinger, Judgment, 289 (emphasis original). 
21
 Engberg-Pedersen, Paul and the Stoics, 14–16. 
22
 “[T]he present work cannot at all get off the ground unless one takes the historical-critical, 
‘naturalistic’ perspective wholly seriously. One must bracket completely, at least initially, any ‘theological’ 
interest one may have in aligning oneself with Paul’s own perspective, which is definitely a ‘theological’ 
one that begins, logically, ‘from above’ in ideas about God and his acts. One must part company with Paul 
and give up reading him merely from within. Instead, one must read the whole of Paul—including his 
‘theological’ ideas—coolly from the outside” (Engberg-Pedersen, Paul and the Stoics, 2). 
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example, while noting Paul’s “participation” ideas expressed in Romans 8.1–13, they are 
quickly set aside because they do not help the modern interpreter to understand why the 
Christ event can result in sinless living.23 Statements about divine action (that is, the 
Christ event) are passed over in favour of statements about how the believer perceives 
himself or herself. 
The outcome of Engberg-Pedersen’s hermeneutical claims is that one can talk 
seriously only about Paul’s statements about human understanding.24 In his interpretation 
of Paul’s ethics and anthropology, the issue of divine and human agency stands out not 
because he explicitly discusses the issue, but because of the dismissal of the problem. He 
has attempted to clarify his understanding of divine and human agency in subsequent 
studies, but in both one finds an emphasis on the human agent and one senses in fact 
hesitancy toward the subject itself.25 
Two decades after Sanders’ volume, Marshall described the “New Perspective on 
Paul” as “the new orthodoxy.”26 Scholars in general have been content with Sanders’ 
picture of Jewish soteriology, and while disagreeing with his interpretation of Paul, they 
have often claimed that the basic pattern that one finds in Judaism is also found in Paul. 
This brief survey has highlighted the general rejection by recent scholars of the Pauline 
contrast between faith and works of the law as indicating fundamentally different means 
to salvation, an interpretation of Paul’s antithesis that earlier scholars simply took for 
granted. Against this “traditional” reading of Paul’s antithesis, these scholars have 
claimed that everyone agreed that salvation was by grace not works. To put this claim in 
the language of this study: salvation is accomplished through divine action not human 
                                                 
23
 Engberg-Pedersen, Paul and the Stoics, 248–52. 
24
 Engberg-Pedersen denies that one must choose between Paul’s apocalyptic statements about God 
and his philosophical statements about humanity (“Response,” 106), but the only “real option for us” 
remains his statements about human understanding. 
25
 Engberg-Pedersen, “Self-Sufficiency and Power;” idem, “Material Spirit.” In the latter article on 
Romans 8.1–13, he interprets the pneuma not as the divine Spirit, but as a constituent part of the human 
being. Where others have found divine action, he has explained it away. 
26
 Marshall, “Salvation, Grace and Works,” 340. Many scholars have been stressing the diversity of 
the “New Perspective,” and it is mistaken to think of it as a “school.” There are nevertheless key points that 
hold a group of scholars together under the umbrella “New Perspective.” These would include (an 
uncritical) following of Sanders’ view of Judaism and generally an opposition to a “Lutheran” interpretation 
of Paul and justification by faith. See Westerholm, Perspectives, 250–57. 
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action. The outcome of Sanders’ portrayal of Judaism and the development of the New 
Perspective on Paul is a general claim that Paul and Judaism agreed on the relationship 
between divine and human action. While the relationship between certain aspects of a 
“soteriological” pattern or a “pattern of religion,” such as justification by faith and 
judgment by works, remains unclear, these items do not indicate alternative means to 
salvation. This is so because faith and works were never in conflict. This claim, which is 
based on Sanders’ portrayal of Judaism and the “ethnic” interpretation of Paul’s 
antithesis, has become the trump card against any attempt to find in Paul’s debate with 
Judaism different understandings of how God and humans interact. This is nowhere 
clearer than in the works of Engberg-Pedersen. 
In his review of Watson’s Paul and the Hermeneutics of Faith, Engberg-Pedersen 
claims that Sanders and the New Perspective on Paul have demonstrated that Paul’s 
antithesis between faith and works of the law is not “between unconditionality (divine 
agency or saving action) and conditionality (human ‘salvific’ action)” but “is 
fundamentally an ethnic one.”27 Watson argues that Paul’s antithesis derives from his 
interpretation of the soteriological patterns found in the Torah.28 One view arises from 
Leviticus 18.5 and makes life contingent on law observance. The other view originates 
from Genesis 15.6 (and Hab 2.4), which describes the unconditional nature of God’s 
promise. Whereas other Jews highlighted Abraham’s obedience to God’s will as the 
reason he is declared righteous, Paul centres the story on God’s unilateral promise. This 
interpretative claim, according to Watson, is Paul’s antithesis, and at the heart of this 
antithesis are two alternative means to salvation. The one is based on human obedience to 
the Torah, and the other is oriented toward what God has done in Christ. Paul’s antithesis, 
according to Watson, is primarily about the ways in which the divine and human agents 
interact, and in this sense, it is set over against the “ethnic” interpretation advocated by 
Dunn, Wright, and others.29 Watson seeks to reintroduce into the interpretation of Paul’s 
                                                 
27
 Engberg-Pedersen, “Lutheran Paul?” 457. 
28
 Watson, Paul and the Hermeneutics of Faith, 39, 76; idem, “Constructing an Antithesis,” 101–02. 
29
 Watson, Paul and the Hermeneutics of Faith, 218. 
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antithesis a “vertical” aspect and to read the antithesis as less directly about the Jew-
Gentile problem. Paul’s claims about the unconditional divine saving act have 
consequences for how Jews and Gentiles relate within the church, but the antithesis is not 
fundamentally about this issue.30 
In Watson’s view, the contrast between the unconditional nature of God’s saving act 
and human obedience set forth in Paul’s antithesis between faith in Christ and works of 
the law is not the sum total of Paul’s view on divine and human agency. Abraham is not 
simply a passive recipient of divine grace. Rather, the divine saving act calls for a 
response in faith and obedience.31 The two phrases “faith in Christ” and “works of the 
law,” Watson argues, refer to communal ways of living and, therefore, human agency.32 
Each way, however, has a different focus since the former is directed toward what God 
did in Christ and the latter is oriented toward what humans do.33 In Paul’s view, Watson 
contends, divine and human agency are not set in opposition, but in comparison with 
some of his fellow Jews, Paul does indeed prioritise divine action.34 
Watson’s argument that the Pauline antithesis is about the divine-human relationship 
runs against the grain of recent studies that have claimed the antithesis is solely or 
fundamentally about how Gentiles can be considered equal members of the one people of 
God. Additionally, his argument that Paul’s theology prioritised divine action in a manner 
not seen in some other Jewish texts directly opposes claims that Paul and Judaism agreed 
on the relationship between works and grace. These claims about Paul’s view of the 
divine-human relationship are what Engberg-Pedersen objects to when he asserts that 
Paul’s antithesis is “fundamentally an ethnic one.” His critique of Watson assumes that 
the arguments made in favour of the New Perspective over the last three decades are 
                                                 
30
 Watson shows how the antithesis functions within an ecclesiological setting in his revised Paul, 
Judaism, and the Gentiles. He argues that the antithesis has the social function of limiting the scope of 
salvation to the “Christian” community, which is formed of both Jews and Gentiles, rather than the 
“Jewish” community (121–21; 212). 
31
 Watson, Paul and the Hermeneutics of Faith, 192, 218. 
32
 Watson, Paul, Judaism, and the Gentiles2, 121–25, 129. 
33
 Watson, Paul, Judaism, and the Gentiles2, 125–27, 129.  
34
 Watson, Paul, Judaism, and the Gentiles2, 15–19. 
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accurate and beyond question.35 Moreover, the “ethnic” interpretation is set against any 
explicit “theological” reading of the grace/works contrast.36 All Paul’s talk about grace, 
faith, and works of the law amounts simply to an attempt to get Gentiles into the people 
of God. The language means nothing more than this. As the title to Engberg-Pedersen’s 
review implies, “Once More a Lutheran Paul?”, any interpretation that resembles the old 
perspective and thus raises even the slightest possibility that Paul has something to say 
about how God and humans, both Jews and Gentiles, relate in the salvation process, is to 
be rejected outright. The New Perspective has taught us this, at least in Engberg-
Pedersen’s view.37 
Engberg-Pedersen advances a second reason that talk about divine and human agency 
in Paul is invalid: it introduces an “either/or-dichotomy” between divine and human 
action that no one in the ancient world made.38 Here along with Watson’s work, Martyn’s 
interpretation of Paul is subjected to criticism. Martyn contends that at the heart of Paul’s 
gospel is a claim about God’s apocalyptic act in Christ to liberate humanity from the 
grasp of Sin and the Flesh.39 Here God himself has invaded the human realm to resolve 
the human dilemma created by Sin and the Flesh. Against the power of the Flesh, God 
sends his Spirit. The Christian community is swept up into this cosmic battle between the 
Flesh and the Spirit as each battles the other for the loyalty of the community. Believers 
are not passive agents, unable to act in accordance with one power or the other. Rather, 
they are “soldiers.”40 Even in points of exhortation, according to Martyn, the focus 
                                                 
35
 Engberg-Pedersen does briefly discuss Romans 4.16 as support for the ethnic interpretation 
(“Lutheran Paul?” 457–58). His conclusion that Paul’s point is only that faith makes salvation available to 
all never actually addresses the issue that Paul writes about divine initiative and human response. The 
relationship between these two aspects is simply ignored. 
36
 Here the charge that the New Perspective amounts to a sociological study does have some validity. 
See Matlock, “Almost Cultural Studies;” Byrne, “Interpreting Romans Theologically,” 230–32. 
37
 While Engberg-Pedersen claims that Watson is wrong to prioritise divine action, Hays criticises 
Watson for underemphasising divine action in his interpretation of pi, stij  Cr i st ou/ as “faith in Christ” 
(“Paul’s Hermeneutics,” 129–30). 
38
 Engberg-Pedersen, “Response,” 109. 
39
 Martyn, Galatians, 97–105, 349. 
40
 Martyn, Galatians, 529–32; cf. idem, Theological Issues, 251–66. 
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remains on God’s acts of deliverance through his Son and in the Spirit. Paul’s gospel 
prioritises divine action.41 
In Engberg-Pedersen’s view, the emphasis placed on divine action by Martyn and 
Watson fundamentally misconstrues Paul because it introduces a mode of thinking that 
has its origins in post-ancient debates. He writes, “[T]he idea of a clear and radical 
contrast between a way to salvation that is ‘unconditional’, in the sense that it is 
exclusively an expression of divine agency, and a way that is ‘conditional’ in the sense 
that it also involves human agency” is a contrast that “has no footing at all in the ancient 
texts themselves.”42 The proposed distinction that Watson, Martyn, and others identify is 
simply the creation of modern minds. “There just is not such a distinction to be found 
anywhere, neither phenomenologically nor in the ancient texts themselves. It is a later, 
distinctly theological construct, made in order to contrast the one true ‘faith’ from all 
other types of (ir)religion, which are so many forms of humanly based idolatry.”43 Here 
the creation of the distinction is given a polemical thrust since the contrast arose as an 
attempt in modern times to defend “the one true ‘faith’” (presumably he means 
Christianity) from all pretenders. As he contends in another essay, “It is possible, 
therefore, that the question of specifically divine and human agency understood in this 
theological sense is a fundamentally post-ancient one. Perhaps the distinction will turn 
out not to have any real grip in an ancient analysis of action but rather to have served as a 
weapon in a more recent battle between ‘religion’ and ‘humanism’, Christianity and 
philosophy.”44 The very question of divine and human agency has been ruled beyond the 
pale by Engberg-Pedersen because it belongs to a different time and a different debate. 
Thus, not only is it not found in Paul’s letters because he is concerned with ethnic issues 
(as the New Perspective has demonstrated), but one should not even expect it to be there 
because he simply could not have thought about it (since no one in the ancient world did). 
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 Martyn, Galatians, 271. 
42
 Engberg-Pedersen, “Lutheran Paul?” 452. 
43
 Engberg-Pedersen, “Lutheran Paul?” 456. 
44
 Engberg-Pedersen, “Self-sufficiency and Power,” 116; cf. 127. 
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This final quote comes from Engberg-Pedersen’s contribution to the volume Divine 
and Human Agency in Paul and His Cultural Environment edited by Barclay and 
Gathercole. This claim sits awkwardly in a volume devoted to the very subject of divine 
and human agency in the ancient world. While recognising the difficulty of speaking 
about this subject, the essayists in this volume are generally quite comfortable exploring 
how various sources explained the interaction between God and humanity. No thought is 
given to the possibility that the very issue, especially in this either/or format, is invalid. 
They find in the Jewish texts a variety of attempts to explain the relationship between 
divine and human actions. Engberg-Pedersen’s claim, therefore, sits uneasily in a volume 
that finds the issue in the ancient texts.45 It presses the question of whether the entire 
project was misguided from the outset. 
Engberg-Pedersen’s claims appear to be significant challenges to those 
interpretations that have sought to find in Paul’s letters contrasting salvific patterns based 
on either divine initiative or human obedience. Nevertheless, the assumption that the New 
Perspective interpretation is right must be tested against the sources themselves rather 
than assumed. Here Josephus’ description of the Jewish schools is very informative. 
Josephus’ texts indicate that the claim that Judaism maintained that salvation was always 
by grace (divine action) not obedience (human action) is not entirely accurate. Also, the 
assertion that no one discussed the issue of divine and human agency is contradicted by 
Josephus. 
2. The Jewish Schools, Human Action, and Fate 
Josephus often mentions men who belong to the leading Jewish groups of the Second 
Temple Period, but only on three occasions does he describe the theological positions of 
the groups (J.W. 2.119–166; Ant. 13.171–173; 18.11–25). While in two of the accounts he 
lists several differences between the three groups, the only issue that appears in all three 
                                                 
45
 Indeed, his discussion of Epictetus and Paul presumes that ancient thinkers did discuss and attempt 
to work out how divine and human agency related. He never relates this to his claim that the topic is a 
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accounts is the relationship between fate and human freedom, the issue of divine and 
human agency. Although Josephus considered his description in War 2.119–166 to be the 
definitive statement (cf. Ant. 13.173; 18.11), it is more useful for our purposes to begin 
with Antiquities 13.171–173. 
Although following the narrative of 1 Maccabees in this section of Antiquities, 
Josephus interjects this comment about the Jewish schools:46 
Now at this time were three schools among the Jews, which thought differently about 
human actions [p e ri . t w/n  a vnqrwp i ,nwn p ra gm a,t wn d i af o,rwj]; the first of these were 
called Pharisees, the second Sadducees, and the third Essenes. The Pharisees, for 
their part, say that certain events, but not all, are the work of fate [e i `m a rm e,nh j]; with 
others it depends on ourselves [t i na. d V evf V e a` ut oi/j  u`p a,rce i n] whether they shall take 
place or not. The sect of the Essenes, however, declares fate the mistress of all things 
[pa ,nt wn t h.n e i `m a rme,nh n  kuri ,a n] and says that nothing befalls men unless it be in 
accordance with her decree. But the Sadducees do away with fate, believing that it is 
nothing and that human actions are not achieved in accordance with her decree, but 
that all things lie within our power [a [p a nt a  d e. e vf V h `m i/n a uvt o i/j  ke i/sqa i], so that we 
ourselves are responsible for our well-being, while we suffer misfortune through our 
own thoughtlessness [w`j  ka i. t w/n a vga qw/n a i vt i,o uj  h `m a/j  gi no m e,no uj  ka i. t a. ce i ,rw 
p a ra. t h.n h `m e t e,ra n a vb o ul i,a n l a m ba,no nt a j]. (Ant. 13.171–73 [Marcus, LCL]) 
The main topic of this comment is how the Jewish schools (a i `re,se i j) understand the issue 
of “human actions,” and particularly how each understands the relationship between 
human actions and divine sovereignty (“fate”). Although aware of other differences 
between the schools, Josephus here distinguishes them based solely on their views of fate 
and responsibility. Boccaccini rightly comments, “[I]t is important to see how the major 
ancient historian of Jewish thought took exactly the problem of the relationship between 
human and divine agency as the criterion for identifying the Jewish ‘schools of thought’ 
of his time, more than any halakhic controversy. The emphasis on theological and 
philosophical issues is not (only) a modern obsession of Christian scholars.”47 
Josephus’ language is drawn from philosophical debates, and his presentation of the 
Jewish schools mirrors other summary statements about different views taken by the 
Greek philosophical schools.48 In general, he has portrayed the Jewish schools in line 
with the major Greek schools, which gives his original readers an easy point of 
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 The reason Josephus puts this passage here is debated. See Sievers who argues that the passage was 
introduced secondarily into the text (“Josephus, First Maccabees, Sparta, The Three Haireseis”). 
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 Boccaccini, “Inner-Jewish Debate,” 15. Cf. Moore, Judaism, 1:456. 
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comparison.49 For the purposes here, the complex issues created by Josephus’ 
accommodation to his readers do not need to be resolved.50 One should note, though, that 
Josephus assumes his readers will be familiar with the philosophical debates and the 
manner in which one can briefly relay those positions. One need not be a philosopher to 
have an interest in this subject. 
Josephus plots the three schools along a single line. The Essenes and Sadducees 
correspond to the extremes, with the Pharisees representing something of a compromise. 
The Essenes, according to Josephus, attribute everything to fate. They view God’s 
sovereignty as absolute and uncompromising. The Essenes on this view eliminate the 
human agent entirely by making him or her a passive character acted upon by fate but 
never acting with or against it. The position is theological determinism in its fullest 
expression. The Sadducees, on the other end, deny the reality of fate and attribute every 
action to the human agent alone. They do not deny the existence of God—such a notion 
would make little sense in an ancient Jewish (or Greco-Roman) context (cf. J.W. 2.165 
[see below]). They reject rather the notion that God is the ultimate cause behind what a 
human does. The prospect of blessing belongs to those who do good, while misfortune is 
the outcome for those who are careless. Apparently, they deny fate because they wish to 
maintain human accountability. The Sadducean view comes close to human autonomy. 
The Pharisees hold the middle ground between these two extremes. They deny neither 
human nor divine agency, and neither do they allow one more control. In their view, 
according to Josephus, they attribute some actions to fate, but others to humans. Despite 
recognising both agents, they do not fall outside of Josephus’ single trajectory. They do 
not view God and humans working together. Instead, they limit each to certain tasks. God 
does this; humans do that. 
                                                 
49
 See Winston, Wisdom of Solomon, 46–58, for a survey of Jewish and Greco-Roman perspectives on 
freedom and determinism. 
50
 These issues include his use of ei` ma r me, nh (is it being used in a philosophical or popular sense? how 
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In this account of the Jewish schools, Josephus has selected only one issue by which 
to introduce them: the relationship between fate and human freedom. He presents the 
schools similarly to the Hellenistic philosophical schools of which his readers would 
probably have been aware. By plotting the schools along a single line, Josephus depicts 
the divine-human relationship in antithetical terms. The two agents do not cooperate, but 
when one acts the other does not. This antithetical framework appears in the other two 
school passages also, although Josephus does hint at the possibility that there are other 
frameworks in which to relate the two agents. 
 The school passage in War 2.119–166 is the longest because of Josephus’ lengthy 
description of the Essenes (§§119–161). When he finally comes to the Pharisees and 
Sadducees (§§162–166), he very quickly lays out the differences between them regarding 
the issues of fate, immortality of the soul, and their mannerisms toward “members” and 
outsiders. Due to this last comment, the Pharisees are presented in a good light, although 
they are still overshadowed by the glowing review of the Essenes. This alerts the 
interpreter to be aware that Josephus has a rhetorical purpose in view as he writes. He is 
not striving for historical objectivism, although he is describing the schools’ views in a 
manner that he considers accurate. 
He writes: 
Of the two-first named schools, the Pharisees, who are considered the most accurate 
interpreters of the laws, and hold the position of the leading sect, attribute everything 
to Fate and to God [e i `m a rm e,nh | t e  ka i. qe w/| p ro sa ,p to usi  p a,nt a]; they hold that to act 
rightly or otherwise rests, indeed, for the most part with men, but that in each action 
Fate co-operates [ka i . t o. m e.n p ra ,t te i n ta. d i ,ka ia  ka i. m h . ka t a. t o. p l ei /st o n e vp i. t o i/j  
a vnqrw,p o i j  ke i/sqa i  b o h qei /n d e. e ivj  e [ka st o n ka i. t h.n e i `m a rm e,nh n]. . . . The Sadducees, 
the second of the orders, do away with Fate altogether [t h.n m e .n e i`m a rm e,nh n 
p a nt a,p a si n avna i ro u/si n], and remove God beyond, not merely the commission, but 
the very sight, of evil. They maintain that man has the free choice of good or evil, 
and that it rests with each man’s will whether he follows the one or the other [f a si.n 
d V e vp V avnqrw,p wn e vkl o gh /| t o, t e  ka l o.n ka i. t o . ka ko .n p ro ke i/sqa i  ka i. ka t a. gnw,m h n 
e `ka ,st o u to u,t wn e`ka t e,rw|  p ro si e,na i]. (J.W. 2.162–165 [Thackeray, LCL]) 
Josephus uses some of the same language here that he uses also in Antiquities 13.171–
173. He places the issue of fate at the beginning of his account thereby bringing the focus 
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of the reader onto this topic.51 He had not mentioned the Essene position on fate in his 
review of them, which further highlights the importance of this topic for his contrast 
between the Pharisees and Sadducees. 
Concerning the Pharisees, Josephus explains that they hold both fate and human 
freedom. On the one hand, the Pharisees are comfortable ascribing to God and fate an 
absolute sovereignty. “Everything” (p a ,nt a) has its origin in God and fate. On the other, 
they maintain that humans are ultimately responsible for their deeds. Humans possess 
within themselves the capacity to choose between good and evil. The Sadducees represent 
the contrasting position. They not only claim that God neither sees nor does any evil, they 
also cast out the very idea of fate.52 
The account of the Sadducean position here is virtually identical to the one in 
Antiquities 13.173. Josephus makes clear that they approach “fate” and God differently. 
They deny the existence of the former, while only limiting the purview of the latter. By 
rejecting fate, “they deny the ‘executive’ aspect of God’s nature, his involvement in the 
world.”53 This distinction between fate and God confirms the assumption made in the 
interpretation of Antiquities 13.173 that the Sadducees are only rejecting the concept of 
fate not God himself. Their disavowal of fate leaves ethical behaviour solely in the hands 
of humans. Again, Josephus presents their view in antithetical terms, and it is a form of 
human autonomy. 
The description of the Pharisees, though, contains more complexity. In Antiquities 
13.172–173, the Pharisees hold the middle position between the other two schools.54 In 
War 2.162–165, Josephus only works with two schools so he presents the Pharisees as the 
opposite perspective of the Sadducees. Whereas in Antiquities 13.172 only some things 
                                                 
51
 The two participles dok ou/ nt ej and a vpa ,gont ej, according to Mason, “are strictly preliminary to the 
main issue in 2:162ff., which now comes clearly into view, namely: the Pharisee’s position on  ei` ma r me, nh 
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 Baumbach draws a false distinction between “the question of predestination and free will” and “a 
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(t i na. ka i . o uv p a,nt a) are attributed to fate and some (t i na ,) to human action, in War 2.162 
everything (p a ,nt a) originates from fate. The change in the Pharisaic view is due to 
rhetorical pressures. Josephus needs the Pharisees to contrast the Sadducees in War 
2.162–163, and in Antiquities 13.172–173, that role can be filled by the Essenes. Based 
on this alteration in the accounts, Mason contends that it “shows how little he wishes to 
be seen as the pedantic sort of philosopher. Broad strokes, changeable as needed for 
presentational reasons, suffice.”55 
This apparent change, however, relies too heavily on single words and downplays the 
consistency that does appear in both texts. Mason himself rightly notes that Josephus’ 
language in both passages is vague and imprecise,56 and this should caution the interpreter 
against overemphasising the exact language used. In fact, “everything” (p a ,nt a) in War 
2.162 is immediately modified by the point that the Pharisees think the act of doing good 
or evil arises from the human agent. By overplaying the potential difference between “all” 
and “some,” Mason has actually missed the one new point that may affect substantially 
how one defines the Pharisaic position. The new point is that fate “cooperates” (b o h qe i /n) 
with the human in what he or she does. This may mean that the Pharisees viewed fate as 
the original cause of everything that a human does. Unfortunately, Josephus has not 
developed this idea here or anywhere else, but at the least it suggests that divine and 
human agency are not viewed by the Pharisees, according to Josephus, as always in 
opposition. The two agents can work together toward the same goal. If this is something 
of what Josephus intended, then it also indicates that Josephus can work with different 
models of the divine-human relationship. As discussed below, the oppositional model, 
which is what Josephus presented in Antiquities 13.171–173, is not the sole method by 
which to explain the interaction between God and humans. Josephus’ more precise, 
although not extremely helpful statement about the Pharisees in War 2.162–163, 
introduces another possible way to relate the two agents. 
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In summary, according to War 2.162–165 a fundamental dividing issue between the 
philosophical schools (cf. §§119; 166) is their respective understandings of the interaction 
between fate and humanity. The Pharisees are the polar opposites of the Sadducees not 
because they ascribe “everything” to fate and the Sadducees ascribe nothing, but because 
the former believe in fate and the latter deny it. The issue that divides these two schools is 
whether the divine agent acts at all. The positions ascribed to the two schools in both 
Antiquities 13.171–173 and War 2.162–165 are basically the same, although Josephus has 
opened up the possibility that the oppositional perspective taken in Antiquities 13.171–
173 is not the only model of which he is aware. In both passages, though, the Pharisees 
find room for both fate and human volition, but the Sadducees have space only for the 
human. 
It is clear from these two passages that Josephus considered the issue of divine and 
human agency to be a clear dividing line between the three leading Jewish philosophical 
schools. In the third school passage (Ant. 18.11–25), Josephus states the position taken by 
the Pharisees, hints at the view of the Essenes, and ignores the Sadducean 
understanding.57 The text of this school passage is difficult and many textual variants 
have been introduced.58 The precise meaning does not need to be resolved, since the 
overall idea can be determined and it has much in common with the description of the 
Pharisees in War 2.162–163. 
Josephus does not attempt to place the schools on a single line as he had done in 
Antiquities 13.171–173, and no direct comparison between the schools on the issue of 
divine and human agency is intended. The Pharisees, Josephus records, attribute 
everything to fate, while at the same time not taking away human volition. This 
relationship between fate and ability is traced back to God himself who saw fit that the 
two should cooperate in the doing of virtue or vice (Ant. 18.13). The statement does not 
add much more to one’s understanding than the account in War 2.162–163. This 
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statement in Antiquities 18.13 may be an attempt to fill out more precisely how the 
Pharisees, in Josephus’ understanding of them, came to the conclusion that “in each 
action Fate cooperates (b o h qe i/n),” but any clarification has not been attained. Regarding 
the Essenes, Josephus remarks that they ascribe all things to God (§18). If this statement 
is intended as a reference to their view of fate and divine sovereignty, then it is no 
different from what is related about the Essenes in Antiquities 13.172. 
In conclusion to this discussion of Josephus’ portrayal of the Jewish schools, the 
following points should be noted. First, these passages reveal that the issue of divine and 
human agency was being discussed in the ancient world. The topic, even in the 
antithetical framework, is not a modern issue introduced solely to justify one faith 
position over others. Moreover, it is not simply an issue hidden away from the public and 
dealt with only in philosophical debates. Josephus assumes that his readers, who were 
probably not all trained philosophers, will be familiar with the topic and that they will 
wonder how the Jewish schools view the subject. Additionally, Josephus reveals that he 
himself took a position on the matter (Ant. 16.398). All this indicates that the topic was 
important even in the ancient world. 
Second, unless one regards the school passages as fictitious, they reveal a scope of 
opinions about divine and human agency among ancient Jews.59 The Judaism with which 
Josephus was familiar was not monolithic in its view on this subject. To be certain, the 
groups did unite around certain concepts, such as the temple and the authority of the 
Mosaic Torah. Nevertheless, the agreement that these items were foundational to Jewish 
identity does not mean that each group held the same opinion about them. What made one 
Jewish in the Second Temple Period was not that they held a certain “orthodox” or 
“common” view about the Torah, the Temple, or Israel, but that they believed these items 
were fundamental to their identity.60 Josephus witnesses to this diversity, and he does so 
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regarding the topic of divine and human agency. Not everyone viewed halakhic the same, 
and we should not expect everyone to view the divine-human relationship the same. 
Finally, Josephus has constructed the school passages and inserted them into his 
narratives at a certain point to serve his rhetorical goals. In both War 2.119–66 and 
Antiquities 18.11–25, he sets forth the schools of the Essenes, Pharisees, and Sadducees 
as alternatives to the “fourth philosophy,” which is credited with being the cause of the 
revolution against the Romans.61 These schools are portrayed as “ancient” (Ant. 18.11). 
The role of the account in Antiquities 13.171–173 is not entirely clear. Taking note of 
Josephus’ own rhetorical aims in constructing and inserting these passages does not mean 
that he has simply concocted the descriptions. Rather, it makes the reader aware that 
Josephus may not have related the intricate details of any group’s view. Josephus has 
adopted in each case standard methods of relating philosophical discussion. This method 
is given to sharp contrasts in order to help the reader see clearly the differences between 
the schools. Almost inevitably, the reproduction of the schools’ views will be given to 
simplicity and reductionism, along with the fact that the author formulates the schools’ 
views in his own way. The possibility must be kept open that the views taken are more 
refined than Josephus indicates. 
A word about terminology is necessary at this point. Engberg-Pedersen’s objection 
that the issue of divine-human agency is a modern one arises in part from how he 
construes the issue. He portrays the issue solely as an either/or dichotomy: to speak of one 
agent necessitates that the other reside into the background. This formulation can be seen 
at work in several theological debates throughout the centuries.62 Engberg-Pedersen is 
right to react against this formulation, but he does not offer any other models in which to 
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 See Weissenberger, “Die jüdischen ,Philosophenschulen‘ bei Josephus,” for the differences between 
J.W. 2.117–66 and Ant. 18.1–25. 
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 For example, the debate between Erasmus and Luther over the freedom of the will operates with this 
oppositional framework. More recently Open Theism begins from the assumption that humans possess free 
will and this necessitates that God cannot know the future. If he did, then there would be no free will. See 
Pinnock et al., Openness of God. 
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relate divine and human action. Fortunately, Barclay fills this gap when he articulates 
three different frameworks in which to understand the relationship.63 
1) Competitive. The divine and human agents are individual actors, and their actions 
are mutually exclusive. The identity of the human agent is attained at the expense 
of the divine. Divine sovereignty negates any human action, rendering the human 
a puppet. Even when the divine and human seek to accomplish the same task, their 
actions are independent of one another.64 “Divine sovereignty and human freedom 
are thus mutually exclusive; human freedom must be understood as freedom from 
God” (6). This pattern can be represented by a straight line with God at one end 
and the human at the other. The more emphasis one places on God’s actions, the 
further one moves from the human and vice versa. 
2) Kinship. Rather than being contrastive, divine and human agency are bound up 
together in this model. The human agent participates in divine action because 
humanity operates within the same sphere as God as an extension of God. While 
some differences between the two agents can be made, when observing them 
acting no distinctions can be drawn. “[H]uman beings participate in the nature of 
God, and might even be described as ‘fragments’ of God: what makes them most 
effective as human agents is what they share with God” (7). This model is similar 
to pantheism. 
3) Non-contrastive transcendence. Here both divine sovereignty and human freedom 
are affirmed but not as contrastive principles nor at the expense of each agent’s 
own identity. Divine sovereignty distinguishes God from humans and indicates 
that God operates outside the realm of the human agent. Humans are real agents 
who act from their own freedom. Yet, human agency is grounded in divine 
sovereignty rather than constrained by it. “The two agencies thus stand in direct, 
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 Barclay, “Introduction,” 6–7. Parenthetical references in the following are to Barclay, 
“Introduction.” 
64
 Barclay writes, “Even where God is regarded as the originator of the causal chain, the human 
respondents act from their own self-initiated wills, since the integrity of that will can be maintained only if 
it is in some respects or at some points independent of the direct creative will of God” (“Introduction,” 6). 
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and not inverse proportion: the more the human agent is operative, the more (not 
the less) may be attributed to God” (7). 
These three models provide a way forward in the discussion that avoids both the 
claim that no one in the ancient world was discussing divine and human agency as well as 
the modern tendency toward playing divine and human agency off against one another. 
The models should remain viable possibilities for each text of the ancient world, 
including the possibility that an author conceives of the divine-human relationship in 
contrastive terms. At the same time, one should not force an author into any of these 
models. Some authors introduce other agents, such as Belial or the power of Sin, 
alongside the divine and human, and this third group of agents will invariably change the 
relationship between the divine and human agents. Moreover, it is possible that an author 
works with one model at a particular point and for some reason switches to another model 
at a different point. 
A philosophical issue should also be briefly noted. The axiom that “ought” implies 
“can” serves as the basis for much of current thought about human ability. It is assumed 
true in the study, for example, of VanLandingham.65 Exhortations made by Paul or other 
authors are addressed to agents who possess the moral capacity to keep the 
commandments. Anything less cheapens human agency. While such an assumption 
contributes to the current obsession with human autonomy, it was not universally held to 
be true in the ancient world.66 The point here is only to suggest that one must keep open 
the possibility that an author does not work from the same starting points that 
contemporary ethical theory does. 
Josephus’ description of the Jewish schools as dividing over the issue of divine and 
human agency indicates that it was a prevailing topic of concern for that time. When 
studying the Jewish sources of the Second Temple period, therefore, one should expect to 
find something about divine and human agency. Obviously not every text will deal with 
the subject, but neither should one be quick to explain away potential statements on the 
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 VanLandingham, Judgment and Justification, 113–14. 
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 It will be argued below that Ben Sira does hold this axiom, but the Hodayot and Paul reject it. 
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topic. Additionally, diversity should be allowed. Josephus himself indicates that Judaism 
was not monolithic. There is no reason to force the texts to hold the same position, and 
reductionism must be avoided. If two Jewish texts contradict each other, then that should 
be allowed. If the Josephus material is taken seriously, then the possibility is opened that 
scholars can investigate the topic of divine and human agency in the ancient Jewish (and 
Greco-Roman) texts. This is what this thesis proposes to do. 
3. The Argument of This Study 
Josephus’ spectrum will be mirrored in the contrasting positions set forth in Sirach 
and the Hodayot. The argument in this study is not that Josephus was historically accurate 
(or inaccurate) in his statements about the three schools.67 Ben Sira has often been 
considered as a forerunner to the Sadducees, and the Hodayot may descend from the 
Essenes if one accepts the traditional view that the Dead Sea Scrolls were the collection 
of the Essenes or a splinter group of the Essenes. Neither theory is necessary for the 
argument here. What is observed by comparing Ben Sira and the Hodayot is that 
Josephus’ claim that Jewish groups held different views of the divine-human relationship 
is valid. 
Ben Sira represents Josephus’ Sadducean position which stresses the human agent. 
The issue of divine and human agency is brought out by several debate passages. In these 
passages, Ben Sira engages views that demote or eliminate the human agent by either 
claiming that God has determined whether a human obeys or disobeys or denying the 
judgment and thereby making obedience irrelevant. Ben Sira seeks throughout his 
teaching to establish the human agent as a valid member within the divine-human 
relationship. Even more than that, he argues for the primacy of the human agent. 
Ben Sira constructs his understanding of the divine-human relationship on the two-
ways model, which he finds in Deuteronomy 30.15–20. This tradition, as developed by 
Ben Sira, indicates that law observance brings life and that humans have the moral 
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 See Maier, freir Wille, for a defence of Josephus based on Ben Sira (the Sadducean position), the 
Psalms of Solomon (the Pharisaical position), and 1QS 3–4 (the Essene view). 
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capacity to obey. This pattern centres on the human agent. The divine agent is not 
eliminated, but he is assigned a particular place. For Ben Sira the divine agent appears at 
creation when he empowers the human to obey and at the time of judgment, which is 
when he acknowledges the human’s actions and gives either “life” or “death.” According 
to the two-ways tradition as Ben Sira develops it, the divine and human agents operate 
independently and at very specific points. Neither agent acts at the same time. The human 
does not need God’s assistance to be obedient to the law. Law observance is 
straightforward because the human knows the difference between good and evil. With 
this well structured scheme, Ben Sira confronts teachings that he considers deceptive and 
fundamentally wrong because they emphasise the divine agent and misunderstand the 
crucial role played by the human agent. 
In sharp contrast to this perspective, the Hodayot stresses the role played by the 
divine agent. The Hodayot comes very close to Josephus’ Essenes who attributed all 
things to God or fate. It constantly highlights the individual’s sinfulness and frailty, and 
what emerges from the overwhelmingly depressive anthropology is a critique of the 
human as a creature. This pessimistic anthropology is equally matched by statements 
about the marvellous grace and mercy of God. These statements highlight the act of 
predestination, the giving of knowledge, and the purification of the sinner. Each is 
attributed to God and especially to his Spirit as the means through which God resolves the 
human’s problem. Salvation itself rests solely in the hands of God. 
Yet the human agent is not merely the passive receiver of these great deeds. The 
hymnist portrays the divine acts as empowering. What emerges from the Hodayot is not a 
denial of human agency, but a restored human agent empowered and continuously 
sustained by a gracious divine agent. Through the spirit of knowledge, the human is 
enabled to observe God’s commandments and avoid sin because he possesses the spirit of 
holiness. Obedience becomes a possibility and indeed a reality precisely because God is 
always at work in the human. 
The stress placed on the divine agent in the Hodayot, therefore, contrasts sharply 
with Ben Sira’s emphasis on the human agent. The two positions stand opposed to one 
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another. Taking account of this diversity that Josephus claimed existed and the Hodayot 
and Ben Sira reveal, the possibility becomes stronger that Paul can fit within the Jewish 
diversity. Josephus’ statements also suggest that one should expect Paul to have an 
opinion on the matter. It would be rather odd indeed for Paul, the former Pharisee (Phil 
3.5), to ignore completely the topic. A starting point for an analysis of Paul’s view could 
be the antithesis between justification by p i ,st i j  Cri st o u/ or works of the law, but as will 
be shown the debate over this phrase is at a stalemate. A way forward, and one that 
allows for more than a superficial summary of Pauline texts and ideas, is through a 
careful study of a single text. Suitable for this purpose is Romans 7.7–8.13. Here Paul 
engages Jewish positions on the possibility for and necessity of obedience. 
In Romans 7.7–25, it will be argued, Paul portrays the e vgw, as the human agent of the 
two-ways tradition. The law, which is unto life, is given to the human who thinks that he 
possesses the moral capacity to obey. Against this view, Paul introduces another agent—
the power of Sin—who enslaves the human and causes him or her to produce evil, the 
very thing he or she tried to avoid. Having exposed what Paul thought to be the serious 
flaw in the two-ways pattern, he turns in Romans 8.1–13 to describe how obedience 
becomes a possibility. God delivers the human from Sin’s grasp through the death of his 
own Son, and he imparts his Spirit as the empowering agent. Paul’s own approach 
resembles the Hodayot. Both prioritise divine action and set forth the Spirit as the means 
through which humans obey. The Spirit enables obedience, which brings about, according 
to Paul, the fulfilment of the righteous requirement of the law. 
Pauline scholarship for the last three decades has been driven by Sanders’ portrayal 
of the role of grace and obedience in Second Temple Judaism and the implications of this 
for Paul’s interaction with Jewish traditions. The last decade has seen a serious attempt to 
reconsider the grounds of Sanders’ argument about covenant, grace, and obedience in 
Judaism.68 This study participates in this discussion. Ben Sira and the Hodayot played 
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crucial roles in Sanders’ argument, but no full-length study of either text has been made 
since Sanders’ study. While each has been called on at various points, this has been in the 
service of asking other questions, such as the meaning of judgment by works or the 
relationship between faith and obedience. This study fills that gap by asking the broader 
and more fundamental question about how each author understands the issue of divine 
and human agency. This study also attempts to find a place for Paul within the Jewish 
spectrum. Paul’s understanding is not radically opposed to all forms of Judaism. Rather, it 
will be made clear that Paul is firmly at home in a Jewish debate. He engages with his 
fellow Jews, subjecting every idea to his understanding of God’s act in Christ. 
This study will begin with Ben Sira before turning to the Hodayot. With the spectrum 
firmly established, Paul’s view as it emerges from Romans 7–8 will be set into this 
spectrum.
27 
CHAPTER 1 
Obedience and the Law of Life in Sirach 
The Sadducean position according to Josephus attributed everything to the human 
agent, and this position is found in Sirach. Written around the beginning of the second 
century BCE, Ben Sira seeks to amalgamate the wisdom and Torah traditions. He 
presents himself as a sage and an interpreter of Israel’s sacred writings. As a sage, his 
primary interest lies in teaching others how to live in a manner that honours God. The 
twin themes that hold his teaching together are, therefore, fear the Lord and obey the 
commandments. 
This chapter explores how Ben Sira develops his understanding of the divine-human 
relationship throughout his work. The problem of divine and human agency is forced on 
him by some alternative theologies that deny any role to the human agent. Against these 
views, Ben Sira adopts the two-ways tradition as the basic paradigm for the interaction 
between the divine and human agents. This scheme centres on the human agent, who 
possesses the moral capacity to obey the commandments. These commandments are 
found in the Mosaic Torah, which was given by God as the means to life. The divine 
agent’s role is limited particularly to the act of judgment, which is a time when God gives 
“life” or “death” based on one’s obedience or disobedience. Even in this act, the focus of 
Ben Sira’s thought remains on the human agent.      
1. Identifying the Alternative Theologies 
In a series of passages built around an Ancient Near Eastern debate formula, Ben Sira 
encapsulates the opinions of others. In this debate formula, authors use direct speech to 
introduce the views they oppose.1 The formula, as Ben Sira has it, is “relatively fixed” 
according to Crenshaw: “(1) the prohibition-formula ’al-tō’mar, (2) the direct quotation, 
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 As other Ancient Near Eastern examples, Crenshaw cites Ani (ANET, 420), Amen-em-opet (ANET, 
413), and ‘Onchsheshonqy (“Problem of Theodicy,” 48–49). 
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and (3) the refutation introduced by kî.”2 The expression is infrequent in previous Israelite 
wisdom texts (Prov 20.22; 24.29; Qoh 7.10, 13).3 By contrast, according to Crenshaw, 
Ben Sira employs the formula nine times.4 
Do not depend on your wealth, 
 And do not say, “It is in my power.”5 
Do not walk after your heart and eyes 
 To go after treasures of evil. 
Do not say, “Who can comprehend my power?” 
 For YHWH seeks the persecuted. 
Do not say, “I have sinned and what has happened to me: nothing at all.” 
 For God himself is slow to anger.6 
They will not be forgiven; 
 Do not be so confident to add sin upon sin. 
And you say, “His mercy is great. 
 He will forgive the multitude of my sins.” 
 For mercy and wrath are from him 
 Upon sinners rests his wrath. (5.1–6) 
Do not say, “What is my need, 
 And what good is now from this for me?” 
Do not say, “I am sufficient. 
 And what evil will now come from this?” 
For it is easy before the Lord in the day of death 
 To repay man according to his ways. (11.23–24, 26 [Greek])7 
Do not say, “From God (comes) my sin.” 
 For that which he hates, he does not do. 
Do not say, “He caused me to stumble.” 
 For he has no need of violent men. (15.11, 12) 
Do not say, “I am hidden from the Lord. 
 And in the high place, who will remember me? 
Among all the people, I am not known; 
 And what is my soul in the totality of the spirits of the sons of Adam?” (16.17) 
                                                 
2
 “Problem of Theodicy,” 51. The corresponding Greek is mh .  ei;ph |j and ga ,r. 
3
 The reason Crenshaw includes Qoh 7.13 is unclear since the complete formula is provided in v.10. 
Crenshaw notes that Prov 20.22; 24.29 “both differ from the usual debate-formula in that they do not 
employ the particle kî” (“Problem of Theodicy,” 49n.5). 
4
 The phrase is identified with italics. The versification of Sirach is problematic. The numbering 
follows Ziegler’s Sapientia Iesu Filii Sirach, unless discussion is of the Hebrew text in which case the 
numbering follows Beentjes, Book of Ben Sira.  
5
 The Hebrew phrase is ydy lal Xy, which is an idiom that appears only twice in the OT, Gen 31.29 and 
Mic 2.1. The Greek reads a uvta ,r kh  mo i, ev st in (“I am sufficient”), which is the same phrase found in 11.24. 
These two texts (5.1–6; 11.23–24) are linked then in both wording and themes. 
6
 After this line the Hebrew adds, “Do not say, ‘YHWH is merciful, and all my sins will be wiped 
out.’” 
7
 The Hebrew of 11.21–22 is damaged: yyd rmat la yl bz[y ht[ hmw ycpx ytÎ.ÐX[ yk Î. . . . . . . .Ð rmat la 
yl[ yhy Î. . .Ða hÎ.Ða. 
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When supplemented with other statements using a modified form of the formula or direct 
speech found throughout Sirach (e.g. 7.9; 11.18–19; 23.16–17; 39.12–35), a coherent 
picture of these alternative views begins to emerge. 
In these passages, Ben Sira depicts alternative understandings of the activity of God 
in this world and the implications these theologies have for ethics. Ben Sira addresses two 
different views of God. The first view maintains that God is remote from the world and 
will neither judge humans for their sins nor reward them for obedience (5.1–8; 7.8–9; 
11.17–19; 16.17–22; 20.16; 23.17–21). The second view presents an overbearing God 
who determines every action, including sin, in the world (15.11–20). In each case, these 
rival understandings of God are used to avoid obeying the divine will as revealed in the 
Mosaic Law. For the first perspective, God’s distance means one can sin because he will 
not respond. The second outlook maintains that humans are not responsible for their 
moral failures because they do not control their own actions. 
The first theological position builds its ethics around its view of a distant God. Sirach 
16.17–22 develops at length the theology and ethics of this view. These people begin with 
the assumption that God pays no attention to them. They are lowly creatures, “hidden 
from God,” and insignificant in comparison to the multitude of other people (v.17). The 
speaker next draws out the implications of this logic for ethics.8 The people think that 
God does not concern himself with their actions, especially the sins committed in secret 
(vv.20–21).9 So long as they are not caught in their sin, they do not need to fear 
punishment. As a vivid picture of this logic, Ben Sira describes the adulterer who 
confidently relies on the darkness to shield his sinful act from others and God (23.18). 
They further reason that God is unaware of just acts (16.22). Obedience is pointless then 
because God does not know when one does good works.10 Their thinking is similar to that 
of the fool who thinks he never receives a reward for his good works (20.16). Even if God 
                                                 
8
 Verses 18–19 are a parenthetical comment made by Ben Sira (cf. Di Lella in Skehan/Di Lella, 
Wisdom of Ben Sira, 275; Gilbert, “God, Sin and Mercy,” 123–24; contra Argall, 1 Enoch and Sirach, 231). 
9
 This interpretation follows the Hebrew text. The Greek text, which picks up some hints from Ben 
Sira’s parenthetical comment, discusses the extent to which humans can know about God’s actions. 
10
 Skehan/Di Lella, Wisdom of Ben Sira,  275. 
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is made aware of these acts or their sins, though, they have no reason to fear because his 
“decree” (qx), his judgment of human action, lies somewhere in the distant future 
(16.22).11 Their thinking might even suggest that they doubt a judgment on human action 
by God. 
The opponents are clearly confident in their wealth. Twice Ben Sira describes them 
boastfully claiming, “I am sufficient” (5.1; 11.24 [Greek]). They have no needs and can 
gain nothing from obedience to God (11.23). Their wealth encourages them to presume 
nothing evil can happen to them (11.24; cf. 11.19 [Heb 17]). Relying on their wealth and 
power (5.1, 3), they boldly declare their sin and the lack of action on God’s part (v.4). 
Because of the inactivity of God, they see no reason to stop sinning. Even if God decides 
to act, these people are certain that he will forgive them. Their God is merciful and full of 
forgiveness. He will certainly overlook their sins (v.6). As extra protection, they rely on 
the multitude of their sacrifices (7.9). If God decided to judge, he would ignore their sins 
because their sacrifices will appease his anger. These people think that sacrifice will 
overcome their lack of obedience. The great mercy of God and their meagre obedience 
evidenced by sacrificing will account for their lack of righteousness.12 
The second theological position advocated a deterministic view of God’s actions in 
the world. The proponents of this position maintain that God actively directs the events of 
the world and of each human. In two similar statements, they blame God for their moral 
failures: “From God (comes) my sin,” and “He caused me to stumble” (15.11a, 12a). God 
controlled their actions and caused them to sin. They do not deny that their deeds are 
immoral, but they refuse to take responsibility for them.13 In fact, one cannot accuse them 
of disobedience, for ultimately the responsibility lies with God. They are not agents, but 
puppets on a string moved about as God wills. Because of this view of God, these people 
escape responsibility for their actions and need not fear punishment from God. 
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 Schnabel, Law and Wisdom, 36. 
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 Cf. Crenshaw’s summary: “In essence they argue that God’s boundless mercy bestows upon his 
devotees license to sin, that his blessings in material wealth give security, that his power robs man of the 
freedom to act decisively to avoid sinful conduct, and that his blindness makes evil profitable, especially 
when the perfidious deed can be concealed from human eyes as well” (“Problem of Theodicy,” 47). 
13
 Gilbert, “God, Sin and Mercy,” 119. 
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Although promoting different views of God, these two positions agree that obedience 
is unnecessary. They openly acknowledge that their actions are sinful, but they see no 
reason to change their current actions. Although God made wisdom available and he 
revealed his will in the Torah, these previous acts by God do not compel them to respond 
with obedience. Further, the prospect that God will reward or punish them does not 
motivate them to be obedient. Actually, they are certain that God will not reward or 
punish them. They find no benefit in obedience. 
Using these direct speech statements as guidelines, one can begin to see the 
theological tendencies against which Ben Sira set himself. Based on his analysis of the 
“do not say” statements, Crenshaw concludes that the underlying problem is “theodicy.”14 
The focus, then, is on the divine agent and his apparent failure to judge. Crenshaw writes, 
“Sirach enlists the debate-form to refute antagonists who used the delay in retribution as 
an excuse to multiply transgressions.”15 Based on the fact that God has not acted, these 
adversaries find little reason to think that God is concerned with their obedience, and 
since disobedience has proven profitable, they will pursue that route.  
Crenshaw is certainly correct that Ben Sira opposes any notion that humans should 
act disobediently because of God’s (apparent) lack of involvement in the affairs of 
humanity. However, it is doubtful that the issue addressed in these passages is the 
problem of theodicy. Theodicy, at least in its most common usage, is an attempt to defend 
God’s goodness and justice in spite of the prosperity of the wicked and the suffering of 
the righteous.16 The problem of theodicy is fundamentally a problem with God. While 
Ben Sira attacks the opponents’ understandings of God, he does this because their views 
result in a massive misunderstanding of the human. This is particularly clear in 15.11–20. 
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 Crenshaw, “Problem of Theodicy,” 51. 
15
 Crenshaw, “Problem of Theodicy,” 51. 
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 Crenshaw defines theodicy as “the attempt to defend divine justice in the face of aberrant 
phenomena that appear to indicate the deity’s indifference or hostility toward virtuous people” (ABD s.v. 
“Theodicy” [6:444]). Examples of “theodicy” include Ps 10 [LXX 9] and Habakkuk. Crenshaw uses the 
term “theodicy” too freely, however. For example, Eve’s response in the garden is theodicy (Gen 3.13), as 
well as Jonah’s questions about God’s justice when he offers forgiveness to Nineveh (4.1–11). Theodicy 
comes to apply to “the problem of evil” regardless of the connections with divine justice or the suffering of 
the righteous. To be useful, a more refined application of the term “theodicy” is required. 
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Beginning with the problem of God, Ben Sira turns to a defence of human freedom. This 
is certainly not the issue of theodicy.17 Crenshaw’s conclusion draws attention to the 
wrong agent, for the issue in the “do not say” passages is not how and when God will act, 
but that these other positions have eliminated the human agent. The human agent has 
become negotiable because there is no fear of judgment. They have declared obedience 
meaningless, and Ben Sira will not stand for this. Even in the “do not say” passages that 
describe the delay in retribution (5.1–8), the purpose is not to defend God’s patience but 
to challenge the conclusion that obedience is irrelevant in light of God’s patience and 
mercy. 
The issue in these passages is precisely the problem of divine and human agency. 
These alternative views use their understandings of God to eliminate the human agent, 
and Ben Sira seeks to establish the human agent. In order to accomplish this task, Ben 
Sira employs the two-ways paradigm. In this paradigm, as is explained below, law 
observance is the means to life and blessing. As Ben Sira develops this pattern, the human 
agent becomes the focal point of the divine-human relationship. 
2. The Establishment of the Human Agent 
In contrast to the alternative theological positions, Ben Sira seeks to establish the 
human as the crucial element within the discussion. He finds in the two-ways paradigm 
the teaching that human action is the means to divine blessing. According to this 
paradigm, which, for Jewish authors, is rooted in Deuteronomy 30.15–20, God sets before 
the human agent “life and death” as the two possible outcomes of law observance. The 
human possesses the moral capacity to obey, and he or she must choose which path to 
follow. Obedience brings covenantal blessing, while disobedience results in death. The 
two-ways scheme provides a well-structured pattern focused on the human agent. Each of 
the two agents, God and the human, act at the appropriate time and in a specific order.18  
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 Cf. Leisen, Full of Praise, 236n.127. 
18
 On the origins and use of this paradigm, see Nickelsburg, Resurrection, 144–65; Kraft, “Early 
Developments.” These discussions revolve primarily around later texts, and surprisingly little is said about 
Deuteronomy 30.15–20 or Sirach 15.14–17. 
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In Ben Sira’s work, this paradigm is most clearly laid out in 15.11–20.19 In this text, 
he directly engages the other theological positions (vv.11–12), and he states clearly in 
vv.14–20 his position, which is developed in other places throughout the book (cf. 
especially 16.17–17.24). 
God created (the) man from the beginning,20 and he gave him into the hand of his 
inclination [wrcy dyb whntyw; ka i. a vf h /ke n a uvt o .n e vn ce i ri. d i a bo ul i,o u a uvt o u/]. If you 
choose [#pxt ~a], you may keep the commandment, and you will understand to do 
his will.21 Poured out before you are fire and water: for whichever you choose [#pxt], 
stretch out your hand. Before a man are life and death, and whichever he chooses 
[#pxy] will be given to him. The wisdom of the Lord is in abundance. He is strong in 
power and sees all. The eyes of God see his works and he observes all of man’s 
actions. He does not command a man to sin nor cause men of falsehood to dream. 
(15.14–20) 
He describes the creation of the human agent through the lens of Deuteronomy 30.15–20 
in order to establish that the individual, not fate, is responsible for his or her destiny. 
“Life and death” are placed before the individual (v.17a), and he or she can choose which 
path to take (vv.15–17). God does not interfere with the human’s decision (v.14), but at 
some point in the future, he will judge the individual based on his or her deeds. In this 
passage, Ben Sira presents the classic Jewish argument for human freedom in the form of 
the two-ways tradition. 
Two key points should be noted about Ben Sira’s use of this paradigm. First, the law 
is directly connected with life, and the way to acquiring this life offered by the law is 
through obedience. In 15.11–20 law observance leads to “life.” Ben Sira takes the pair 
“life and death” (v.17) from Moses’ exhortation to Israel in Deuteronomy 30.15–20. 
Moses declares that he has set before the Israelites “life and death,” and if they so choose, 
they can live (vv.15, 19). Life and death represent two alternative outcomes for human 
existence, and they are defined in this-worldly terms. Life entails receiving the covenantal 
blessings of a long life and enjoyment within the Promised Land (vv.19–20; cf. 28.1–14). 
Death by contrast is physical death and exile (30.18; cf. 28.15–68). The means to either 
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 These verses have been significantly altered in the transmission process. See Liesen, Full of Praise, 
236–38, who argues that the expansions introduce an eschatological aspect. Reiterer contends for Hebrew A 
as original at points (“Immateriellen Ebenen der Schöpfung,” 111–16) 
20
 Hebrew A adds: “and he put him into the hand of the one who would snatch him.”  
21
 Hebrew A adds: “If you trust in him, you will even live.” Cf. the Greek: “and to act faithfully is a 
matter of choice [pi,s tin  po ih / sa i e uvdo ki,a j].” 
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destiny is determined solely by the human’s response to the commandments. Moses tells 
Israel that if they will “obey the commandments . . . then you will live, multiply, and 
YHWH your God will bless you in the land” (30.16). If they disobey, then they “will 
certainly perish” and will not live long in the land (vv.17–18). In this passage from 
Deuteronomy, which functions as a summary of the entire book, Moses clearly outlines 
two paths for Israel’s future, and these two paths are marked by how one responds to the 
law. Ben Sira picks up this two-way imagery and adopts it as his basic understanding of 
the divine-human relationship. When he lists the pairing of “life and death” in Sirach 
15.17, he is recalling Moses’ exhortation to the people, and he, like Moses, makes the 
human’s destiny dependent on law observance. 
The second key point of Ben Sira’s conception of the divine-human relationship is 
that humans have the moral capacity to observe the commandments. Foundational to the 
sapiential and legal traditions that Ben Sira follows is the assumption that a human can 
obey the commandments.22 The “ought” of God’s will implies a “can” on the human’s 
part. The human capacity to know the difference between good and evil (cf. 17.7) 
indicates for Ben Sira that humans have the ability to do good. In 15.14–17 he argues 
strongly for the individual’s freedom to determine his or her own destiny through 
obedience to the Torah. Against the view that God dictates what humans will do (vv.11–
12), Ben Sira claims that after creating the human agent God “has given him into the hand 
of his inclination” (wrcy dyb whytXyw) (v.14). The noun rcy first appears in the biblical 
narrative in the flood account (Gen 6.5; 8.21).23 There it has a negative connotation and 
refers to humanity’s preference for evil over the ways of God. Ben Sira transforms the 
meaning of this term, though, by removing it from the flood narrative and placing it 
within the context of creation.24 God gives the inclination, and therefore it cannot be 
predisposed toward evil. The inclination must be neutral otherwise he concedes to his 
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 The wisdom text 4Q418 126.1–10, however, stresses God’s sovereignty over human beings (see 
Harrington, “Wisdom at Qumran,” 149–51). 
23
 I am following here Levison, Portraits of Adam, 34–35. 
24
 He may have been motivated by the use of the verb rcy in Genesis 2.7, 8, 19. See Aitken, “Divine 
Will,” 289–90, for the connections with creation. 
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opponents that God is responsible for their moral shortcomings. The rcy is for Ben Sira “a 
neutral capacity which enables people to choose morally.”25 Within this debate context, 
this divinely imparted ability highlights “man’s autonomy and power of decision.”26 
Ben Sira also accentuates human ability through the verb #px. If one desires, he or 
she can keep the commandments (15.15) or select between “fire and water” (v.16) or “life 
and death” (v.17). The point of repeating this verb is to emphasise that God has created 
humans with the moral capacity to choose their own destiny.27 Verse 15 is significant 
because it clearly states that humans can observe the law. Verse 17 indicates that the 
human’s destiny is ultimately at stake.28 Whether the individual decides to obey or 
disobey the law determines whether he or she receives life or death. The failure to be 
obedient lies with the human who actively chooses to reject the commandments and the 
life offered by them. Nothing prevents the individual from observing the commandment 
except one’s own decision to disobey. 
Ben Sira also conveys his optimistic view of human agency by claiming that God 
does not interfere in the human’s autonomous decision. Ben Sira writes that God “has 
given (the) man into the hand of his inclination” (15.14). The idea is that God has set the 
human before the two paths—life and death—and the individual can determine for 
himself or herself from his or her own will because he or she possesses the necessary 
competence which path to take. God will not interfere. The human is autonomous. Martyn 
captures the idea well when he describes the actions taken by the divine and human 
agents as separate steps. God acts first by creating the human, and then he removes 
himself from the scene. The human act is a distinctly separate, independent step in the 
process. God’s action, Martyn argues, is limited to the initial, creative moment, and he 
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 Levison, Portraits of Adam, 35. 
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 Murphy, “Yēser in the Qumran Literature,” 337. 
27
 “Ben Sira employs the verb “to choose,” Heb[rew] h ps, three times in as many verses, thus 
emphasizing that human beings enjoy personal freedom in deciding whether or not to observe the Law (v 
15) and in choosing life or death (v 17)” (Skehan/Di Lella, Wisdom of Ben Sira, 272). 
28
 Ben Sira has no eschatological connotations, so “life” and “death” refer to this-worldly destinies. 
Life includes wealth, peace, long life, peaceful death, and honour after one’s death by the continual praise 
of one’s name. Death is the opposite and culminates in a violent death. The person is either forgotten or 
remembered as a fool. See Collins, “Root of Immortality.” 
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“neither interfere[s] in the human agent’s subsequent autonomous choice nor tak[es] 
measures to improve that agent’s formation.”29 God’s self-limiting action protects him 
from the charge that he is responsible for sin, and it also ensures that the human agent is 
responsible for his or her own decision. This divine limiting presents a unique situation in 
that the human stands alone before the two alternative paths. The decision for life or death 
ultimately belongs to the human. 
These two points arise directly from the two-ways pattern. An additional point for 
Ben Sira’s understanding of the divine-human relationship that is not clearly stated in 
15.11–20 is the idea that God will eventually judge humans according to their deeds. 
Although leaving the human to his or her own devices, God carefully observes all that 
each human does (vv.18–19). At the appropriate time, he re-enters the scene in order to 
reward or punish the individual. In this paradigm, God re-acts to what each individual 
does. Although judgment is not mentioned directly in 15.11–20, it is vitally important to 
Ben Sira. It is mentioned in almost all the other debate passages and appears throughout 
the work. 
These three aspects (life attained through law observance; human moral capacity; 
divine judgment) form Ben Sira’s view of the divine-human relationship. This 
relationship revolves around the human agent’s decision whether to obey or disobey. 
Although God begins the process by giving humans freedom and the covenant, these 
actions are intended to bring about human obedience. Similarly, divine judgment focuses 
on what the human has done. God’s actions are important not because of what they reveal 
about his nature, but because of how they affect human obedience. This chapter explores 
how Ben Sira develops these three aspects in order to establish the human agent as the 
central figure in the divine-human relationship. 
A. Life through Torah Observance 
Numerous statements can be found in Sirach which suggest a relationship between 
obedience and life, disobedience and death. In his exposition on honouring one’s parents, 
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 Martyn, “Epilogue,” 176. 
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he repeatedly claims that honour, glory, or long days will be the outcome of one’s 
obedience (3.1–16). The obedient person is assured of a peaceful death (2.3). Ben Sira 
instructs his students that if they will care for the orphan and widow then they “will be 
like a son of the Most High and he will love you more than your mother” (4.10). Those 
who remain steadfast will not be abandoned, and if someone trusts in God, he will give 
assistance (2.2–3, 6). The person who remains faithful will not lose his or her reward 
(v.8). Those who devote themselves to studying the Torah and acquiring wisdom will 
serve kings (8.8; 39.4), and future generations will remember their names and teachings 
(39.9–11; cf. 41.11–13). A prime example of this is the “Praise of the Fathers” (44–50). 
The representatives are not chosen at random; rather, Ben Sira mentions those who are 
worthy of remembrance because of their obedience to God’s will, particularly the Torah. 
For example, Enoch walked with God and avoided death (44.16; cf. Gen 5.24),30 and 
because he stood against the rebellious people, Caleb is given strength to capture a hill 
(Sir 46.7–10). Their names live on perpetually because of their obedience, and now they 
serve as motivation to Ben Sira’s students to be obedient. 
Wisdom’s blessings are acquired through discipline and testing (4.17–18). If a person 
goes astray, though, Wisdom rejects him or her and gives the person over to destruction 
(v.19). Obedience to the commandments is the alternative to corruption and death (28.6). 
Indeed, the sinner will suffer greatly (7.17; 9.11), and a violent death awaits him or her as 
the punishment of God (7.31). Those who commit adultery will be humiliated in public 
and punished for their sin (23.21–27).  
Ben Sira’s ultimate goal in writing is to instruct his students in how to acquire 
wisdom (24.34; 50.27–29; cf. Prologue). The way to wisdom, he maintains, is through 
obedience, particularly observance of the Torah. The first imperative of the book is to 
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 Skehan disputes the authenticity of the Enoch saying (Wisdom of Ben Sira, 499; cf. Mack, Wisdom 
and the Hebrew Epic, 199–200). The textual evidence is evenly split (ms B and Greek have it; Masada and 
Syriac do not), but Skehan’s argument that the statement should be excluded because Enoch became 
popular in Jewish traditions is weak. If the line was inserted by a supporter of Enoch, then surely this 
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scriptural account. Moreover, if Ben Sira is debating an “Enochic” group, as many scholars claim, then by 
mentioning Enoch first he claims Enoch as a supporter of his movement. 
  
38 
 
keep the commandments: “If you desire wisdom, keep the commandments, and the Lord 
will provide it to you” (1.26).31 This statement sets forth straightforwardly the 
fundamental role of obedience. The human must obey the law in order to attain wisdom, 
and the keeping of the law is observed by God who acknowledges the obedience by 
imparting wisdom. 
The precise relationship between obedience and blessing, however, is unclear from 
these statements. These statements need to be placed within a broader context in order to 
understand the relationship. It will be argued in this section that the divine-human 
relationship is modelled after the Creator-creation relationship. This relationship is based 
on God’s commands. God gives orders, and creation obeys. As part of this analysis, Ben 
Sira’s understanding of “covenant” will be addressed in response to Sanders’ argument 
that the establishment of the covenant was an act of grace. After establishing the link 
between Torah observance and blessing, the arguments that the divine-human relationship 
is built around “fear of God” or “faith” will be evaluated, as well as the claim that the 
possibility of atonement means that God’s mercy is the ultimate determining factor in the 
relationship. 
i. Wisdom and Torah in Sirach 
Before describing how Ben Sira related divine action to human action, it is necessary 
to clarify the role of the Torah in his thinking. Of the scriptures, Ben Sira’s writing style 
is closest to Proverbs, and most scholars situate him firmly within the wisdom tradition. 
Many scholars consider him to be influenced by Job and Qoheleth, perhaps even directly 
responding to the latter.32 Torah traditions have also greatly influenced Ben Sira’s 
thinking, and his attention to Israel’s history is considered by some scholars to be a new 
element in the wisdom tradition.33 The issue that needs to be resolved, for our purpose, is 
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 On vv.11–30 see Di Lella, “Fear of the Lord as Wisdom.” He points out the influence of 
Deuteronomy on Ben Sira’s thoughts. 
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 So Hengel, Judaism and Hellenism, 1:141, 143. 
33
 So Murphy, Tree of Life, 76–78; Jacob, “Wisdom and Religion,” 255. See, however, Whybray, 
“Ben Sira and History,” who questions this claim. 
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whether his ethical exhortations are derived primarily from the wisdom tradition or if the 
Torah’s commandments are foundational to his ethics.  
While some scholars maintain that Ben Sira’s ethics are overwhelmingly dominated 
by the outlook of the sapiential tradition not the Torah, the division between these two 
sources downplays Ben Sira’s attempt to wed the two. In his account of Wisdom’s decent, 
he concludes boldly, “This is the book of the covenant of the Most High God, the law 
which Moses commanded us as an inheritance for the gathering of Jacob” (24.23). 
Wisdom traditions are undeniably joined with the Torah, and it is probably even 
appropriate to speak of “identification.”34 He encourages his students not only to fear the 
Lord, which is the most fundamental expression of piety in the wisdom tradition (see 
Prov 1.7; Qoh 12.13), but also to “keep the commandments” (Sir 1.26). Wisdom is 
identified as the fear of the Lord and the doing of the law (19.20). 
The link between wisdom, life, and Torah also comes through the concept of 
“instruction, discipline” (rswm/p a id ei,a). “Instruction” belongs to the world of wisdom, and 
it is from here that Ben Sira develops his initial understanding of it. However, as is typical 
of most of his thinking, he connects it with the Torah. The relationship between the three 
concepts (discipline, Torah, and wisdom) is evident in 24.25–29. Following the 
identification of pre-temporal Wisdom with the Torah (v.23), Ben Sira describes the 
Torah as a bountiful river that provides nourishment.35 The Torah overflows with 
“wisdom” (v.25) and “knowledge” (v.26), and “instruction” flows freely from its banks 
(v.27). These three terms all belong to the wisdom tradition, but Ben Sira uses them to 
describe the contents of the Torah. The abrupt switch back to wisdom in vv.28–29 shows 
the connection between Wisdom and Torah for Ben Sira. He can shift easily and 
effortlessly between the two categories. 
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 Schnabel, Law and Wisdom, 69–79, 90–91. Boccaccini argues that wisdom and the Torah are not 
identical because wisdom is eternal while the Torah is historical (Middle Judaism, 81, 89). While this is 
correct, after the giving of the Torah wisdom is identified as the Torah. 
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 The six mentioned rivers (Pishon, Tigris, Euphrates, Jordan, Nile, and Gihon) were important 
throughout Israel’s history. See Sheppard, Wisdom, 69–71. 
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In several statements, the Torah provides the basis for Ben Sira’s exhortations.36 
Obedience to the commandments is the alternative to corruption and death (28.6). The 
Torah also governs one’s interaction with his or her neighbours (28.7; cf. 19.17). One 
should give to the poor because of the commandment (29.9; cf. vv.1, 11). The greatest sin 
is not disobedience to the sages’ instructions, but rejecting the Torah (41.8; cf. 19.24). 
3.1–16 is an extended reflection on the commandment to honour one’s parents (cf. Ex 
20.12; Deut 5.16).37 The answer to Ben Sira’s request for help controlling his tongue and 
thoughts mixes wisdom and Torah motifs as the solution (Sir 22.27–23.6). He calls his 
students to listen to his instruction (p a id e i,a), which sets the tone for a discussion of 
wisdom ideas (23.7).38 In the middle of the section, Ben Sira comments on the person 
who utters the divine name while swearing falsely (23.9–10). Although using different 
terminology, the instruction arises from the third commandment (Ex 20.7; Deut 5.11), and 
a person familiar with the Torah would not miss the connection. Similarly, in his 
comments on adultery (23.16–27), which replies to the problem of one’s thoughts (vv.2–
6), he focuses on disobedience to the Torah. The adulteress is guilty first of all because 
she disobeyed the law of the Most High (v.23). Ben Sira does not accuse the adulteress of 
failing to obey a maxim from the sages.39 Further, the woman’s disobedience to the law 
functions as a teaching moment. As Ben Sira explains in the conclusion to the section, the 
woman’s children will realise that nothing is greater than fearing God and keeping his 
commandments (v.27). This statement forms an inclusio with v.23, which began the 
discussion of the woman’s punishment, and highlights the importance of obedience to the 
law. 
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 Schnabel, Law and Wisdom, 46–9. He discusses 19.17; 21.11; 23.23; 28.6–7; 29.9; 32.14–33.6; 
35.1–7; 37.7–15; and 41.5. 
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 Contra Sanders, “Sacred Canopies,” 123–24, who ignores v.6 when he says that Ben Sira does not 
mention the promise of long life. 
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Wisdom of Ben Sira, 322). 
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Collins contends that Ben Sira’s ethical instructions come primarily from the 
sapiential tradition, while Nickelsburg points out that the form is derived from this 
tradition not a legal one.40 Identifying exact sources for Ben Sira’s teaching, however, is 
difficult since the content of Proverbs and other wisdom sources matches the instructions 
found in the Mosaic Torah. Both address the basic ethical actions of life and often with 
the same language. Ben Sira’s historical position in Judea prior to the conflict with 
Hellenism explains the lack of references to the so-called Jewish identity markers 
(circumcision, Sabbath, and food laws).41 In addition, his interest in the cult shows an 
awareness of traditions that cannot be assigned to sapiential traditions (7.29–31; 35.1–12). 
Ben Sira’s own search for wisdom began in the temple (51.14). His wedding of the two 
traditions cautions one from attempting to identify specific backgrounds when the two 
traditions are themselves so similar. The issue of form is not important since it does not 
indicate from where one derives authority for the particular instructions in a book. 
Burkes claims that the Torah was not vital to Ben Sira’s ethics because he tells his 
students to gain wisdom through the teaching of the elders (6.32–35; cf. 8.8–9).42 She 
fails to note, though, that the content of the elders’ discussions is the Torah itself (6.37; 
37.12; cf. 9.15 [Greek]).43 The sages, then, do not represent authority in themselves, but 
their authority comes through the source of their discussions. The instruction to seek 
wisdom through the sages’ reflections on the Torah summarises the very task that Ben 
Sira has set for himself, as his grandson recognised (Prologue 7–14). 
Ben Sira’s appropriation of the wisdom and Torah traditions is complex. The strict 
distinction between wisdom and law proposed by some scholars, however, does not 
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 Collins, Jewish Wisdom, 62; Nickelsburg, “Torah and the Deuteronomic Scheme,” 230. 
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 It is perplexing when Collins claims that Ben Sira “ignores certain sections of the Law, particularly 
the cultic and dietary laws of Leviticus” (Jewish Wisdom, 57). Ben Sira is well versed in the cultic practices 
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(Mattila, “Ben Sira and the Stoics,” 491n.74).  
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 Burkes, “Wisdom and Law,” 259. 
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adequately explain Ben Sira’s practice. He seeks to make clear that the two sacred 
traditions speak with a unified voice. The manner in which Ben Sira brings the law and 
wisdom together makes it appropriate to speak of one attaining life through law 
observance. 
ii. The Creator, His Commandments, and Human Obedience 
According to Sanders, Ben Sira’s exhortations to Torah observance must be 
understood within the covenant context. He enlists Sirach as one of his examples of 
covenantal nomism. He begins his analysis of Sirach by arguing that Ben Sira held a 
traditional (that is, Rabbinical) view of Israel’s election.44 Israel’s place of prominence is 
noted in 17.1–14. Ben Sira appears at first to be reflecting on all of humanity, but part 
way through the poem he turns to Israel and her encounter with God at Mt. Sinai (vv.11–
14; cf. Ex. 19.16–19).45 Among all the nations, God has chosen Israel for himself (Sir 
17.17), which, developing from Deuteronomy 32.8–9, is a clear statement of Israel’s 
election.46 In 24.1–23 Ben Sira highlights Israel’s special election by describing 
Wisdom’s decision to make her dwelling place in Israel.47 Wisdom is specifically 
identified as “the book of the covenant of the Most High God, the law which Moses 
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 Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism, 329–33. Parenthetical references in the following are to 
Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism. 
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 Wischmeyer identifies v.12 as “[e]ine klassische Formulierung des Bundesnomismus” (“Theologie 
und Anthropologie,” 23). 
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 Cf. Hos 2.19–20; Jub. 15.31. 
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 The claim that Israel alone possesses the wisdom that the world sought is often read as a polemic 
against Hellenism (see Hengel, Judaism and Hellenism, 1.138–39, 160–62; Skehan/Di Lella, The Wisdom 
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(Collins, Jewish Wisdom, 32–33 [with reference to Ben Sira]; Perdue, Sword and the Stylus, 259–65). More 
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Judaism (see Boccaccini, Middle Judaism, 77–81; Wright, “Fear the Lord and Honor the Priest;” Martin, 
“Ben Sira,” Prockter, “Torah as a Fence;” Argall, 1 Enoch and Sirach).  
  
43 
 
commanded us as an inheritance for the gathering of Jacob” (v.23). The equation of 
wisdom and the Torah, Sanders notes, serves as a sign of Israel’s election, and this 
connection between wisdom and the Torah is the “theme” of the book (332; emphasis 
removed). 
Sanders is undoubtedly correct that the connection between wisdom and the Torah is 
crucial for Ben Sira, even if he overstates it by calling it the “theme.” The election of 
Israel also is assumed throughout and stated at points, but it is questionable how 
significant election and the covenant (as understood by Sanders) are for Ben Sira’s 
conception of the divine-human relationship. Sanders himself seems to recognise this 
problem when he writes, “What Ben Sirach has to say about the fate of the individual is 
not thematically connected with his traditional picture of the salvation of Israel at the time 
of the Lord’s coming” (332). Because Ben Sira’s eschatological hopes only apply to 
Israel as a nation and not the individual (36/33.1–22), “the question of the election has no 
soteriological consequences” (333).48 The connection between election, the covenant, and 
salvation that Sanders finds in the rabbinical literature, the Dead Sea Scrolls, and other 
texts and is fundamental to covenantal nomism is radically broken in Ben Sira. 
Concerning the relationship between obedience and disobedience and the covenant in the 
rabbinic literature and Qumran, Sanders argues, 
The distribution of reward and punishment does not, in rabbinic literature, become 
the basis of salvation; rather, the covenant is the main factor in salvation, while a 
man is punished or rewarded for his deeds within the covenant. Similarly in Qumran, 
one is punished for transgressions of the ordinances of the covenant and rewarded for 
adherence, but saved by being in the covenant itself. (297) 
Individual salvation in Ben Sira’s this-worldly perspective, however, is not dependent on 
election but is determined by whether one is among the righteous or wicked, which is 
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 The authenticity of this prayer for deliverance from the nations has been questioned by Collins 
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determined by “whether or not he more or less satisfactorily keeps the commandments of 
the covenant” (333; cf. 346). Individual salvation is, Sanders concludes, ultimately 
determined by obedience. The difference between Ben Sira and the Rabbis and Qumran is 
stark. To be certain, the relationship between obedience and blessing should not be 
construed as “works-righteous legalism in the pejorative sense, in which a man arrogantly 
thinks that his good deeds establish a claim on God” (345). Nevertheless, it remains the 
case, as Sanders notes, that the individual’s hope of blessing rests on his or her obedience 
to the commandments. 
Having separated the covenant and election from divine blessing, the structure of 
covenantal nomism collapses. The individual, which is Ben Sira’s primary focus, no 
longer relates to God based on some prior divine act of grace. Now he or she relates based 
on whether or not the law is obeyed. One could argue, I suppose, that because God gave 
the covenant to Israel as an act of grace the individual Israelite’s obedient response is not 
the means to acquire life and blessing. Obedience, then, would have the same function as 
it has in the rabbinic literature, namely, the means to remaining within the covenant. The 
pattern of covenantal nomism would remain intact. Yet, not only does Sanders seem to 
acknowledge that this account of the function of obedience is problematic when applied 
to Ben Sira, it also presumes that Ben Sira thought about the concept of a “covenant” in 
the same manner that the term is employed in Sanders’ description of covenantal nomism. 
In Sanders’ understanding, the covenant signifies an act of divine electing grace. The 
establishment of the covenant relationship is always prior to the demand for obedience, as 
the very phrase “covenantal nomism” indicates. While the covenant cannot be divorced 
from the commandments and expectation for obedience, the focus remains on the divine 
agent who acts prior to any human action.49 Sanders identified several statements in the 
rabbinic literature that recounted God establishing the covenant prior to giving the 
commandments and Israel accepting and obeying those commandments.50 Ben Sira’s 
story of Wisdom’s descent and identification with the Torah even lends itself to this 
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 See Watson, Paul and the Hermeneutics of Faith, 8–13. 
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 Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism, 85–87, citing, e.g., m. Bek. 2:2; Mekilta Bahodesh 5; 6. 
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interpretation (24.1–23). Here in no uncertain terms Israel is declared to possess the 
wisdom that the world sought, and this is given as an act of divine grace.51 Yet, this single 
account of Israel’s election in 24.1–23 must be set within the broader context of Ben 
Sira’s concept of the covenant relationship. Such prioritising of the divine agent in giving 
the covenant (1) does not represent Ben Sira’s description of how one enters into a 
covenant relationship with God, and (2) it hides the fact that, in the case of the Mosaic 
covenant, the covenant relationship consists of the giving and obeying of commandments. 
When not overlaid with supposed rabbinical understandings of how one comes to be 
in a covenantal relationship with God (by grace), Ben Sira’s own perspective about how 
one enters into a covenantal relationship with God appears differently. He gives priority 
to the human act of obedience. Regardless of its genre, the point of the “Praise to the 
Fathers” is clear: those obedient to God are rewarded for their actions.52 Ben Sira first 
identifies Noah as a righteous and blameless man, who endured during a period of wrath 
and is responsible for the continuation of the human race (44.17). He received an eternal 
“sign” (twa) or “covenants” (d i a qh /ka i) to signify that God would not wipe out humanity 
(v.18). While Ben Sira does not state that Noah was chosen to be the survivor of the 
human race because of his righteousness, within the context he probably intends one to 
draw that conclusion.53 
Ben Sira is more explicit when he describes Abraham as one who 
kept the commandments (twcm) of the Most High, and entered into a covenant (tyrb) 
with him. In his flesh, he cut a statute (qx), and when he was tested, he was found 
faithful. Therefore, he gave an oath to him:54 to bless the nations by his seed, to 
multiply him as the dust of the earth,55 to raise high his seed like the stars, to give 
them an inheritance from sea to sea and from the River to the ends of the earth. 
(44.20–21) 
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 “[B]en Sira’s myth of Wisdom is the story of how God’s freely given, innervating, vivifying 
goodness has been made present in the Torah. It is the story of grace told from the perspective of eternity” 
(Nickelsburg, Jewish Literature, 58). 
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 Brown, “God and Men in Israel’s History.” 
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 Cf. VanLandingham, Judgment and Justification, 36. 
54
 This line is translated from the Greek. The Hebrew is damaged at the centre of the line, but appears 
to convey the same idea: wl ~yqh h[[ . .]Xb !k l[. 
55
 This line and the next have dropped out of the Hebrew. If the line began with a l (as both v.21b, d), 
then it is, most likely, a case of homoioarcton. 
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In v.20b Ben Sira clearly has in mind Genesis 17, which is where the term “covenant” 
appears for the first time in the Abraham narrative. Genesis 17 records God’s 
establishment of the covenant with Abraham and the command to circumcise. The 
opening verses summarise the remainder of the chapter (vv.1–2). Further, they highlight 
the close connection between covenant and obedience. Verses 3–14 outline the covenant 
obligations for the two parties beginning with God’s. He will make Abraham’s 
descendants into a mighty, numerous nation and will provide them with a dwelling place 
(vv.3–8). Abraham, for his part, will be obedient to God’s commands, especially the 
command to circumcise. His descendents will observe this statute perpetually as a sign of 
the covenant (vv.9–14). The order in which the covenant is described as well as the 
obligations placed on Abraham and his descendents shows that the author of Genesis does 
not think the covenant is given based on Abraham’s obedience. 
Ben Sira moves away from Genesis 17 in his next comment on the testing of 
Abraham (Sir 44.20d). Here he draws on a common early Jewish theme found initially in 
Genesis 22. The most well known example is probably Jubilees, which divides 
Abraham’s life into ten (actually nine) tests (17.17; 19.8).56 Ben Sira likely only has in 
mind the sacrifice of Isaac (Gen 22.1–19), which is the only point in Abraham’s life that 
Genesis calls a test (v.1).57 
Ben Sira continues in Sirach 44.21 by recalling the Abrahamic blessing found 
initially in Genesis 12.1–3 (cf. 15.1–21). Genesis 22 may provide the example for how 
Ben Sira orders his recounting of the events. After God tested Abraham, he blesses 
Abraham and his descendants because (yKi) he did not withhold Isaac (22.16). Similarly, 
Ben Sira follows the order of Genesis: Abraham was tested, he remained faithful, and 
God blessed him for it. The blessing given to Abraham is the outcome of his obedience to 
the test. 
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 The author says that Sarah’s death was the tenth test (19.8), but he only lists seven in 17.17. The 
sacrifice of Isaac is the eighth. For a discussion of this motif in Jubilees, see Watson, Paul and the 
Hermeneutics of Faith, 222–36. 
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Despite the formal similarities between Sirach and its source in Genesis, Ben Sira 
makes several interpretative moves in this short statement that shift the focus from God’s 
establishment of the covenant to Abraham’s obedience as the reason for the covenant. 
First, he focuses on Abraham’s obedience to God’s will.58 The opening line sets the tone 
for the rest of the section. Ben Sira describes Abraham as obedient to the 
“commandment,” which is probably a reference to the Mosaic Torah (Sir 44.20). While 
he probably does not envision Abraham possessing a copy of the law, he nevertheless 
thinks that Abraham was obedient to it.59 Abraham’s obedience is also highlighted when 
Ben Sira makes him the subject of the verbs in v.20. Particularly interesting is the claim 
that Abraham entered (ab) into a covenant with God (v.20b). In Genesis 12.1–3, 15.1–17, 
and 17.1–14, God is the one who approaches Abraham about entering into a covenant 
relationship. Ben Sira could be making the simple observation that Abraham was in a 
covenant relationship with God, but in light of his focus on Abraham’s actions in Sirach 
44.20, he could intend more. Abraham’s obedience to the law led to the establishment of 
the covenant relationship, and one could then say that the covenant was initiated by 
Abraham not God.60 
Second, in 44.20d Ben Sira combines Genesis 22.1–14 (testing) and 15.6 
(faithfulness).61 Joining these two texts is not unique since other early Jewish authors did 
so also (cf. 1 Macc 2.52), but the implications that result from the combination are 
significant. By combining the two, Ben Sira identifies Abraham’s obedience to the 
command to sacrifice Isaac as faithfulness. In Genesis 15.6, however, Abraham’s faith is 
in response to God’s promise, and there is no mention of any obedience. In fact, the 
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 de Roo, “God’s Covenant with the Fathers,” 195. 
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 Ben Sira never clarifies how Abraham could be obedient to the Torah, which he normally describes 
as the book of the law given to Moses. Perhaps he thinks that Abraham was obedient to the Torah because 
of the connection between wisdom and the Torah (cf. 24.1–23) or because of the connection between the 
Torah and creation (cf. 17.1–14). 
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 Some later traditions provide more specific reasons for why God chooses Abraham: Apoc. Abr. 8.1–
6: because he rejected idolatry; L.A.B. 6.11: Abraham refuses to help build the tower of Babel (for 
discussion of these and others, see Evans, “Abraham in the Dead Sea Scrolls,” 149–58; VanLandingham, 
Judgment and Justification, 23–35). 
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 Genesis 15.6: “And he [Abram] believed (!mia/h,w.) God, and it was credited to him as righteousness.” 
22.1: “And after these things, God tested (hS'nI) Abraham.” 
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covenant ceremony described in vv.9–21 is unilateral. Stipulations are placed on God, but 
nothing is said about Abraham’s actions. Ben Sira interprets “faith” so that it means 
obedience to God’s commands rather than trust in God’s promise. 
Ben Sira’s third significant hermeneutical move concerns his understanding of the 
point at which God makes his oath. Ben Sira places the establishment of the covenant and 
the testing of Abraham prior to his explanation of the “oath.” He is most likely following 
Genesis 22 as noted previously. In adopting the pattern of Genesis 22, though, he 
overlooks the promises made previously to Abraham in 12.1–3 and 15.1–21. By placing 
the promises prior to any obedience on Abraham’s part, the author of Genesis draws to 
one’s attention the action of God. By ignoring these two texts, though, Ben Sira 
highlights Abraham’s actions as the reason for his special relationship with God. If in 
Sirach 44.21 Ben Sira is not simply following the order of Genesis 22 but has in mind 
Genesis 12.1–6 and 15.1–6, the contrast between the actions of Abraham and God 
becomes even sharper. By rearranging these events, Ben Sira places the emphasis on 
Abraham’s actions rather than God’s. Regardless of which texts Ben Sira intends to 
summarise in Sirach 44.21, the conjunction !k l[ (dia. tou/to) suggests a logical 
relationship in which the following statement (in this case the blessings) is dependent on 
the preceding statement (here, the obedience). The blessing is the outcome of Abraham’s 
obedience rather than God’s grace. 
By focusing exclusively on Abraham’s obedience, Ben Sira makes a theological 
claim about the relationship between obedience and the covenant.62 The structure of 
covenantal nomism, in fact, is reversed. The first act is taken by the human, and God’s 
action is secondary and a response to the human. God does not enter into a covenantal 
relationship with Abraham on the basis of his grace; rather, the covenant relationship is 
God’s acknowledgement of Abraham’s obedience. 
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 On the similarities between Jubilees and Ben Sira, Garlington states, “There is, then, a general 
agreement between this book and Ben Sira that the ratification of the ‘covenant in his flesh’ was subsequent 
to a prior obedience” (‘Obedience of Faith’, 39). This order of events, however, does not cause him to 
question the assumption that the covenant was established by grace without any reference to obedience. 
Contrast VanLandingham’s discussion of Jubilees in Judgment and Justification, 23–26. 
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Ben Sira’s praise of Phinehas for his zealous action on behalf of the people when 
they rebelled follows a similar pattern as the other examples mentioned (44.23–24; cf. 
Num 25.6–13; Ps 106.28–31). In response to what he did, he was awarded a “covenant of 
peace” (Sir 45.24).63 The conjunction !kl (dia. tou/to) in v.24 signifies that the covenant 
was established in response to Phinehas’ action. Ben Sira simply follows the description 
of events in Numbers 25.6–13 and even uses the same language. Nevertheless, Phinehas 
receives the covenant because of his act to purify Israel. 
Another example is Ben Sira’s comments on David. He begins by recounting David’s 
magnificent works during his childhood and his battles with the Philistines (47.1–7). He 
commends David for his musical talent and the order he introduced to Israel’s worship 
(vv.8–10). Finally, he notes that the Lord overlooked David’s sin and gave him a 
covenant (v.11). One could argue that the establishment of the covenant is based on 
divine initiative and is not given in response to David’s obedience. Two points should be 
noted, however. First, Ben Sira stresses David’s exceptional obedience. His transgression 
is mentioned only in passing. Second, David’s sin does not affect Ben Sira’s 
understanding of him or his children.64 He does not attribute the split in the kingdom to 
David’s transgression but to the foolishness of Solomon, Rehoboam, and Jeroboam 
(vv.19–25). In fact, David’s love for God assures that his line will never be destroyed 
despite the actions of his children (v.22). The mention of David’s transgression is not 
intended to indicate that the covenant was established by God’s grace. Ben Sira is simply 
retelling the key points of David’s life. Even the example of David, therefore, continues 
the pattern observed throughout the rest of the poem: obedience leads to divine blessing, 
and the concept of the covenant for Ben Sira does not begin with God’s gracious election. 
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 ~wlX tyrb qx becomes dia q h ,kh  eivrh , nh j. Schwemer comments, “Hier vereinfacht der Enkel zu 
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The situation with the Mosaic covenant is more complex, but ultimately Ben Sira’s 
understanding of this covenant emphasises the human act of obedience not a divine act of 
grace. Unlike his accounts of Abraham, Phinehas, and David, Ben Sira does not state that 
Israel received the covenant because of their obedience. Rather, the giving of the 
covenant is portrayed as a gracious event in which God elects Israel as his people (24.1–
23).65 When actually reflecting on this covenant, however, Ben Sira’s interest is not in 
why Israel received it, but the content of it, namely the commandments, and the 
expectation that comes with it. Ben Sira centres his thoughts around the Mosaic covenant, 
because it, unlike any of the other covenants, tells a person how to relate to God. At the 
climax of the tale of Wisdom, wisdom is identified not solely as the covenant, but as “the 
book of the covenant of the Most High God, the law that Moses commanded us” (v.23). 
The Mosaic covenant is the commandments.66 
In the first creation hymn (16.26–17.32), the Mosaic covenant is clearly identified as 
the commandments. Recounting how God as Creator rules over all creation, Ben Sira 
comes to the creation of Israel. He does not begin with Abraham’s election or the 
deliverance from Egypt. His view of the beginning of Israel coincides with the moment 
the people stand at the base of Mt. Sinai (17.11–14). Here Israel is created by God and 
selected as his people (v.17). In this event, Israel enters into a covenantal relationship 
with God when he gives them “the law of life” (17.11b). This law is further identified as 
an “eternal covenant,” and when giving this covenant God “revealed his decrees” (v.12). 
The giving of the Torah is the creation of a relationship that can be described as a 
covenant. This text clearly indicates that the Torah is foundational to Israel’s relationship 
with God, and defined as “the law of life,” the Torah is the source of life for any who 
obey its commandments. There is no two-stage idea of God establishing a covenant 
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 Nickelsburg misses the point of Sirach 24 when he says that Ben Sira is not concerned with Moses 
receiving the Torah as an historical event, but with the “ahistorical interpretation that sees the Mosaic Torah 
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relationship with Israel and then giving the commandments and the expectation for 
obedience. Watson argues correctly, 
What is significant, however, is not the usage of the term diathēkē but the assumption 
that the giving and observing of commandments is fundamental to God’s relationship 
to Israel. This giving and observing of commandments is not here [in 17.11–14] set 
within a prior “covenant” characterized by pure divine electing grace.67 
When describing God as allotting the law or establishing the covenant, the purpose is not 
to declare that this act is done out of divine mercy. Rather, by crediting God with the 
giving of the Torah, Ben Sira underscores the divine origin of the commandments. The 
commandments must be obeyed because God himself gave them. 
Ben Sira’s emphasis on the obligation found in the Mosaic covenant is not a case of 
misunderstanding the covenant. The covenant structure itself highlights the requirement 
for obedience.68 Moses’ plea for the people to obey in Deuteronomy 30.15–20, for Ben 
Sira, functions as the hermeneutical guide for how the rest of the Torah should be read. 
Those places that link blessing and obedience in this reading strategy stand out. Indeed, 
the previous covenants between God and an individual are read through this 
understanding of the Mosaic covenant. Whereas Paul argues that the covenant with 
Abraham was initiated and sustained by divine grace (Gal 3; Rom 4), Ben Sira finds 
Abraham’s obedience to God’s commandments as the reason for the covenant. The 
different readings of Ben Sira and Paul stem from their hermeneutical starting points.69 
Finding in Habakkuk 2.4 the principle that righteousness comes through faith (Gal 3.11; 
Rom 1.17), Paul confirms this in the Abraham narrative (Gen 15.6; Gal 3; Rom 4) and 
therefore rejects the reading strategy found in Ben Sira and other Second Temple texts. 
Because Paul will not discard the Torah as divine revelation, he is forced to remarkable 
interpretations of those parts that seem to oppose his interpretation (cf. Rom 10.5–8; Deut 
30.11–14). Ben Sira, by contrast, employs Deuteronomy 30.15–20 as his guide to reading 
the Torah, and this leads him to focus on the acts of Abraham rather than God. The 
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significant acts of divine intervention, such as the Exodus, mentioned at the beginning of 
Deuteronomy (4.20) are ignored by Ben Sira. Israel’s blessings, for Ben Sira, are the 
outcome of their faithfulness to the commandments, not the result of God’s invading 
mercy nor his fulfilment of the promises to the Patriarchs (cf. Deut 1.8; 9.27). In Ben 
Sira’s view, each individual must reconfirm the covenant, and God’s goodness to 
previous generations is the result of their obedience and does not carry over to later 
generations. Both authors exploit the text of Deuteronomy and the Torah based on their 
hermeneutical starting points, and the different starting points explain the radical 
outcomes of their readings. 
The failure by much of contemporary scholarship to recognise the different 
hermeneutical starting points results in a systemic misreading of Paul and Second Temple 
Judaism. The two are conflated with the result that both are distorted. This failure to 
acknowledge the different starting points even affects readings of Deuteronomy. Many 
scholars attempt to read Deuteronomy through Paul’s (prophetic?) lens without 
acknowledging that they have begun with this hermeneutical presupposition.70 Yet, Paul’s 
reading strategy results in a drastic rewriting of part of Deuteronomy and an explicit 
rejection of other parts of the Torah (see Lev 18.5 in Gal 3.12; Rom 10.5). No less, 
adopting Ben Sira’s pattern requires one to ignore key elements of the Torah. An 
objective reading of Deuteronomy is not possible, but recognising these fundamentally 
different hermeneutical starting points will, at the least, force one to acknowledge those 
points in Deuteronomy or the Torah as a whole that do not actually fit one’s perspective. 
This is exactly what Paul and Ben Sira do. 
Whereas Sanders argued that the divine-human relationship was grounded in God’s 
electing grace, Ben Sira maintains that the divine-human relationship revolves around the 
giving and observing of the commandments. Ben Sira’s perspective, in fact, gives more 
attention to the actions of the human agent than those of God. A covenantal relationship, 
as Ben Sira formulates it, is often depicted as God’s acknowledgement of human 
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obedience. All this indicates that covenantal nomism is not the correct framework in 
which to interpret Ben Sira’s statements that correlate obedience and blessing and 
disobedience and cursing. The proper context must account for the central point that God 
is one who gives commandments and the human agent is one who should obey them. In 
Sirach this context is the Creator-creation relationship. In several passages, Ben Sira 
reflects on the works of God and how they consistently obey his command. The divine-
human relationship, or more specifically the Israel-God relationship, is a subset of the 
created order, and the giving of the covenant with its commandments is the specific form 
of how the Creator relates to those who are endowed with his image. While there are 
significant differences between humans and the rest of creation, they relate to God in the 
same manner as all of creation: through obedience to his commandments.71 
The pattern of God giving commandments and his creatures obeying them can be 
observed in the relationship between God and Wisdom, the first of his creations. Wisdom 
roamed freely throughout the heavens, and she sought on earth a people among whom she 
could reside (Sir 24.3–7). God chose Israel for her, and at his command, she took up 
residence within Israel: “Then the Creator of all things commanded me and the Creator 
caused me to rest in my tent. He said, ‘In Jacob you will settle and in Israel you will 
obtain an inheritance’” (v.8). Despite her eternal nature, she finds her resting place in 
Israel’s cult where she serves the Lord (vv.9–10). Wisdom interacts with her Maker by 
observing his commandments. God is portrayed as one who gives commandments. From 
the outset, then, God’s interaction with his creation is portrayed as the giving and 
observing of commandments. 
Similar to his depiction of Wisdom’s interaction with God, Ben Sira reflects on 
creation’s obedience to God’s commands in the three creation hymns. In the third creation 
hymn (42.15–43.33), Ben Sira describes how different parts of creation obey their 
Maker’s instructions. He opens the hymn with the statement “By his word are the works 
of the Lord, and the creatures do his will” (42.15). The second half of this statement 
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summarises the content of the latter part of the hymn (43.1–26). The sun continues on its 
path because of the Lord’s word (43.5). The stars are assigned their positions in the sky 
by the word of the Lord, and they give light to the night sky without tiring (v.10). The 
snow, wind, and other astronomical occurrences come from his commands (vv.13–22). In 
the second creation hymn (39.12–35), Ben Sira describes how God uses various aspects 
of creation as a means of divine judgment on the wicked or redemption for the righteous. 
Referring to the crossing of the Red Sea (Ex 14.21–30), Ben Sira says that the waters 
parted because God commanded them (Sir 39.17). This salvific event occurred at the 
“word” of the Lord, the very command issued “from his mouth.” Based on this event, Ben 
Sira concludes that the purpose of the Lord is always accomplished, and no one can limit 
his saving power (v.18). Some winds, along with fire, hail, famine, and other pestilences, 
are forms of divine judgment, and they were created to calm the wrath of their Maker 
(39.28–29). Even some animals were created to inflict punishment on ungodly people 
(v.30). These various means of punishment eagerly wait for and then accomplish the 
Lord’s commands. They never fail to complete their assigned task (v.31). The first 
creation hymn also reflects on God’s control over the celestial beings. He placed them in 
the sky according to his will, and they do not waver from their assigned tasks (16.26–27). 
“They never disobey his word” (v.28), Ben Sira claims. These three hymns reference 
God’s control over creation as a reason to praise him. The celestial beings and weather 
events diligently serve their Creator and accomplish the tasks for which they were 
created. Their relationship is formed around the commands given by God. 
The theme of creation’s obedience to God is common in Second Temple Judaism.72 
God is worthy of praise because he controls creation (Pss. Sol. 18.10–12; 1QHa 20.4–11), 
and this characteristic of his power distinguishes him from idols (Bar 3.33–35; Let Jer 
60–65). Baruch appeals to God’s control over all of creation as the reason for him to 
sustain human life (2 Bar. 24.4–9) and ultimately to bring an end to wickedness (v.19). 
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The consistent obedience of creation contrasts with the inconsistency of humankind, who 
is not today what it will be tomorrow (vv.15–16).73 In several instances, other authors use 
the idea to contrast the obedience of the non-human creation with the disobedience of 
some humans and the obedience of others. In the Two-Spirits Treatise, God’s control over 
creation is paralleled to his act of placing within humans two spirits and ultimately his 
decision concerning who will be in the lot of the Prince of Lights and the Angel of 
Darkness (1QS 3.15–21). The closest parallel to Ben Sira’s use of this motif is 1 Enoch 5. 
Enoch utilises the consistent obedience of creation to chastise the disobedient for their 
neglect of the commandments and to encourage the obedient that God will bless them. 
The difference between the non-human part of creation and the human part is the 
possibility that humans can revolt against their Maker. This is precisely the same link that 
Ben Sira establishes between the heavenly beings and humans in Sirach 16.26–17.14. 
The first creation hymn brings this pattern of the Creator-creation relationship into 
direct contact with the divine-human relationship. Having briefly claimed that God 
established the boundaries for all the heavenly beings and that they always serve him 
(16.26–28), Ben Sira proceeds to explain the place of humanity within the broader created 
order. He reflects directly on the creation accounts in Genesis (17.1–10), while offering 
his own distinctive interpretations of key aspects. Although being in the image of God 
(Sir 17.3; cf. Gen 1.27–28), humanity is a subset within the created order, and the divine-
human relationship is simply an expression of the Creator-creation relationship. 
Consistent throughout the discussion on each category of creation is the claim that each 
part relates to God through obedience to the commands he gives. Humanity differs from 
the rest of the created order because it possesses knowledge of good and evil, is endowed 
with freedom, and thus the possibility exists that individuals might rebel against God. 
In the description of humanity, the key characteristics of the two-ways paradigm can 
be detected. First, Ben Sira identifies the Torah as “the law of life” (17.11b) and the 
“eternal covenant” (v.12a). The parallelism between “covenant” and “law” indicates that 
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obedience to the law is not simply the means to remaining within a previously established 
covenantal relationship. Torah observance is the means to life. Even if a covenant of 
grace was established prior to any human action, it is the case, for Ben Sira, that one’s 
enjoyment of life is contingent solely on one’s obedience. This emerges, in this poem, at 
the conclusion when Ben Sira describes how God observes all human action. He sees 
both those who do evil (v.20) and those who do good (v.22). What matters at the time of 
judgment is not ethnicity, but obedience: “Afterward [God] will rise up and repay them. 
He will give back their recompense upon their heads” (v.23). The divine act is a response 
to the human’s obedience or disobedience to the commandments found in the Torah (cf. 
v.14). 
Second, in 17.1–14 Ben Sira focuses particularly on God revealing to humans what is 
expected of them.74 Along with giving to humans “discretion and tongue and eyes, ears 
and a mind for thinking” (v.6), God also “filled them with knowledge and understanding 
and showed to them good and evil” (v.7).75 Ben Sira differs significantly from Genesis in 
explaining how humans came to know the difference between good and evil. According 
to Genesis 2–3, Adam and Eve learned the difference between good and evil only after 
they ate from “the tree of the knowledge of good and evil” (2.17; 3.1–13). This slight, but 
significant interpretative move brings Ben Sira’s view in line with Moses’ claim that by 
giving the people the law he had set before them good and evil (Deut 30.15).76 Again, 
Deuteronomy functions as the hermeneutical key to interpreting the rest of the Torah. As 
the poem in Sirach 17.1–14 continues, Ben Sira claims that “knowledge” and the “law of 
life” are revealed (vv.11–12). He summarises the divine demand as “beware of all evil. 
He gave commandment to each of them concerning his neighbour” (v.14; cf. 27.30–28.7). 
For Ben Sira it is fundamental that God himself made the moral categories of good and 
evil known and not that humans learned them because of the serpent’s deception (cf. Gen 
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3.13). By revealing good and evil, humans have a clear understanding of what is expected 
from them. The failure to do good cannot be attributed to a lack of understanding. 
Moreover, in Ben Sira’s view possession of knowledge implies that one can keep the 
commandments.77 Obedience is possible because humans know what is expected of 
them.78 
Third, the divine decision to leave the human to his or her own will is not as apparent 
in 17.1–24 as it is in 15.14, but the poem does describe God’s judgment of human action. 
Contrary to those who deny the judgment (16.17–23), Ben Sira holds that God sees 
everything done by each person (17.15–22). Only “after” the human obeys or transgresses 
the commandments (17.20, 22), does God respond: “Afterward [m e t a. t a u/t a] he will rise 
up and repay them. He will give back their recompense upon their heads” (v.23). The 
divine act of judgment is a re-action to what humans do from their own free will. 
In 17.1–14 Ben Sira places Israel’s special relationship with God within the broader 
context of humanity’s and the rest of creation’s relationship with God. In claiming that 
Israel relates to God in the same manner as all other humans, he has not eliminated the 
unique relationship that Israel possesses with her God. Israel’s legal, covenantal traditions 
rather have been placed into the wider context of a creation theology. Creation theology 
typifies wisdom theology,79 and by combining the Torah with creation, Ben Sira gives 
creation theology a specific focus on Israel. Ben Sira perceives no tension between these 
two traditional types of theology.80 A reason that there is no fundamental tension is 
because both have the same pattern for the divine-human relationship: God gives 
commandments and creation follows them. 
Although created in the image of God and given dominance over other creatures, 
humans belong to the same created order as Wisdom, the stars, and the animals. The 
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divine-human relationship is a subcategory of the Creator-creation relationship, and the 
former takes its structure from the latter. Humans, like the rest of creation, are to obey 
God. God has given to humans knowledge of good and evil and revealed specifically to 
Israel the covenant that contains the law that Moses commanded to them (17.11–14; 
24.23; 45.5). This covenant pattern forms the basis of the relationship. Ben Sira 
undoubtedly thinks of God as loving, merciful, gracious, but whenever he sets out to 
describe how any aspect of creation interacts with God, he argues that the interaction is 
based on the commandments given by God. The entire cosmos exemplifies an ordered 
harmony centred on God as the one who issues commandments. 
The Creator-creation relationship revolves around God giving commandments and 
creation obeying them. The divine-human relationship, as a subset of the Creator-creation 
relationship, likewise is built around God giving commandments and the human 
observing them. This correlation between the divine-human relationship and the Creator-
creation has significant implications for how one understands the relationship between 
obedience and blessing, disobedience and cursing that was observed at the beginning of 
this section. It is not the case that obedience is merely the response of the faithful human 
to God’s prior grace. Nor is it the case that obedience is simply the means to maintaining 
a life already possessed. Rather, obedience is the means to attaining life and blessing. Ben 
Sira exhorts his students to observe the law because he thinks that this is the only means 
to life. His nomism has not collapsed into perverse legalism in which one arrogantly 
demands blessing from God, as Sanders rightly noted, but it remains the case that Ben 
Sira contends that life comes through keeping the law. This is, in Ben Sira’s view, God’s 
ordained method by which one should acquire the blessings of life.81 
Against his opposition, Ben Sira argued that God set life and death before the human 
agent in the form of the Torah (15.17; 17.11). The human’s obedience to the 
commandments is the means to possessing life and blessings. This was the first point in 
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the two-ways pattern, and it has been seen in other parts of Sirach. Numerous statements 
indicate a connection between law observance and life, but it is the broader context of the 
Creator-creation relationship that defines how obedience relates to life. In this 
relationship, God is portrayed as one who gives commandments and creation obeys them. 
For Ben Sira, the divine-human relationship is modelled after the Creator-creation 
relationship, and the roles of God and humans remain the same. God gives 
commandments, and humans should obey them. The one who obeys will be given life and 
blessing, while those who disobey will be punished. 
iii. Obedience, Fear of God, and Faith 
In the discussion of covenant and Sanders’ claim that Ben Sira employs covenantal 
nomism, it was observed that this focus on a divine act of grace is misplaced. The giving 
of the covenant does not establish a relationship centred on divine acts of mercy. Rather 
than looking to the divine agent as the primary actor, Ben Sira points to the human agent 
and his or her obedience to the commandments. Obedience is, as argued above, the means 
to life and blessing. Whereas Sanders sought to orient the divine-human relationship 
around God’s acts of mercy, others have attempted to sever the link between obedience 
and life by arguing that the relationship is founded, for the human’s part, on a prior, 
internal basis. As important as law observance is, it comes in second place behind the 
inner dispositions and attitudes that form the true heart of the relationship and the basis 
for life.82 Obedience to the law is the visual evidence of one’s belief in God and, in some 
views, as the means to maintaining life in the covenant. Either way, life is acquired 
through another means than obedience to the law. In recent scholarship, two 
characteristics in particular have been highlighted: fear of the Lord and faith.83 
Schnabel maintains that one’s obedience to the law arises from an inner dependence 
on God, which is expressed by the phrase “fear of the Lord.” The close relationship 
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between the two concepts is revealed in several verses where they appear in parallel lines. 
For example: 
Consider diligently in the fear of the Most High and in his commandments and 
meditate continually. (6.37) 
The one who fears YHWH will do this, and the one who grasps the Torah will 
understand her [wisdom]. (15.1) 
The fear of YHWH is all wisdom, and in all wisdom, there is the doing of the law. 
Better is the fearful who lacks intelligence, than the one abounding in intelligence 
who also transgresses the law. (19.20, 24) 
The one who observes the law prevails over his thoughts, and fulfilment of the fear 
of the Lord is wisdom. (21.11) 
The order of the parallelism, which is determined by the context, clarifies the relationship 
between fearing the Lord and keeping the commandments. If the context focuses on “a 
fundamental or ‘inner’ viewpoint,” then fear of the Lord appears first, and the mention of 
the law “appears to be a concretization” (6.37; 15.1; 23.27; 37.12; 39.1). When the Torah 
appears first, the emphasis is on accomplishing certain actions, and the thought process 
moves from the “concrete to the more comprehensive realm” (1.26–27; 9.15–16; 21.11; 
32.14–16; 32.24–33.1). Based on this scheme, Schnabel concludes that the fear of the 
Lord is the foundation for obedience to the law. The fact that fearing God is not lost in 
keeping the commandments, he further notes, “makes sure that the keeping of the law is 
not a routine performance or accomplishment but a result of one’s personal commitment 
and confidence in God who makes the obedience to his law possible (cf. 15,13).”84 
According to this perspective, then, fear of the Lord refers to the disposition or character 
of a person, while obedience to the law defines how one lives. Further, fear of the Lord 
establishes a personal relationship with God so that one’s obedience flows from that prior 
relationship. 
Garlington focuses on the role of “faith” in the divine-human relationship. 
Employing Sanders’ distinction between getting in and staying in, he argues that one 
responds to God’s gracious election by believing in him. Just as grace is the divine action 
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on which the relationship with Israel is founded, faith is the human action that serves as 
the basis for the relationship. One’s faith manifests itself in obedience to the Torah; that 
is, obedience is the outward expression of one’s inner faith in God. Two quotes will make 
clear his position. First, commenting on the relationship between faith and fear of God in 
1.14, he states, “[F]aith, which is the gift of God, is both temporally and logically prior to 
obedience.”  Second, commenting in 2.6, he writes, “The accent is on human activity: one 
must do as well as believe. This is the obedience which proceeds from faith and 
complements faith.”85 Although obedience functions as the means for remaining in the 
covenant, it is not abstracted from faith. At times the linear relationship resides into the 
background, so that faith becomes obedience (see 4.15–16). These instances, according to 
Garlington, highlight the active nature of faith.86 Generally speaking, however, Ben Sira 
views obedience as the evidence of one’s faith. 
Despite these claims, several points show that one’s obedience does not arise from 
one of these internal perspectives and that they do not form the foundation of the divine-
human relationship. Three comments will be made about fear of the Lord followed by 
some observations about faith. 
First, although Schnabel’s analysis does clarify the relationship in some of the texts 
(e.g., 1.26–27; 2.15–16), it does not adequately explain all of them. The priority of the 
fear of the Lord is not found in some of the texts. In 9.15–16 the statements imply no 
dependent relationship. There is no conceptual difference between conversing about the 
law and making one’s glory the fear of the Lord. Fearing God is only a “more 
comprehensive realm” (Schnabel’s phrase) if one imposes a distinction between the two 
expressions. In 15.1 no movement from a prior, internal attitude to physical manifestation 
of that perspective is evident. The previous verses depict one’s actions (14.20–27), and 
15.1b continues describing one’s actions. Fear of the Lord can only be an internal 
disposition if one ignores the focus on obedience in the section and has decided 
previously that obedience to the law is an external expression of a prior commitment. 
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Likewise, in 23.27, Ben Sira does not distinguish between the two ideas nor does he 
suggest that fearing God is more important than keeping the law.87 The context actually 
implies that the two concepts are the same. The adulterer fails to fear God (v.19), and the 
adulteress neglects the Torah (v.23). Further, v.27 concludes Ben Sira’s reflections on the 
outcome of adultery, which arise from his prayer for deliverance from sexual temptation 
(23.2–6). The prayer may contain hints that a character change is needed toward sin, but 
the answer focuses on actual obedience not a change of character or disposition toward 
God. One final text worth noting is 32.24–33.3 (35.28–36.4 Greek), where Ben Sira 
describes what will happen to the one who observes the commandments. 
The one who obeys the Torah watches his soul, and the one who trusts in YHWH 
will not be ashamed. Evil will not befall the one who fears YHWH, for when tested 
he will turn and be saved. The one who hates the Torah will not be wise, and is 
tossed about like a boat in a storm.88 A man who is insightful understands the word, 
and the Torah is for him as trustworthy as the Urim.89 
The main subject is clearly one’s attitude toward the law, which is mentioned three times. 
Six descriptions are given of the nature of the one who follows the law. The one who 
fears YHWH is the same as the wise person, the faithful one, and the intelligent person. 
These descriptions are synonymous expressions intended to encompass the entire being. 
Priority is not placed on one action over the other. There is no conceptual difference 
between the character traits. 
Second, claiming that the fear of the Lord provides the basis for obedience overlooks 
Ben Sira’s statements that define the fear of the Lord as an action to be accomplished. In 
an exposition on the fear of the Lord in 1.11–30, Ben Sira claims, 
You who desire wisdom keep the commandments, and the Lord will supply her to 
you. The fear of the Lord is wisdom and discipline, and his desire is fidelity and 
meekness. Do not disobey the fear of the Lord, and do not come to him with a double 
heart. (vv.26–28) 
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Fear of God is identified as wisdom, and the means to attaining wisdom is through 
obedience to the commandments. It is, in fact, the fear of the Lord that one disobeys. 
Boccaccini succinctly states, “Being pious, loving God, and fearing God represent one 
thing: obeying the law.”90 In his last biographical statement, Ben Sira claims that those 
who follow his instructions will be wise and equal to all “because [yk] the fear of the 
YHWH is life” or, according to the Greek, “his path” (50.29). Those who fear God avoid 
sin (15.13; contrast 23.19), and when they do sin, they repent (21.6) and offer sacrifices to 
God (7.31). The fear of the Lord is not merely a mental assessment or disposition; rather, 
it is obedience to the will of God. 
Finally, one should observe how the fear of the Lord and the law are related by the 
authors of Deuteronomy and Proverbs, the two texts from which Ben Sira primarily draws 
his understanding of the fear of the Lord. Neither of these texts makes the fear of the Lord 
the basis for obedience. In Deuteronomy the fear of the Lord is a covenantal concept 
linked with obedience to the Torah, which is found in a written text. Moses instructs the 
future leaders of Israel to read the law publicly every seventh year “so that [the people] 
may hear and learn in order that they may fear YHWH their God and obey by doing 
(tAf[]l;) all the words of this Torah” and so that their children, who were not present when 
Moses gave the law, will also learn to fear the Lord (Deut 31.12–13). When a new king 
comes to power, a copy of the law is to be written, and he shall study it all his life “in 
order that he may learn to fear YHWH his God and to keep all the words of this Torah 
and its decrees to do them” (17.18–19). A programmatic statement of the Deuteronomic 
perspective is 10.12–13: 
Now, Israel, what does YHWH your God require from you? Except to fear YHWH 
your God, to walk in all his ways, to love him, to serve YHWH your God with all 
your heart and with all your soul (and) to obey the commandments of YHWH and his 
decrees which I am commanding you today for your good.91 
This text brings together key ethical phrases found throughout Deuteronomy in order to 
underscore the necessity for obedience to the law, particularly the law Moses is currently 
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delivering to the people just before they enter the Promised Land. There is no movement 
from an inward attitude to an outer expression in these phrases. Moses’ comment is 
intended to motivate the Israelites to obey the Torah. Aside from one mention of fearing 
God, it is always connected with obedience to the Torah.92 Fear of the Lord does not 
establish one’s relationship nor refer to a personal relationship with God that then 
provides the basis for one’s obedience. 
The sages responsible for Proverbs often stress the practical side of the fear of the 
Lord. The one who fears the Lord obeys his commands (Prov 23.17; 24.21 LXX), which 
means avoiding evil (3.7; 8.13; 16.6) and living an upright life (14.2). Those who desire 
knowledge choose to fear the Lord (1.29). The sages highlight the obedience aspect of the 
fear of the Lord by placing it in parallelism with various terms for wisdom (cf. 1.7; 9.10; 
15.33), which is a practical concept. Wisdom is not simply the acquiring of book 
knowledge, but rather it is living in conformity to the teaching of the sages. The sages’ 
instructions are even equal to the fear of YHWH (compare 13.14 with 14.27). The 
postscript to Qoheleth equates fear of God and obedience to the commandment as the 
single (hz<) duty of a human (12.13). Even if fear of the Lord is an internal attitude that is 
expressed through obedience, the sages never describe it as forming the foundation of 
one’s relationship with God. For these sages, the fear of the Lord refers to obedience to 
the “divine will.”93 
The relationship between faith and obedience proposed by Garlington is simply not 
evident in the text. First, faith is never said to be a gift from God. It is a human action that 
is generated by one’s own desire for God. Second, Ben Sira does not establish a linear 
relationship between faith and obedience. In 2.6 “trust” (p i ,st e uso n) is one of nine 
imperatives found in vv.1–6. Nothing in these verses suggests that faith precedes any of 
the other commands or serves as the grounds for motivating one to be obedient. Third, 
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faith is not based on some prior divine action; rather, one trusts that God will help in the 
future: “Believe in him, and he will help you” (2.6). Throughout chapter 2 faith in God is 
forward looking (vv.8, 10, 13), and in other places Ben Sira encourages one to trust God 
because he will act on one’s behalf (11.21; cf. 32.24).94 Faith in God looks to what he will 
do for a person not backwards to what he might have done. 
Rather than being the basis for one’s obedience, fear of God and faith are ways of 
obeying the law. One final point is worth noting about both of these perspectives. They 
maintain that a relationship with God founded on human obedience is inappropriate, 
fundamentally wrong, and a weaker form of religion. Without one of these inner 
dispositions as the foundation of the relationship, personal obedience can become simply 
routine or, worse, one’s perspective can slip into the mindset that “salvation” is achieved 
by obedience rather than through divine grace. The underlying assumption is that these 
attitudes are the correct and proper human responses to God. Ben Sira’s exhortations to 
obedience, then, must be put in a linear relationship to the attitudes that truly form the 
divine-human relationship. Elevating faith or the fear of the Lord above the other 
commands, however, is an attempt—either consciously or unconsciously—to conform 
Ben Sira to a (traditional) Pauline perspective. Ben Sira’s own emphasis on obedience to 
the law is lost. Rather than imposing a paradigm on Ben Sira, one must first allow him to 
define his view of how the divine-human relationship works without judging its value. 
In summary: Fear of the Lord and faith do not form the basis of the divine-human 
relationship. Further, obedience is not the outward expression of these inner attitudes. The 
relationship is the opposite: obedience to the law is expressed through fearing God and 
believing in him. 
iv. Atonement and Sin 
Whereas some have sought to distance the connection between obedience and 
blessing by focusing on prior, internal human attitudes that reveal themselves in 
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obedience, others have sought to lessen the importance of obedience by pointing to the 
need for forgiveness. Human sinfulness and the possibility for repentance and atonement 
signal, for Gowan, that Ben Sira did not “operate with a strictly merit-based theology.”95 
Sanders argues that atonement points away from the human agent and to the divine. It is 
ultimately not the human’s imperfect obedience that brings life but God’s undeserving 
mercy, which is offered despite the human’s sin. Ben Sira is acutely aware of the moral 
shortcomings of humanity (8.5; 19.16). Unlike those who forsake God’s law (41.8), the 
occasional sinner is not hopelessly condemned to suffer an excruciating death or to come 
under the curses of God. Avoidance of sin is ideal, but when one sins, atonement and 
forgiveness are available. The possibility for forgiveness suggests, then, that the divine-
human relationship is founded on God’s mercy which is given in spite of the human’s sin. 
Ultimately, life and blessing are acquired not by law observance, but by God’s grace.  
Certainly, there is an appeal to God to have mercy, forgive, and forget the sinner’s 
transgressions, but the basis on which God acts in this manner is not his limitless mercy, 
but the human’s return to the Torah. The solution to imperfection and sin is not an appeal 
for mercy, but obedience to the commandments. Performing acts of atonement indicates 
to God that the human’s desire is to be faithful to the commandments, and because one 
has obeyed, God is willing to forgive past transgressions. God forgives because the 
human obeys. Atonement, for Ben Sira, is an act of obedience to the Torah.96 
Traditional methods of atonement, such as repentance (17.25) and praying for 
forgiveness (21.1; cf. 28.2), are encouraged. Ben Sira stresses also almsgiving (3.30; 
7.10; 12.3; 29.1; 35.4) and honouring one’s parents (3.3, 14–15a). Ben Sira’s view of the 
sacrificial system is disputed.97 Büchler argued that Ben Sira does not specifically 
mention the sin or guilt offerings, and he often exhorts one to pray rather than sacrifice 
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(cf. 7.8–10; 21.1; 28.2).98 Büchler assumes that because prayer brings forgiveness Ben 
Sira does not think the person should also sacrifice. This assumption must be questioned 
since Ben Sira encourages other means of atonement along with prayer. Prayer does not 
cancel the need to forgive one’s neighbour (28.2), and it does not stand in opposition to 
almsgiving or honouring one’s parents, which are the two means of atonement most often 
mentioned by Ben Sira. Ben Sira advocates several methods of atonement that neither 
compete with nor cancel out one another. Ben Sira also denounces those who abuse the 
sacrificial system by assuming that God will forgive them if they give abundantly (7.8–9; 
34.21–24; 35.15). Attacking this view would not be necessary if he thought the sacrificial 
system was irrelevant.99 Büchler’s argument is simply biased against the sacrificial 
system.  
In his statements on almsgiving and honouring one’s parents, Ben Sira describes the 
one who does these acts as observing the law. By performing these atoning acts, one is 
not appealing solely to God’s mercy as the source of forgiveness. By doing these atoning 
acts, one fulfils the commandments, so that obedience cancels disobedience. The two 
statements about honouring one’s parents (3.3, 14–15a) form an inclusio around an 
exposition on the fifth commandment (3.1–16): 
The one who honours his father atones (e vxi l a ,ske t ai) for sin. (v.3) 
Kindness (tqdc) to a father will not be forgotten, and it will be firmly planted in place 
of sins. In your day of distress, it will be remembered for you. (vv.14–15a)100 
Throughout the passage, Ben Sira interprets the two aspects of the fifth commandment: 
the command to honour parents and the reward (or promise) of long life in the land that 
results from obedience (Ex 20.12; Deut 5.16).101 He explains that the command takes 
different forms: honour (vv.3, 8), respect (v.6), service (v.7), help (v.12a), and patience 
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(v.13) are positive expressions of the command, while glorifying one’s self at the expense 
of a parent (vv.10–11) and grieving (v.12b) or forsaking (v.16) one’s parents evidence 
one’s failure to obey. The reward for obedience is joy in one’s own children (v.5a), one’s 
prayers being heard by God (v.5b), and a father’s blessing which provides security 
(vv.8b–9a). Ben Sira generalises the reward of life in the land to simply “long life” (v.6). 
Disobedience brings the opposite consequences: no stability (v.9b), lack of glory (vv.10, 
11b), and the curse of the Lord (v.16). The rewards (or punishments) are the outcome of 
one’s obedience (or disobedience) to the commandment. 
The two comments on obedience to the fifth commandment resulting in atonement 
follow this same pattern (vv.3, 14–15a). Atonement for disobedience is given to someone 
who honours his or her parents. Obedience to the law brings forgiveness.102 “The day of 
distress” in v.15 could refer to any point of trouble, but more likely Ben Sira is thinking 
about a point of divine judgment when God calls a person to account for his or her 
actions. Obedience to the law is remembered by God and functions as atonement in place 
of one’s transgressions when God judges. The difficult clause in v.14b also supports the 
idea that one’s obedience counts in place of one’s sin. The NRSV renders v.14b as “will 
be credited (p ro sa no i ko do m h qh ,se t ai) to you against your sins.”  Sanders rightly criticises 
this translation of the rare verb, which is unsupported by the Hebrew.103 Nevertheless, he 
too quickly dismisses the idea that one’s obedience stands in place of one’s disobedience. 
Verse 14b sets one’s obedience directly against one’s sins. Moreover, this clause comes 
between two positive statements about God remembering one’s obedience (vv.14a, 15a). 
The implication is that obedience is remembered instead of disobedience.     
Ben Sira contributes to the growing tradition that almsgiving is an atoning act of 
righteousness done in obedience to the law.104 The first mention of alms or charity 
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appears in his interpretation of the fifth commandment (3.14). One means of fulfilling the 
commandment is by being charitable to one’s father, which brings forgiveness of sin. 
This concept is developed further in 29.1–20, where Ben Sira offers advice on loaning 
money. Providing monetary assistance to a neighbour is a means of keeping the 
commandments (v.1). One’s willingness to lend money, however, should not be limited 
only to those who can repay. Alms should be given without hesitancy to those in need 
(v.8), and one should “help the poor for the commandment’s sake” (v.9; cf. Deut 15.7–
11). Providing alms is like storing up a treasure and is accomplished in accordance with 
the commandments (Sir 29.11–12a; cf. Tobit 4.9–10). Further, almsgiving provides a 
means of security against disaster (Sir 29.12–13; cf. 12.3; 40.17, 24). A helpful analogy is 
Tobit 14.10–11. Tobit explains to his children that Ahikar escaped death because he gave 
alms, while Nadab was imprisoned for his evil ways. Almsgiving is also stated as a means 
of fulfilling the commandments in Sirach 35.4, which appears in a section on the 
sacrifices (vv.1–12). In the first paragraph, Ben Sira outlines various actions that function 
like sacrifices (vv.1–5). Almsgiving is equal to offering a “thank offering.” 
Elsewhere almsgiving is said to count in one’s favour against one’s sin:  “Water 
extinguishes a flaming fire, so almsgiving atones (rpkt/evxi l a,se t a i) for sin” (3.30).105 
Almsgiving functions like obedience to one’s parents and sacrifices since all accomplish 
the same task, namely, atonement. Almsgiving is also mentioned in 17.22, where Ben 
Sira says it is valuable before God. The juxtaposition of this statement with divine 
knowledge of human sin in the previous verse (v.20) and the divine judgment of humans 
in the next two verses suggests that alms counters one’s sin before God.106 When God 
judges one’s works, he takes account of one’s sin or one’s almsgiving and repentance 
(v.24) and rewards or punishes in accordance. 
Both honouring one’s parents and almsgiving are obedience to the commandments 
and means of atonement. Ben Sira is an early witness to the idea that one’s obedience to 
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the law, particularly through almsgiving, brings atonement. One must be careful, 
however, to neither over-interpret nor under-interpret Ben Sira’s claim. One over-
interprets the statements when it is claimed that the Jewish person lived in fear that he or 
she might not amass enough good works to overcome one’s sinful deeds. For Ben Sira 
God does not count one’s deeds so that life (or a peaceful death) hangs in the balance. 
Rather, God judges the totality of one’s life: did the person live according to the law, 
which includes making atonement when one fails? Others under-interpret the statements 
by avoiding the straightforward equation between obedience to the law and atonement.107 
Appeals are made to divine mercy as the means for accounting for human sin, or some 
point out that Ben Sira expects a person to repent.108 While sin affects one’s standing 
before God and the possibility of life or death, Ben Sira maintains that sin and the 
possibility of atonement do not alter the pattern of the divine-human relationship. Law 
observance ultimately determines whether one enjoys a blessed life or dies a miserable 
death. Mercy is not the sole cause of forgiveness, and repentance does not replace other 
acts of atonement. Sin is accounted for by human obedience to the law. The means to life 
remains the same, namely, obedience to the law. 
v. Summary 
This section has analysed the first characteristic of the two-ways paradigm: the 
connection between life and law observance. The “law of life” is given to Israel (17.11; 
45.5) and before each individual God sets “life and death” (15.17). Against Sanders’ 
claim that obedience to the commandments is subsequent to the establishment of the 
covenant, it was argued that God enters into a covenantal relationship as a response to the 
person’s obedience. Moreover, Sanders misunderstood the primary conceptual 
background for the relationship between obedience and life. This context is the Creator-
creation relationship. According to Ben Sira’s description, this relationship revolves 
around God giving commandments and creatures, whether angels, the sun, or humans, 
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obeying those commandments. Obedience to the commandments sits at the centre of the 
relationship since the human task is to keep them. While some have attempted to 
circumvent the centrality of obedience by highlighting either “internal” attitudes or God’s 
merciful forgiveness, both of these were seen to actually be expressions of law 
observance. Ben Sira defines everything about the divine-human relationship in terms of 
obedience to the commandments. All one must do in order to acquire life and blessing 
from God is observe the commandments. 
B. The Human Ability to Obey 
The second key aspect of Ben Sira’s conception of the divine-human relationship 
follows naturally from the link made between life and law observance. Ben Sira maintains 
that humans are morally capable of obeying the commandments. In 15.14–17 he uses the 
combination of rcy and #px to make this point. Humans are created morally neutral, and 
they are capable of choosing between life and death (v.17) and of keeping the 
commandments if they desire (v.15). With the knowledge of the law, the human can 
decide based on his or her own will power whether to take the path leading to life or the 
one unto death. Nothing prevents the individual from obeying except his or her own 
deliberate refusal to obey. The optimistic portrayal of human ability is also found in 17.1–
14. Ben Sira claims that God himself gave knowledge, and this divine act makes humans 
culpable for their actions. The underlying assumption is that because the individual is 
responsible for the outcome he or she must be capable of controlling that outcome. For 
Ben Sira the divine act of giving the law implies that the recipient is capable of keeping it. 
Life and blessing can be attained through obedience because the knowledge of what is 
necessary to acquire life is clearly known. 
In contrast to what will be noted about the Hodayot and Paul, Ben Sira does not think 
the human needs God’s assistance to obey the law. In fact, Ben Sira claims the precise 
opposite: Not only is divine assistance not needed, God actually withdraws his presence 
from the scene. After setting the human before the alternative paths of life and death, God 
leaves the individual to his or her own will (15.14). God himself does not interfere in the 
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human’s autonomous choice. Whereas the opponents argued that God determined human 
action, Ben Sira claims that God is not responsible for the disobedience of any individual 
because God is not actively working in the human’s life. He is a passive observer (vv.18–
20). The act of obedience is an independent, secondary step. Only because God is 
removed (temporarily) from the scene can the human be held responsible for his or her 
transgression. This divine decision to separate from the human creates the possibility for 
the human to obey. God’s holiness is protected and human obedience is made important. 
Many of Ben Sira’s statements simply presume that his students are capable of 
obeying his instructions. 15.14–20 and 17.1–14 are exceptions since in these passages 
Ben Sira actually attempts to justify this assumption. Despite the lack of formal argument 
for this view, one can detect its influence elsewhere. Particularly relevant here are several 
passages in which Ben Sira personifies Wisdom as God’s agent (4.11–20; 6.18–37; 
14.20–15.10). In these poems, Ben Sira personifies “wisdom” as a beautiful female who 
should be pursued with all one’s energy. Two important points run throughout each 
poem. First, each poem describes humans successfully keeping the law apart from divine 
assistance. Second, Wisdom, as God’s agent and the mediator of his presence, avails her 
benefits only to those who have endured her trials. This second point further supports the 
argument that life and blessing are attained through obedience. 
i. Wisdom as the Result of Endurance 
In 4.11–19 Ben Sira explains the blessings received by those who pursue and acquire 
wisdom. The passage opens with some general observations about the one who desires 
Wisdom. He or she sits under Wisdom’s tutelage and rises early looking for her (vv.11–
12). Once one finds wisdom, he should never let go (v.13). One willingly serves and 
obeys her (vv.14–15), and as a result will enjoy her benefits, which include “glory” 
(v.13), security, and the ability to “judge the nations [tma/e;qnh]” (v.15).109 In these 
instructions, Ben Sira makes blessing contingent on obedience. One must remain faithful 
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to Wisdom by being obedient (v.16), and the result is all the wonderful treasures that 
Wisdom has to offer. 
In vv.17–19 Ben Sira goes on to describe the testing one must endure in order to 
acquire Wisdom.110 
For I will go with him, making myself strange [rkn],111 and I will test him with 
temptations. I will bring fear and timidity on him, and I will torture him with my 
discipline [pa id ei ,a] until his heart is filled with me.112 I will turn and lead him, and I 
will reveal to him my secrets. If he wanders away, I will forsake him, and will deliver 
him over to the destroyers. 
The idea of the Lord’s people being tested is not unique, but the method employed by 
Wisdom differs remarkably from the Lord’s.113 When he tested his people in the 
wilderness, he continued to meet their needs (cf. Deut 8.2–3), and no trickery was 
involved. Wisdom, by contrast, tests her pursuer by concealing her identity from him. 
While the verb rkn can simply mean that one’s appearance is changed so that others are 
unable to identity the person (Job 2.12; Lam 4.8), in other instances it describes one who 
alters his or her appearance in order to deceive someone. Rebekah covered Jacob in 
animal skin in order to mislead Isaac (Gen 27.23). Similarly, Jeroboam’s wife tried to 
trick Ahijah by disguising herself (1 Kings 14.5–6). In light of the testing imagery, Ben 
Sira probably intends the latter meaning.114 Wisdom hides her presence from her disciple 
in order that she might entice him to abandon her. The nominal form of this word (yrIk.n ") is 
the name given by the ancient sages to the Foolish Woman, who seeks to trap the simple 
(Prov 2.16; 5.20; 6.24; 7.5). By using this root, Ben Sira may be suggesting that Lady 
Wisdom appears to her pursuer as the Foolish Woman in order to test him. The sentence 
“I will torture him with my discipline” (Sir 4.17d) likely means that Wisdom, acting as 
the Foolish Woman, continuously presents her pursuer with opportunities and reasons to 
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disobey. The stringent commands of Wisdom appear burdensome and unnecessary in 
light of the pleasures offered by the Foolish Woman. 
The testing motif highlights the crucial role of obedience, and this is confirmed by 
the contrast between the two individuals in vv.18–19. Only those who remain obedient 
receive Wisdom’s benefits. Those who are led astray by Wisdom’s trickery are cast 
aside.115 Wisdom’s relationship with any individual revolves around that person’s 
obedience. This pattern of interaction suggests that the divine-human relationship is 
similar, for Wisdom is God’s representative agent. 
Along with this idea of blessing being acquired through obedience, one should also 
note that Wisdom’s assistance is not required in order for one to obey her demands. The 
entire poem functions as an implied exhortation, and it assumes that the exhortation can 
be fulfilled. Ben Sira, in fact, is so confident in an individual’s ability to obey that he even 
describes Wisdom as working against the human. Wisdom’s presence at the beginning is 
no benefit to the human and may actually have adverse affects. When Wisdom finally 
reveals herself to the obedient, she comes with blessings and not to assist the human to 
obey. Implied throughout the poem is that the human can be obedient apart from God and 
even in spite of Wisdom’s trials.   
The lengthy poem in 6.18–37 details how one chooses “discipline” (p a i d ei ,a) in order 
to acquire wisdom (v.18). Ben Sira uses two images, agriculture and hunting 
(imprisonment in the Greek), to convey how one attains discipline. These images 
emphasise the trial and labour required to become disciplined and acquire wisdom. The 
poem teaches that Wisdom comes only through constant discipline, and this includes 
careful reflection on and observance of the Torah.116 
 Like a farmer labouring in the field, one must toil and become disciplined in order to 
reap the benefits of Wisdom (vv.19–22). The effort put forth is minimal compared to the 
benefits given by Wisdom (cf. 51.27). This is only the path for those who accept 
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discipline. Like a farmer who removes a rock from his field, those who reject discipline 
cast aside Wisdom (6.20–21). Unlike the farmer, however, who removes the rock in order 
to cultivate the field, the undisciplined cast away the item that they need the most. In the 
mind of the foolish, undisciplined person, the burden of Wisdom’s discipline outweighs 
the benefits she makes available to those who toil. 
The second stanza employs the image of hunting to describe one’s desire to capture 
Wisdom (vv.23–31). Ben Sira exhorts his students to place themselves in Wisdom’s net 
and become her prey (vv.24–25).117 The image conveys the sense that Wisdom’s ways 
appear as a trap for those who desire her discipline. The image frightens the weak-hearted 
and assures that only those who truly desire Wisdom will pursue her. This idea is even 
stronger in the Greek, which uses the image of imprisonment. The human must give up 
all his or her privileges to Wisdom. One becomes like a prisoner, taken captive by a 
foreign ruler. The subjection, however, is voluntary and for the time being difficult. 
Verses 26–28 mix into the hunting image themes associated with the Love Story 
(Liebesgeschichte).118 The human is portrayed as a suitor pursuing his beloved (vv.26–
27). Once he has hold of her, he must not let go. The hunter has captured his prey, and 
now, like a new bride, Wisdom gives herself to her suitor. “For at last you will find her 
rest, and she will turn into delight for you” (v.28). Wisdom now becomes a delight to her 
capturers, and the fetters, which seemed like bondage (v.24), now provide protection 
(vv.29–30). Just as hunting for animals requires patience and discipline and the pursuit of 
love takes endurance, one’s attempt to capture Wisdom requires the same. 
In the final stanza (vv.32–37), the pursuit of discipline is connected with Torah 
observance.119 Students should attach themselves to wise men who discourse about the 
Torah (cf. 9.15; 37.12). Presumably, Ben Sira has in mind teachers like himself (33.16–
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18) who discuss not only the interpretation of the ancient Scriptures but, more 
importantly, how one obeys the commandments. He concludes this section by 
commanding his students to devote themselves to the Torah: “Consider diligently in the 
fear of the Most High and in his commandments and meditate continually. Then he will 
inform your heart and will give you wisdom as you desire” (6.37).120 The ultimate and 
most important means for acquiring Wisdom is through Torah observance. This verse 
indicates clearly the conditional relationship between law observance and blessing. God 
acknowledges the obedience of the human by giving to the human what he or she desired.  
As with 4.11–20, this poem teaches that the one who desires wisdom must embrace 
hard work and endure a period during which Wisdom’s benefits are not evident. Ben 
Sira’s focus throughout the poem is on the human agent actively pursuing life and 
wisdom. The metaphors used highlight the difficultly involved in acquiring wisdom, and 
they all emphasise the active pursuit required by the human. Obedience is the means to 
attaining wisdom, which is then given by God. Wisdom’s presence is, therefore, a 
blessing attained through obedience. This indicates that Wisdom’s assistance is not 
needed in order to obey the commandments. There is no suggestion that the human will 
fail because of some moral incapacity or hindrance from an external being. The human 
possesses the power to obey and endure the difficult paths that lead to wisdom. 
In the third poem, Ben Sira again mixes the images of hunting and love to explain the 
human pursuit of wisdom (14.20–15.10). He first describes the one who desires Wisdom. 
He pursues her like a hunter and sets traps for her (14.22), and he camps near her place of 
residence (vv.23–27). The person progressively moves closer to Wisdom until he resides 
under her protection and is able to avoid the blazing sun. Finally, the person dwells inside 
Wisdom’s own home. Wisdom, for her part, “comes like a mother to him and like a 
young bride, she welcomes him” (15.2). She satisfies with “bread of understanding” and 
“water of wisdom” (v.3). She provides support and exalts the one who relies on her 
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(vv.4–5) and rewards her pursuer with the greatest of all rewards, “an everlasting name” 
(v.6). 
Contrary to Boccaccini, this poem does not describe “a contemporary and 
simultaneous movement” of Wisdom and her pursuer toward one another.121 Rather, it 
describes a sequential process in which a lover strives after his beloved until he has won 
her over. Much like the lover of the Song of Songs, the one who desires Wisdom pursuers 
her. Similar to the beloved of the Song, Wisdom receives her suitor and imparts joy and 
provision to him. Wisdom must be sought first before she gives her benefits. The only 
way to Wisdom is through obedience to the law, and Wisdom herself is the reward for 
those who keep the commandments. 
The crucial point for understanding the poem comes at the very centre: “For the one 
who fears the Lord will do this (taz), and the one who grasps the Torah will come to her” 
(15.1). The referent of taz is not clear. It could point back to what has been described in 
14.20–27. Alternatively, it could refer to the next line about Torah observance (15.1b). 
Either way, Ben Sira’s poem about the pursuit of wisdom culminates in obedience to the 
Torah. As Webster points out, the erotic images in these verses elicit emotions that are 
then directed toward the Torah.122 Again, this poem contains an implicit exhortation to 
pursue wisdom with all one’s focus since this is the way to life and blessing. Ben Sira 
also assumes that the human can obey the law apart from God’s intervention. Wisdom 
arrives on the scene only after the human has successfully obeyed. 
These three poems are linked both in terminology and in thought. Each portrays the 
human pursuit for wisdom and blessing through obedience. As with his statements 
elsewhere, Ben Sira describes blessing as contingent upon obedience. Contrary to the 
claims of Sanders, Garlington, and others, life is not freely given through the covenant. 
Rather, it is attained through persistent obedience to Wisdom’s demands.  
Each poem also relates how the human is capable of obeying apart from divine 
assistance. In each section, Wisdom’s assistance comes only after the human has endured 
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her tests and faithfully pursued her. The lack of divine assistance does not indicate that 
Ben Sira’s understanding of the divine-human relationship is legalistic in the pejorative 
sense. Yet, there is, contrary to Garlington’s claim, a “notion of unaided self-
achievement” portrayed in these passages and others.123 The idea of “unaided self-
achievement” does not have to be understood in a negative Pauline/Reformation sense, 
however. The unassisted obedience of the human does not result in boasting before 
God,124 but it is nonetheless the case that Ben Sira thinks the human can obey apart from 
divine intervention.125 This indeed is fundamental to his theology.126 
This separation between God and Wisdom and the human is crucial for Ben Sira for 
two reasons. First, it protects the human agent’s autonomy. God does not influence the 
human in his or her decision whether to choose life or death. The alternative view’s claim 
that God dictates human action, therefore, is rejected. Second, it keeps the focus on the 
human agent. Whereas Ben Sira’s opponents seek to eliminate the human agent, he 
establishes the primacy of the human agent by arguing that God removes himself. 
ii. Freedom and Providence 
Despite his claim that humans are free to determine their own destinies, one should 
not conclude that Ben Sira views God as anxiously looking at humans wondering what 
they will do next. Nor should one conclude that God has simply left creation to run itself 
and he has no interest in what humans do. This was the position taken by Ben Sira’s 
opponents (16.17, 20–22), and he strongly rejects it. In Ben Sira’s view, God remains the 
sovereign Creator. Nothing is hidden from God’s sight (15.18–19; 17.15, 19–20; 23.19) 
since his knowledge extends from before creation and continues unabated (23.20). God’s 
sovereign hand is visibly seen in the ruling governments (10.4–5; cf. Prov 21.1), and, as 
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will be discussed below, at some point he will judge each individual for his or her sins. 
God himself distinguished between the days when he declared some holy and some 
common and between humans when he blessed some and cursed others (36/33.7–15). In 
this text is the teaching about the duality of the world. “All the works of the Most High,” 
Ben Sira claims, “come in pairs, one the opposite of the other” (v.15; cf. 42.24).127 Ben 
Sira’s belief in the ultimate sovereignty of God is, in the view of many scholars, difficult 
to reconcile with his claims about human freedom. It is possible that Ben Sira was simply 
confused or, as some scholars contend, gave different answers to different problems as 
the situation necessitated without realising that the answers were contradictory.128 Such a 
conclusion, however, denies to Ben Sira the ability to be a complex thinker as well as 
overlooks the traditional nature of Ben Sira’s claims.129 
The traditional nature of Ben Sira’s statements should not be missed. One is hard 
pressed to find any Jewish source of the Second Temple period that denies to God 
knowledge of future events or that declines to him ultimate control over the world. While 
some authors, however, did deny human freedom (cf. 1QS 3–4), the wisdom tradition did 
not view God’s sovereignty as impinging on human freedom. Prior sages taught that God 
not only sees the actions of both the evil and the good (Prov 15.3), but also that he created 
everything, including “the wicked for the day of trouble” (16.4). This specific divine 
action, however, does not mean that God created a specific group of people designated as 
“the wicked.” Rather, the wicked are those who have been arrogant (v.5), prideful, and 
generally reject wisdom. The sages behind Proverbs see no conflict between claiming that 
God determines the lot (v.33), directs the king (21.1), or provides “the answer of the 
tongue” (16.1) and the exhortation “to watch over mouth and tongue is to keep one’s soul 
from distresses” (21.23). Fundamental to the sapiential worldview is the possibility for 
humans to act according to their own will and the assumption that God remains in control 
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of the world. The ordered nature of creation is what reveals God’s control, and the goal of 
wisdom instruction is to teach a person how to cohere one’s life with this order. This 
background provides the context within which Ben Sira thinks about the relationship 
between God’s providence and human free will.  
Ben Sira’s teaching on the duality of creation should be read within this context (Sir 
36/33.7–15). The passage affirms that God can move individuals as he pleases (v.13), but 
Ben Sira’s general view is that God does not interfere with individual decisions.130 The 
passage is not a blanket statement of divine determination of every human being or 
activity. Ben Sira rather relates the general teaching that God remains in control of his 
creation. The principle of opposites (v.14) testifies to the order of creation and should not 
be taken as a statement that God created two opposite groups of humans whose destines 
are eternally fixed.131 Similarly, the potter image in v.13 indicates that God has ultimate 
control over creation, but, as in Jeremiah 18.1–11, the image is not necessarily 
deterministic.132 Ben Sira’s reflections on God’s sovereignty are presented in a specific 
form that is in some ways new, but the actual content and teaching of the passage is the 
same as one finds in other sapiential passages. God’s will (!wcr) does not ultimately 
determine human destiny, but neither does human freedom negate God’s foreknowledge 
and providence.133  
To summarise: the two-ways paradigm laid out in 15.14–17 has thus far proven to be 
an accurate summary of Ben Sira’s understanding of the divine-human relationship. Ben 
Sira correlates law observance with life so that life and blessing are ultimately dependent 
on obedience not God’s mercy or grace. His statements about life and obedience are best 
understood within the framework of the Creator-creation relationship, not Sanders’ 
pattern of covenantal nomism. For Ben Sira, a covenantal relationship with God is itself a 
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blessing given by God in response to obedience to the Torah. Ben Sira has also claimed 
either explicitly or implicitly in several passages that humans can obey the Torah. The 
three passages in 4.11–20, 6.18–37, and 14.20–15.10 develop the theme of the human 
pursuit for wisdom. One aspect that connects these passages is the description of humans 
obeying without Wisdom’s assistance and even in spite of Wisdom’s trickery. For Ben 
Sira the human simply has no need for God to intervene to correct some inherent problem 
or to enable one to obey. 
While Ben Sira sought to distance the human from God, he does not eliminate God 
entirely from the scene. The next section looks at how Ben Sira describes the judgment of 
God. The act of judgment is, for Ben Sira, God’s most important act, since in this act God 
re-enters the drama and gives blessings or curses based solely on what each individual has 
done. 
C. Judgment as the Re-Action of God 
Although God’s initial act of giving the law establishes the basic structures of the 
divine-human relationship, the final act of God dominates Ben Sira’s thinking about God. 
The giving of the law sets in motion a chain of events in which the human must choose to 
either obey or disobey and the outcome of the human’s decision determines how God will 
respond. The judgment is God’s second major act. Here he re-enters the scene in order to 
judge the individual based on his or her deeds.134  
Ben Sira’s view of judgment is forged out of his debate with his opponents. If God 
decides to judge, the other positions think that they have nothing to worry about because 
God’s default position toward humans is mercy. “His mercy is great” is their rallying call 
(5.6). Mercy assures them that forgiveness is available for all their sins. They focus on 
God and his attributes as the key to understanding how God will judge humans. Against 
this view, however, Ben Sira claims that God’s mercy and wrath are equally balanced. 
                                                 
134
 Because Ben Sira has no notion of an eternal life or death, the judgment he speaks about should not 
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God has no default position toward humanity. Rather than focusing on God’s character at 
the judgment, Ben Sira makes judgment revolve around the human agent. God’s decision 
whether to bless or punish is a re-action to whether the individual obeyed or disobeyed. 
As with all of Ben Sira’s thought, the focus even of his view of the divine act of judgment 
is on the human agent. 
Ben Sira’s understanding of the method by which God judges can be summarised: 
God evaluates a person’s deeds and rewards or punishes based solely on what a person 
has done. God’s default position is neither mercy nor wrath, since whether he shows 
mercy or wrath is determined entirely by an individual’s obedience. 
i. Patience and Mercy 
Whereas the other views hold that the delay in retribution is evidence that God is 
uninterested in what human do, Ben Sira argues that the delay shows God to be patient.135 
Following the lead of his scriptures, he says that God is “slow to anger” (5.4b). The 
terminology comes from the often-repeated creed found first in Exodus 34.6. Moses has 
requested to see God’s glory, and from his position behind the rock, he hears the claim 
that God is merciful, slow to anger, forgiving but still one who punishes sin. Ben Sira 
fully embraces the idea that God is patient and allows time for a person to repent of his or 
her sins (17.15–29). God’s patience is for the benefit of humanity (18.11–12). 
God’s patience should not be understood as non-action. First, history proves that God 
calls people to account for their actions. Ben Sira recalls God’s judgment of Sodom, the 
removal of the Canaanites from the Promised Land, and the punishment of the wilderness 
generation (16.6–10). History also provides examples of those who trusted in God and 
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were not disappointed (2.10). Second, the delay in judgment supports Ben Sira’s non-
eschatological understanding of reward and punishment. The moment of death serves as 
the final and most important point at which God reveals his view of a person’s actions. 
The person who suffers greatly or dies young is being punished by God. God rewards the 
obedient with a peaceful death. Ben Sira, therefore, warns his readers not to rely on 
current perspectives since the truth about a person will be revealed at his or her death. 
Ben Sira’s understanding about the timing of divine judgment is not controlled by his 
view of divine patience. He exhorts, “Remember retribution does not delay” (7.16b). In 
5.7 he claims, “For suddenly [God] will go forth cursing.” Even the rich should not trust 
in their money since death can come at any point (11.18–19; cf. 9.12) or worse they lose 
their wealth to the poor (11.21). The prayer of the humble rises quickly to the Lord, and 
like a warrior, he will not delay or be patient when executing judgment (35.21–22).136 An 
example of this is when God delivered Israel from Assyria. In response to the prayers of 
the people, the Lord acted quickly by sending Isaiah to provide instructions (48.20). Both 
divine redemption and judgment are found in this single event. The delay in judgment 
upon which the alternative theologies relied is not the only pattern for how God interacts 
with humans. Divine judgment can come at any moment and without any warning. Ben 
Sira, therefore, concludes his work with an exhortation to obedience, which serves as a 
summary of the entire message of the work. Each person should continue in obedience, 
and God will reward the person when he deems it appropriate (51.30). The importance of 
proper timing is emphasised through the repetition of ka i ro ,j in both halves of the 
verse.137 
Closely related to the idea of God as patient is also the notion that God is merciful 
(cf. 18.11).138 The alternative positions claim that if God decides to judge he will show 
mercy. They unyieldingly claim, “Great is his mercy. He will forgive the multitude of my 
sins” (5.6). They confidently rely on God’s mercy and forgiveness so that they have no 
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need to worry about the outcome of the judgment. God will find in their favour because 
of his mercy. They maintain that God’s default position toward humans is mercy. 
Ben Sira, by contrast, claims God has no default position toward humans. If only one 
“stiff-necked” (@r[ hXqm) person remained, God would not overlook this person’s 
transgressions. Rather, he would punish the person (16.11). This verse clearly shows that 
God’s default position toward the sinner is not mercy. In his discussions of judgment, Ben 
Sira maintains an equal balance between mercy and wrath: 
For mercy and wrath are from him. (5.6c) 
For mercy and wrath are with him; and he remits and forgives, but his wrath rests on 
the wicked. As his mercy is great, so also is his wrath; He judges each according to 
one’s deeds. (16.11c–12)139 
Mercy and wrath stand parallel to each other and neither dominates the other. God’s 
interactions with humans are controlled by neither his mercy (grace or love) nor his 
wrath. 
The balance between these attributes does not remain forever since God will 
eventually judge each person. The evaluation of a person’s deeds determines whether 
God shows mercy or wrath. In 16.12–13 Ben Sira places wrath and mercy in balance, 
states that God will judge according to deeds, and then explains that the sinner will not 
escape and the godly will be rewarded. God’s undetermined position gives way at the 
judgment of one’s deeds. It is only after the judgment that one receives mercy or wrath. In 
17.29 Ben Sira writes, “How great is the mercy of the Lord and (his) atonement to those 
who turn to him.” Mercy and atonement are given only to those who repent of their 
transgressions. Although patience is shown to all, it is given especially to those who 
accept God’s discipline (18.14). The wicked fall under the wrath of God, while the 
righteous receive mercy. 
Sanders is, therefore, incorrect to claim that “the heart of Ben Sirach’s religion” is 
“confidence in God’s justice tempered by confidence in his mercy: pragmatic nomism 
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modified by the assurance of compassion.”140 The mercy of God does not lessen his 
justice or his wrath. Similarly, Yinger is incorrect when he claims that “the divine 
recompense according to deeds is superseded for the penitent by mercy and 
forgiveness.”141 Judgment by works does not cease to operate because the person repents. 
Repentance and subsequent obedience are acknowledged by God so that the person is no 
longer deserving of punishment. The righteous person looked to God’s mercy as his 
reward for obedience. The justice of God assures that mercy is given to those who 
deserve it, while wrath to those who warrant it. God does not overlook the sins of the 
wise because he is merciful, but because the wise atone for their sins through the various 
means supplied by God. Seifrid’s conclusion about mercy in the Psalms of Solomon is 
applicable to Ben Sira also: mercy does not “express deliverance in spite of justice, but 
deliverance as justice rendered by God.”142 Divine mercy is the reward given to the 
obedient. The interpretation put forth by Sanders and Yinger is, in fact, closer to the 
perspective of the alternative theologies than to Ben Sira. 
ii. The Criterion of Divine Judgment 
If God decided to judge humanity for their sins, the alternative theologies relied on 
their sacrifices to appease God’s wrath. Ben Sira rejects their claim: “The Most High is 
not pleased with the offerings of the ungodly, nor because of many sacrifices does he 
atone for sins” (34.23). As he explains, sacrifices are only valid when accompanied by 
obedience (35.1–12). Divine judgment is not based on one’s ability to slaughter an animal 
but on one’s success in keeping the law. 
Scholars agree that, in his perspective on divine judgment, Ben Sira adopts the 
commonly held “doctrine of retribution” as the basic paradigm by which God judges 
humans.143 This view can be summarised: the person who obeys God’s will, as expressed 
particularly in the Torah, will be rewarded with “life” (security, peaceful death, 
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everlasting name, etc.); the one who commits evil and rejects the Torah will be punished 
and experience “death” (tribulation, short life and painful death, dishonoured name, 
etc).144 The concept of retribution arises from the basic principle that God judges a person 
based on one’s actions. Thus, Ben Sira writes that the Lord will “reward a person 
according to his ways” (11.26).145 This widely held idea is particularly important for Ben 
Sira as he seeks to counter the alternative views, which is probably why four of the five 
instances of this statement are made in the context of his disputes with the other positions 
(11.26; 16.12–14; 17.23).146 Against the claims of the wicked (11.23–24), Ben Sira 
reminds one that material possessions provide no security at the time of judgment. Even if 
judgment tarries until one’s death, God will expose the person’s deeds (v.26). The 
righteous, therefore, should continue in their obedient ways with the certainty that God 
will reward them (vv.21–22) and punish the wicked. 16.12–14 provides the grounds on 
which God condemns the previous examples listed in vv.5–10. God did not arbitrarily 
judge in the past, for those he condemned were sinners. He evaluated their actions and 
rewarded them accordingly. Although God can show mercy, it is only given to those who 
deserve it. The sinner will not go unpunished just as the godly person’s obedience does 
not go unnoticed. 17.24 appears in the middle of Ben Sira’s appeal for the wicked to turn 
from their sins (vv.15–29). Their evil ways are not hidden from God, as they think 
(16.17), which means they cannot escape judgment. Punishment can be avoided if they 
will repent and abandon their evil ways. Giving alms will replace their evil deeds before 
God (17.22). The prospect of judgment according to works serves, then, as motivation for 
repentance. 
The idea of judgment by works appears regularly outside of the debate passages.147 
Writing about the one who seeks to honour himself, Ben Sira says, “The Lord will reveal 
your secrets, and in the midst of the assembly, he will overthrow you” (1.30). About the 
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righteous person, he writes, “Do good to the just, and reward will be yours, if not from 
him, from the Lord” (12.2).148 These two verses establish two different ways in which 
God interacts with humans, and the deciding factor is what each person does. The first 
person exalts himself, while the second shows goodness to someone else. The one 
receives punishment, and the other is rewarded. In both cases, God evaluates one’s 
actions and then renders a judgment. Ben Sira exhorts those who fear God to not sway but 
to remain faithful. If they stumble, they could fall and lose their reward (2.7–8). The 
possibility of reward functions in 2.7–9 as a motivation for obedience. In contrast to the 
righteous, God will punish the sinner because of their lack of trust (2.12–14). The one 
who does evil will have evil returned to him (7.1–3; cf. 13.1; 27.25–29; 28.1), and the one 
who embraces a prostitute will be caught (9.3–9).149 The one who cares for the outcast of 
society will be as a son to God (4.10). The final statement of the book highlights the 
importance of this theme: the human does his or her duty, and God rewards for it (51.30). 
Although this is only a small sampling of the verses that describe the judgment, it is clear 
that the criterion of judgment is one’s deeds. 
The idea of judgment by works is enhanced through the image of a treasury and the 
counting of good versus evil deeds. Ben Sira warns, “Do not commit a sin twice since you 
will not go unpunished for one” (7.8). Although the comment could be overstated for 
rhetorical effect, Ben Sira could actually think that one sin could be the difference 
between life and death. He notes later that God keeps account of one’s sins (28.1). 
Whereas humans are supposed to keep the Torah, God keeps track of when they break his 
commandments. Ben Sira uses the image of a treasury as a motivation for obedience. 
Giving alms is considered making a deposit in a holding so that in the face of disaster one 
will be delivered (29.12). One’s treasure is one’s obedience to the commandments, and 
obedience is more valuable than gold (v.11). Charity to one’s father counts in place of 
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one’s sin (3.14). This image could suggest a strict counting of deeds where one’s 
obedience replaces one’s sin before God and tips the scales in one’s favour.150 
One should not conclude from these verses, however, that judgment amounts to a 
single deed. The singularity of sin in 7.8 contrasts with the multiple gifts the sinner 
intends to offer as the means of repentance in v.9. By explaining that God keeps track of 
one’s sins (28.1), Ben Sira is pointing out that nothing the human does escapes God’s 
notice and that judgment will happen someday. The treasure image does not necessarily 
mean that each action done by a human either contributes to the chest or removes 
something. The image is only used in a positive sense: the obedient person contributes to 
a treasury, which brings a reward. Ben Sira never says that the wicked contribute to a 
treasury nor does he claim that the righteous deduct something from the treasury when 
they sin. The lack of a negative application of this image is significant for understanding 
what it means. The image underscores the importance of obedience and encourages one to 
continue being obedient. One’s status as righteous or wicked does not hang in the balance 
waiting for the moment of judgment. Life or death is the result of God’s judgment, but the 
individual Israelite can be certain of the outcome. 
Throughout Sirach the criterion of judgment remains consistent. One’s status as a 
member of Israel does not factor into Ben Sira’s understanding of judgment. As Sanders 
notes, the only criterion that matters when determining if a person has “salvation” is 
whether one is among the wicked or the righteous, which is determined entirely by one’s 
obedience to God’s will.151 Further, one’s mental disposition toward the law does not 
factor into the judgment.152 Ben Sira assumes that the person who loves the law will obey 
it (2.16). The judgment evaluates what a person actually does, not what one claims to 
think or believe. 
Sanders, however, is wrong when, in explaining the relationship between mercy and 
justice, he describes the judgment asymmetrically: “the usual formulation is that God 
                                                 
150
 Box/Oesterley comment, “The good deed is written down in God’s book and therefore cannot be 
blotted out” (“Sirach,” 1.325; cf. Skehan/Di Lella, Wisdom of Ben Sira, 156). 
151
 Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism, 333. 
152
 Contra Yinger, Judgment, 285 
  
89 
 
punishes the wicked for their deeds, while bestowing mercy on the righteous.”153 This 
subtle shift alters the entire paradigm and introduces God’s action into the issue. The 
wicked are judged based on their actions, but for the righteous judgment is dependent on 
God’s actions. Regardless of the applicability of this formulation to other Jewish texts, it 
misunderstands Ben Sira’s claim. Ben Sira views divine judgment in symmetrical terms: 
both the wicked and righteous are judged according to deeds. The wicked are judged and 
punished because they disobey; the righteous are judged and rewarded because they obey. 
At the judgment, according to Ben Sira, God does not evaluate one’s desire or 
attempt to keep the law. Nor does God count how many bulls and goats one killed. He 
looks solely at one’s obedience to the law. The question asked at the judgment is, did this 
person keep the law? The difference between the wicked and the righteous is not an 
attitude toward the law, but actual observance of the law. The wicked refuse to obey the 
law and reject it as the means to life. The righteous embrace the law, obey it fully, which 
includes atoning for one’s sins, and accept it as the means to life and God’s favour. The 
wicked are punished, while the righteous are rewarded. 
iii. Summary 
Ben Sira’s understanding of judgment, while derived from his scriptures, is forged 
out of conflict. These other positions, in their own ways, deny that God will call humans 
to account for their deeds. Their understanding of judgment revolves around God’s 
actions, not humanity’s. Ben Sira, however, will have none of this, for it is the reality of 
judgment that reveals the necessity for obedience to the commandments. In his view of 
the judgment, Ben Sira’s focus is ultimately on the human agent and what he or she does. 
When God judges he looks at whether the human has obeyed or disobeyed. The delay in 
retribution only indicates that God is patient, and his default position toward humans is 
not mercy. Mercy and wrath are equally balanced, and whether God shows one or the 
other depends solely on whether the individual has obeyed or disobeyed. The criterion of 
judgment is one’s deeds. Within Ben Sira’s perspective on the divine-human relationship, 
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the judgment is not important because God does it, but because the obedient are 
vindicated and the disobedient punished. The judgment is ultimately about the human 
agent. 
3. Conclusion 
Of Josephus’ three schools, Ben Sira provides a clear example of the Sadducean 
view. Neither Ben Sira nor the Sadducees denied the existence of God, but both believed 
that God had empowered human beings to keep the Torah and determine for themselves 
their own individual destinies. This view, in the case of Ben Sira, is defended against 
other views, which deny the prospect of judgment or presume on God’s grace. The 
problem with these views, for Ben Sira, is that they overemphasise divine action. In 
contrast to these views, Ben Sira argues that the divine-human relationship revolves 
around the human agent and whether he or she obeys the Torah. He adopts the two-ways 
tradition (15.14–17), which he finds in Moses’ appeal to Israel (Deut 30.15–20). In this 
pattern, the human is empowered to obey and Torah observance leads to divine blessing. 
For Ben Sira, Moses’ statement indicates that the human’s destiny is determined by his or 
her obedience to the Torah, not God’s grace. 
Sanders presented Sirach as an example of covenantal nomism. He did not deny the 
emphasis placed on obedience by Ben Sira. Instead, as covenantal nomism makes clear, 
he contended that obedience was the response of the faithful Israelite to the prior grace of 
God. This covenantal context, however, is the wrong framework for Ben Sira’s demand 
for obedience. Ben Sira understands the divine-human relationship as a subset of the 
Creator-creation relationship. Just as the latter is based on the creature’s obedience to 
God’s commands, so the former is also. The human is distinguished from the rest of 
creation because he or she possesses freedom and can disobey God’s will. By viewing the 
divine-human relationship within the sphere of the Creator-creation relationship and with 
this claim that human’s possess freedom, Ben Sira centres his thought on the human agent 
and his or her obedience. 
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In his reaction to the alternative views’ overemphasis on God, Ben Sira does not 
deny that God acts. He rather depicts God as reacting to the human’s obedience or 
disobedience. God is merciful, but he is equally wrathful. How he responds to the 
individual is determined entirely by whether a person has kept the Torah. The single 
criterion of the judgment is indeed obedience. God’s mercy is not given to any Israelite, 
but only to the faithful. Sanders’ interpretation of Sirach, along with Garlington’s and 
Yinger’s, turns out to ascribe to Ben Sira the very view that he sought to disprove. 
Ben Sira provides one end of the spectrum of Jewish views offered in the Second 
Temple Period. His focus on the human agent contrasts sharply with the Hodayot’s 
attention to divine action, as the next chapter will show.
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CHAPTER 2 
God’s Gracious Acts of Deliverance in the Hodayot 
Ben Sira argued robustly that law observance is the means to life and blessing. The 
divine-human relationship revolves around what each individual does. He matches 
Josephus’ claim that the Sadducees ascribe everything to human action not “fate” 
(e i `m a rm e,nh). On the other end of the spectrum, for Josephus, stand the Essenes, who 
attribute everything to “fate.” This chapter investigates the Hodayot as a representative of 
an Essene-like position. The hymns contained in this document consistently point to 
God’s saving acts. The human is a sinner created from perishable material, and when left 
to his or her own devices, the sinner will always disobey. God, however, has predestined 
some to salvation, and he brings the sinner from a state of condemnation to salvation. To 
bring the human into the realm of salvation, God imparts his Spirit of knowledge and 
holiness. Led by this Spirit, the human is enabled, despite his continuing sinful condition, 
to obey God’s will. The focus throughout the hymns is God’s gracious acts of 
deliverance. While the hymnist maintains that humans must be obedient, this obedience is 
based on God’s prior and continuing acts. The possibility for human action is created by 
God himself when he delivers the human from his frail, sinful creaturely condition. 
After addressing some introductory issues regarding the Hodayot material, this 
chapter will analyse how the hymnist sets human action in relation to divine action. 
Attention will be drawn to the pessimistic anthropology and how God resolves this 
problem through various means, all of which are associated with the spirit. These divine 
saving acts enable obedience. The hymnist develops a clear understanding of the divine-
human relationship that prioritises God’s actions, while creating the possibility for human 
action. Because the spirit works through the human to produce obedience, it is not an 
independent, secondary act. The human is an active agent, but one led by the spirit given 
by God. Throughout the Hodayot, the claim is made that God works to bring about 
salvation and everything that is necessary to attain it. 
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1. Background Issues 
Research on the Dead Sea Scrolls has passed through several stages, and scholarship 
now finds itself re-evaluating many of the early claims made about the scrolls and the 
community behind them. Regarding the Hodayot, a general sense of excitement 
surrounded this work in the initial years after its discovery. Several studies devoted to 
individual columns appeared within a decade of its discovery.1 The Hodayot was 
attributed to the “Teacher of Righteousness,” who was identified as the “founder” of the 
sectarian group residing at Qumran, and it was assigned a key role in how scholars 
assessed the theology of the community.2 As study of the Dead Sea Scrolls has become 
more complex and the assured results and assumptions of previous scholarship have been 
questioned, the conclusions drawn by previous scholarship about the Hodayot have not 
gone unchallenged. Before turning to the theological statements about God and humanity, 
it is necessary to comment briefly on several background issues that are relevant to the 
Hodayot. 
Among the vast number of scrolls discovered in the caves near Khirbet Qumran, 
eight copies of the Hodayot were found. The first scroll, 1QHa, is the fullest copy, and it 
has served as the basic unit of comparison for other scrolls. Additionally, six copies were 
found in cave 4 and another one in cave 1.3 Although these other scrolls are in poor 
condition, their remains overlap significantly with 1QHa, only rarely presenting a 
different wording.4 4QHa is the only scroll that contains any material of significant length 
not found in 1QHa.5 While the material has assisted in filling some gaps in 1QHa and 
confirmed the original order of 1QHa, these additional scrolls have not assisted greatly in 
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resolving any of the background issues surrounding the Hodayot. Schullers’ sober 
assessment is worth repeating: 
Although some quite small pieces can prove to be very significant (particularly for 
reconstructing the arrangement and extent of an individual manuscript) what we can 
learn from the 4Q manuscripts is limited. For the most part, they do not allow us to 
recover major portions of text missing in 1QHa, nor do they readily answer many or 
most of our questions about the origin, authorship and purpose of this collection.6 
In terms of the issues being addressed in this chapter, the 4QH scrolls neither create nor 
resolve any problems. This study will focus primarily on 1QHa and utilise the other 
Hodayot scrolls to fill lacunae where appropriate.  
The question that has dominated study of the Hodayot most concerns the original 
authorship. From the earliest days, some part of the Hodayot has been attributed to the 
“Teacher of Righteousness.” This obscure figure, who is infrequently mentioned, is 
considered to have been the “founder” of the community and to have initiated its 
separation from the Temple and perhaps society in general.7 The precise dates of this 
figure are disputed, and it is not clear that he ever resided at Qumran itself.8 Of course, all 
this presumes that the scrolls belong to a community that lived at Qumran.9 
                                                 
6
 Schuller, “Cave 4 Hodayot Manuscripts,” 140. 
7
 Knibb, “Teacher of Righteousness,” 918–21;” Stegemann, Library of Qumran, 147–52; 
Charlesworth, Pesharim, 30–40; Eshel, Dead Sea Scrolls, 29–61. 
8
 This person has traditionally been dated to around 150 BCE, which is the traditional date for the 
foundation of the Qumran community (Stegemann, Library of Qumran, 147–48; Charlesworth, Pesharim, 
30–36). Others have argued that he lived at the beginning of the first century BCE (Wise, “Dating the 
Teacher of Righteousness”). 
9
 The relationship between Khirbet Qumran, the caves, and the Dead Sea Scrolls is problematic. The 
archaeological evidence favours the conclusion that a group lived at the site roughly between the end of the 
second century/beginning of the first century BCE until about 68 CE when the Romans took control. 
Attempts to identify the remains as a Roman style villa or a fortress are unconvincing. For the 
archaeological details and secondary literature, see Magness, “Qumran Archaeology,” 1.47–77; idem, The 
Archaeology of Qumran. While not denying the existence of a group at Qumran, some scholars suggest that 
there is no or a limited relationship between the site and the scrolls. Wise, Abegg, and Cook in The Dead 
Sea Scrolls, 32–33, argue that those who used the scrolls and finally hid them in the caves are not the same 
group that composed them. The scrolls were placed in the caves by the sicarii around the time of the Jewish 
revolt. Closer to the more traditional understanding of the relationship between the caves and the site, 
Stegemann suggests that the scrolls were placed by the community (the Essenes) on the brink of war with 
Rome (“The Qumran Essenes;” idem, Library of Qumran). This explains the lack of trails between the site 
and the caves, since the caves were not used for storage during the community’s existence. 
Our knowledge of the group’s existence prior to settling at Qumran is scanty. The majority position 
connects the Qumran community with the Essenes (see Charlesworth, Pesharim, 55–58; for a critique, see 
Talmon, “Qumran Studies,” 11–14). The “Groningen Hypothesis” developed by García Martínez and van 
der Woude maintains that the community split from an existing apocalyptic group that originated in the 
third century BC (“‘Groningen’ Hypothesis”). Boccaccini identifies this prior group with Enoch Judaism 
(Beyond the Essene Hypothesis). Others argue that the Essenes and subsequently the Qumran community 
arose around the time of the Maccabean uprising. The traditional position maintains that the Qumran 
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Although initially scholars tended to ascribe all of the Hodayot to the “Teacher of 
Righteousness,” scholars began to refine the criteria by which one could determine the 
authorship of individual hymns.10 Eventually the hymns were divided into two groups: 
the “Community Hymns” and the “Teacher Hymns.”11 This has been the standard 
position since the 1960s, and the cave 4 material seems to support the division of the 
hymns since some scrolls have only the “Teacher Hymns” or the “Community Hymns.”12 
This division of the Hodayot into two groups is built on the content and genre of the 
individual hymns. Theological differences between the two categories have also been 
detected. 
Scholars have continuously returned to this issue in search of better arguments to 
support the initial claims. Questions remain, however, and more often than not, the 
studies have presumed their conclusions about authorship from the outset. In a recent 
study by Douglas, he identifies linguistic connections between the hymns in columns 10–
17.13 He argues on this basis that they were composed by a single author, who he 
identifies as the Teacher of Righteousness. His study, however, only proves that the 
hymns are linguistically related, not that they stem from the same author, let alone the 
Teacher of Righteousness.14 One can identify similar linguistic links in the canonical 
Psalms, but this does not prove authorship. At best, linguistic connections can only 
suggest authorship, but there must be more substantive evidence, such as the text itself 
                                                                                                                                                  
community split from the larger Essene community, most likely because of disputes concerning the 
priesthood (Charlesworth, Pesharim, 27–44). The hypothesis of disputes over the priesthood has been 
challenged, however (see Collins, “Origin of the Qumran Community,” 159–67). Alternatively, the 
community gathered at Qumran may have been a special group of Essenes, those devoted to a more 
secluded life-style, or the “headquarters” of the larger group (Stegemann, Library of Qumran, 147–52). On 
the historical problems, see now Eshel, Dead Sea Scrolls, and the essays edited by Boccaccini, Enoch and 
Qumran Origins. 
10
 For a history of the debate and literature, see Douglas, “Teacher Hymn Hypothesis Revisited.” 
11
 Holm-Nielsen is typically credited with dismantling the claim that the Teacher of Righteousness 
composed all of the hymns. He argued that the Hodayot consists of different genres, so it cannot stem solely 
from the Teacher of Righteousness (Hodayot, 320; cf. pp.316–31). 
12
 Schuller thinks that 4QHc and possibly 4QHf contained only the “Teacher Hymns,” while 4QHa 
contained only the “Community Hymns” (“Cave 4 Hodayot Manuscripts,” 144, 145, 148–49). 
13
 Douglas, “Teacher Hymn Hypothesis Revisited.” The column numbers used in this study are taken 
from García Martínez/Tigchelaar, Dead Sea Scrolls Study Edition (hereafter DSSSE). The numbering in 
Stegemann’s reconstruction, 1QHodayota, appeared too late to be adopted. 
14
 Douglas’ reconstruction of the historical background in col. 10 and 12 exploits the metaphorical 
language (“Teacher Hymn Hypothesis Revisited,” 159–66; also Garnet, Salvation and Atonement, 13–31). 
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claiming to be written by a specific person. Likewise, Schuller’s reconstruction of the 
cave 4 material only demonstrates that the hymns of the Hodayot were transmitted 
separately for some time. The different collections do not prove authorship nor can they. 
The analysis by Wise, in which he focuses on terms found in the “Teacher Hymns” and 
other literature about the Teacher, appears fruitful and provides a way forward in this 
discussion.15 Again, however, this cannot prove that the Teacher was the actual author. 
His students may have composed these hymns in remembrance, just as the pesharim were 
composed after the Teacher’s death but (partly) in light of his life.16 
For this study, however, the question of authorship need not be resolved. This study 
does not oppose the possibility that individual hymns may stem from the Teacher, but 
neither does it assume that any do. Regardless of whether the Teacher of Righteousness 
wrote every hymn, a few, or none does not alter how one understands the theological and 
anthropological statements. Throughout this study, the singular “hymnist” and the third 
person personal pronoun “he” will be used for simplicity. No claim regarding authorship 
is made or intended by this designation, for it is most likely that the hymns stem from 
different authors.17 
Another issue raised by study of the Hodayot concerns the unity of the theological 
claims. Some scholars drive a wedge between the various hymns, usually in terms of 
authorship, but also based on genre and word usage, thereby arguing that one should not 
attempt to understand the text as presenting a unified perspective on various subjects. For 
example, when discussing the genre of the Hodayot, Hopkins argues that there is “a 
constant shifting of emotions and themes” which “creates a thematic and emotional 
tension” that should not be dismissed since this tension “must be recognized as the most 
important element in 1QH.”18 She faults Merrill for using three passages to form a basic 
understanding of predestination from which to understand the rest of 1QHa. She claims 
                                                 
15
 Wise, “Concept of a New Covenant.” 
16
 Cf. Thyen, Studien zur Sündenvergebung, 81–85. 
17
 Because the sectarian community appears to have been celibate, the masculine pronoun is justified. 
18
 Hopkins, “Qumran Community,” 329–30. 
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that this process “robs the collection of its rich diversity.”19 Diversity in form and 
wording, however, does not necessarily mean diversity in thought.  
Two other points should be noted. First, the repetition of key thoughts and 
expressions with the same basic meaning suggests that a coherent thought pattern 
underlies and joins the individual hymns together. As Licht notes, “The same things are 
said over and over again.”20 The repetition certainly creates a sense of monotony, but it 
also helps the interpreter to understand better the author’s points. There can be little doubt 
that a pessimistic anthropology runs throughout the material and that the focus is on 
God’s deliverance. The repetition makes these points clear. Second, while it is correct that 
one should not force unanimity when none exists, neither should one create contradictions 
where they are not evident. Some scholars juxtapose statements about some subject, such 
as predestination and free will or judgment and mercy, to demonstrate that the author(s) 
advocated contradictory positions.21 They are able, then, to favour one perspective over 
the other, choosing whichever best fits their argument. The result is that scholars reveal 
more about their own views than they do the views of the ancient text. The Hodayot may 
not (indeed does not) fit everything together in a manner that satisfies current 
philosophical and theological arguments, but it does presume the teaching of the 
community that authored it. As Licht points out, the text was written for those familiar 
with the “underlying doctrine,” and “coming to the text from the outside, we are 
compelled to reconstruct the doctrine which underlies it, if we honestly try to understand 
the scroll.”22 The goal of this chapter is to explain how the hymnist understood the 
relationship between God and humanity, and on this issue there is a unified perspective 
that runs throughout the Hodayot. 
Finally, the issue of genre needs to be addressed. Some scholars think that the prayer, 
poetic genre biases one to elevating God’s character and actions over humanity.23 The 
                                                 
19
 Hopkins, “Qumran Community,” 329–30n.22; referring to Merrill, Qumran and Predestination. 
20
 Licht, “Doctrine,” 3. 
21
 VanLandingham Judgment and Justification, 114–15, 119 (on predestination and free will); 122–23 
(on judgment and mercy). 
22
 Licht “Doctrine,” 3. 
23
 Cf. Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism, 167; Condra, Salvation for the Righteous Revealed, 
169–170. 
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genre, VanLandingham argues, does not give an accurate picture of what people believed 
because it is predisposed towards one perspective.24 It elevates God’s righteousness over 
the sinfulness of humans. The pessimistic anthropology presented in the Hodayot, 
therefore, cannot provide the basis for how one understands the relationship between God 
and humans since it is merely the product of the genre. VanLandingham’s point, however, 
raises the question of why an author would write something with which he did not agree. 
If the author did not accept this theology, then why did he write it down, and why did this 
community preserve so many copies? VanLandingham also fails to understand the 
function of genre. Authors choose a certain genre because it best suits the point the author 
is trying to make. The author of the Hodayot chose the poetic genre because it was the 
most appropriate for what he wanted to communicate about God and humans, grace and 
salvation. The author was not bound by genre to say certain things, but rather he chose 
this genre because it suited his purposes.25 Moreover, of the 200 or so hymns and prayers 
found in the Dead Sea Scrolls, only a few actually present such a pessimistic description 
of humanity (cf. 1QS 10–11; 4Q392; 4Q393; 4Q400 2 5b–7; 4Q511 [4QSongs of the 
Sageb] 28; 29; 30).26 This suggests that, while hymns are more suited than legal texts for 
contrasting God’s righteousness with human sinfulness, the hymn or prayer genre is not 
bound to this contrast. 
2. Divine Saving Acts and Human Obedience 
The primary interest of the Hodayot is to praise God. The individual hymns usually 
open, so far as can be told, with either “I give you thanks Lord” (ynwda hkdwa) or “Blessed 
are you Lord” (ynwda hta $wrb). This is often followed by a description of what God has 
done to redeem the elect from their sinfulness or enemies. These opening phrases set the 
focus on God’s character and actions. Whereas Ben Sira insisted that each agent act at the 
appropriate time, one following the other and neither at the same time, the Hodayot 
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 VanLandingham, Judgment and Justification, 122, 135. 
25
 “[H]ymns must not be divorced from doctrine, because they are often the most innocent expression 
of it” (Carson, Divine Sovereignty, 82). 
26
 For a survey of the hymns and prayers, see Chazon, “Hymns and Prayers;” idem, “Prayers from 
Qumran.” One should also note the approximately forty copies of the canonical psalms found in the Dead 
Sea Scrolls (see Flint, “The Book of Psalms,” 454). 
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presents a view of divine and human agency that, while prioritising God’s actions, 
coordinates human action within the sphere of divine action. Ben Sira’s emphasis on the 
human agent is reversed by claiming that God acts first to restore the broken relationship. 
After God has taken the initial steps, the human is enabled to obey God’s will because 
God remains at work through his Spirit. Assigning the first act to God is necessary not 
because the hymnist thinks grace is better than law observance, but because the human is 
a frail, sinful creature incapable of obeying the commandments. In a variety of ways, the 
hymnist explains how God overcomes the human dilemma. The uniting factor in all of 
these means of redemption is the divine Spirit. It is these divine saving acts that lead the 
hymnist to put pen to paper. The Hodayot, as a whole, are a reflection on how God 
redeems sinners from themselves and restores to them the glory once held by Adam.  
The following sections will analyse three divine acts: predestination, the giving of 
knowledge, and purification. The role assigned to the spirit will be specifically 
highlighted. It will also be noted how these divine acts relate to human action. Finally, the 
understanding of the divine-human relationship set forth here will be compared with 
Sanders’ description of covenantal nomism. First, however, one must understand the 
hymnist’s portrayal of the incapacity of the human agent, for it is this factor, itself gained 
through divine revelation, that makes clear precisely why the hymnist prioritises divine 
action. 
A. The Creaturely Limitations of Humanity 
From the initial studies of the Hodayot, scholars have recognised the pessimistic 
anthropology that dominates the hymns.27 Humans are described as worthless creatures 
predisposed to wickedness and destined for death. These ideas, Ringgren notes, “are 
presented [in the Qumran texts] with such emphasis that they almost become the leading 
motif in the Qumran concept of man. In any case they are repeated so often in the psalms 
that there is an overwhelming impression of man’s nothingness and depravity.”28 Even if 
                                                 
27
 For summaries of the anthropology of the Hodayot, see Hyatt, “View of Man;” Licht, “Doctrine,” 
10–11. For the Dead Sea Scrolls generally, see Lichtenberg, Menschenbild. 
28
 Ringgren, Faith of Qumran, 95. 
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Ringgren overstates the importance of this idea for the sect’s anthropology, he is correct 
in his observation about the Hodayot. While this repetition can make the hymns 
monotonous, it contributes to the over all focus on divine action by reminding the reader 
how pathetic humans are. The use of repetition also gives the Hodayot a sense of 
simplicity, and many studies have merely reproduced the overt claims that humans are 
worthless and sinful without any attempt to grasp the interconnectedness of these two 
themes or the underlying logic.29 The anthropology is deceptively complex. What makes 
the anthropology of the Hodayot stand out is not its pessimism, which is similar to other 
texts, but the exact form that the pessimism takes: humans are necessarily morally 
incompetent because they are formed from material that wastes away.  
Here it is necessary to state clearly what “salvation” means for the hymnist since this 
has significant implications for how he constructs the human problem. An eschatological 
tension runs right through the Hodayot. In the current age, salvation consists at least of 
joining the human community of the redeemed, possessing knowledge, and being in a 
state of purity despite one’s sinfulness. These present salvific measures are not the 
fullness of salvation, however, for the hymnist looks toward another period when he will 
dwell both with the human community and with the holy ones (11.19–23) and possess 
“all the glory of Adam” (4.27). To be certain, the community perceives of itself as already 
participating in worship with the angels and possessing Adam’s glory, but the fullness of 
these realities has not yet dawned.30 In this future state, a “transformation” will take place 
as the human’s dusty, fleshly origin and sinful disposition are left behind. The human 
does not become “angelic” or “divine,” but those portions of the creaturely condition, 
such as the dusty origins and the resulting disposition toward disobedience, that hinder 
him or her will be removed.31 This future expectation for transformation provides the 
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 E.g. VanLandingham, Judgment and Justification, 119–35. 
30
 Fletcher-Louis overemphasises the present time aspects (All the Glory of Adam, 96; cf. 
Lichtenberger, Menschenbild, 224–27). 
31
 For the idea of “transformation,” see Fletcher-Louis, All the Glory of Adam, 104–12 
(“Transformation in the Hodayot”). He claims that the transformation is to an “angelomorphic existence” or 
a “‘divine’ humanity” (105, 112). This seems to overstate the evidence. 
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context over against which the hymnist develops his anthropology.32 The hymnist does 
not confine the anthropological problem that prevents the human from entering into this 
eternal bliss solely to disobedience. Rather, the problem extends to the very core of the 
human, the material from which he or she was created.  
At the risk of creating distinctions that the hymnist may not have consciously made, 
it is useful to divide the phrases and words used to develop the anthropology into two 
categories: descriptions drawn from the realm of creation (material), and expressions 
about righteousness and wickedness (moral). The distinction between the two will allow 
us to highlight the distinctive point of each semantic field and to identify any potential 
scriptural backgrounds. First, phrases and words referring to the material composition of 
the human will be noted. This language is used to emphasise the human’s creaturely 
limitations. Second, statements about humans as morally weak will be noted briefly. This 
distinction between the two categories, while heuristically helpful, is not maintained in 
the hymns. The two categories are brought together and mutually interpret one another so 
that phrases that originally referred only to the human’s frailty and insignificance now 
testify to the reason one transgresses. The hymnist traces the anthropological problems of 
frailty and sinfulness back to the material from which humans were formed. This 
perspective is arrived at, it appears, by interpreting Genesis 2.7 through Genesis 3.19. 
i.  The Material Weakness of Humanity 
In 18.1–7 the hymnist contemplates why God would reveal his mysteries and wisdom 
to a human being. He asks, “What, then, is man—he is earth, pinched off [clay] and to the 
dust he will return (wtbwXt rp[lw #rwq ÎrmxÐ awh hmdaw ~da whpa hmw)—that (yk) you have 
given him insight into wonders like these . . . ?” (lines 3–4).33 Three things should be 
noted about the interjected comment. First, it is fundamental to the concept of humanity 
that the person is formed from the earth. The hymnist is playing on the lexical 
                                                 
32
 It is not possible to determine which came first, the pessimistic anthropology or the conception of 
the salvific state, but the two ideas do overlap and reinforce one another. 
33
 The grammar of these lines is not entirely clear. This translation follows Stegemann, 1QHodayota, 
238. García Martínez/Tigchelaar think the question is “What, then, is man?” and the answer begins with “he 
is nothing but earth” (DSSSE, 187). They begin a new sentence at yk. Either way is consistent with the 
points drawn here. 
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connections between the term ~da and hmda. The human is by definition a product of the 
earth. Second, death appears to be the inevitable outcome of human existence. This 
appears, on the one hand, to contradict the hymnist’s expectation that he and others will 
attain to eternal glory. On the other hand, it underscores the need not only for divine 
intervention, but also for God to transform the hymnist’s current condition. The creaturely 
condition that leads to one’s demise must be overcome. Finally, this statement draws on 
scriptural ideas and language. The phrase “pinched off clay” likely comes from Job 33.6, 
where it is one of several comments about humans coming from clay or dust (4.19; 10.9; 
30.19). The dust and clay language, which always has a negative connotation in Job, 
signals frailty and limitation. More significant for the hymnist’s view are Genesis 2–3. 
The idea that humans are formed from the earth originates in Genesis 2.7 where the 
author records that “YHWH God formed the man from the dust from the ground” (rc,yYIw 
hm'd"a]h'-!mi rp'[' ~d"a'h'(-ta,: ~yhil{a/ hw"hy>). The claim that humans will return to the dust, which is 
widespread throughout the OT (see below), is first stated in Genesis 3.19: “and you will 
return to the dust” (bWvT' rp'['-la,w>). The combination of Genesis 2.7 and 3.19 in 1QHa 18.3–
4 indicates that the hymnist thinks the two belong together. The hymnist’s dislike for the 
material from which the human is formed can be accounted for if Genesis 3.19, with its 
negative perspective on humanity’s origins, functions as the lens through which the 
hymnist reads the neutral statement in 2.7 about the material God used to create Adam. 
The hymnist’s understanding of humanity and its future is ultimately rooted, then, in a 
particular understanding of the sacred texts. These three points provide the basic problem 
that the hymnist has with the human being as a creature: he is formed from material that 
wastes away. This depiction of the human problem is conveyed in several ways. Here we 
will focus on a few of the key expressions used to remind the reader that he or she is a 
frail, weak creature destined to die. These expressions do not point in and of themselves 
to the sinfulness of the human.  
“Son(s) of man/Adam” (e.g. 7.9 [4QHa 8 i 11]; 9.27, 34; 12.30; 19.26) and “born of a 
woman” (5.20; 21(top).1, 8; 23(top).12) point to the birth of each human and may hint at 
the first man and woman. The phrase “son(s) of Adam” (~da ynb) is common in the OT, 
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although it is often difficult to determine if an author is referring to humanity in general 
or specifically to the first human, Adam. The same ambiguity appears in the Hodayot. At 
the least, though, the phrase, along with “son(s) of man” (Xwna ynb), recalls the fact that 
humans are created beings. The phrase “born of a woman” comes from Job, where it 
indicates the frailty and mortality of humanity (14.1; 15.14; 25.4). The expression 
“kneaded from water” (5.21; 9.21; 11.24; 20.25) may draw on a tradition about the water 
rising to cover the earth before God created the first man.34 It recalls the origins of 
humanity from dust and highlights the frailty and worthlessness of the human being. The 
phrases hwr[ dws (“foundation of shame”) and hdn rwpm (“source of impurity”) also occur 
several times (5.21; 9.22; 20.25). The terms hwr[ and hdn have sexual overtones (e.g., Lev 
12.5; 18.6–19) and can refer metaphorically to shame, filth, and impurity due to one’s 
sinfulness (Lam 1.17; Ezek 23.19). The terms in the Hodayot, according to Licht, 
“transfer a deep sexual disgust to the contemplation of human nature in general.”35 
Another term to note is rXb (flesh), which appears 29x in Stegemann’s reconstruction 
of the Hodayot. It is used in several ways. It stands for all humans as creatures (5.22; 
7.24) or a particular part of the human body (16.33). In 7.15 “hand of flesh” parallels ~da 
and Xwna. Most often, it indicates the weakness and mortality of humanity. Those made of 
flesh are unable to understand God’s mysteries (5.3, 19; 7.24) and are insignificant within 
creation (12.29; 26(bottom).10). The “flesh” cannot be relied on for protection (18.23) 
and fails under the pressures of life (16.33). In 18.23, “flesh” may mean either one’s 
personal abilities or other humans. Either way, the context contrasts God’s care and 
protection with the securities created by humans. As a “spirit of flesh,” the hymnist 
cannot follow God’s will nor can he protect himself from evil spirits (4.25).36 The 
hymnist’s use of rXb to describe the human condition as weak and insignificant follows 
the typical use of the term in the OT. “Flesh” is like the grass of the field, and although it 
possess a form of glory, it withers and dies (Isa 40.3; cf. Ps 78.39). If God removes his 
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 Lichtenberger, Menschenbild, 81–84; cf. Greenfield, “Root ‘GBL’.” The difficulty with this 
interpretation, though, is the date at which the tradition is first clearly presented. 
35
 Licht, “Doctrine,” 10. 
36
 Cf. Holm-Nielsen, Hodayot, 249n.26.  
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Spirit, all flesh would perish (Job 34.15). One should not put confidence in the powers of 
flesh for they are fleeting (Jer 17.5) and cannot stand against God (2 Chron 32.8). 
Weakness characterises flesh (Job 6.12). God does not see like flesh does (Job 10.4) 
because he is the opposite of flesh (Isa 31.3; cf. Dan 2.11). As Bratsiotis accurately 
summarises, “The characteristics, then, of basar are its creatureliness, its absolute 
dependence on God, its earthly nature, and its weakness, inadequacy, and 
transitoriness.”37 
“Flesh” itself is not inherently flawed, and the view taken by the hymnist is not 
identical to some later “Gnostic” perspectives on the flesh as intrinsically evil. Yet, there 
is in the Hodayot a consistent negative description of the flesh. Even in general 
statements such as 5.22 and 7.24, there is a negative overtone. The flesh is something that 
impedes the human from participating in worship with the angels. The idea that one must 
be delivered from the “flesh” appears in 7.17–20. The passage describes the creation of 
the righteous person who adheres to God’s demands and is given salvation. The 
description concludes, “You have raised his glory rXbm.” rXb can refer to humanity, and 
the preposition -!m would be translated “above.” This would mean that God established 
the righteous person with honour over humanity in general or more specifically the 
wicked.38 Alternatively, the word could mean “from flesh,” indicating that God has 
removed the righteous person from the realm of flesh and all its limitations.39 The latter 
option appears to be correct. The term “flesh” in the Hodayot rarely means simply 
“humanity” without any hint at the weakness and insignificance of humans. Twice in the 
immediate context, “flesh” represents inability. Humans are unable to direct their own 
futures (line 15), and they lack the ability to understand God’s ways (line 24). Line 20 
contributes to the idea that in salvation God restores to humanity “all the glory of Adam” 
(4.15). By giving the righteous a glory apart from flesh, the hymnist does not deny the 
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 Bratsiotis, “rf,b, ” TDOT, rev. ed., 2:328. 
38
 Holm-Nielsen, Hodayot, 228, 231n.19. 
39
 Fletcher-Louis, All the Glory of Adam, 134. Fletcher-Louis’ claim that this removal “from flesh” 
refers in part to “a fully sexual life” based on some OT texts in which “flesh” refers to the genitals (e.g. Lev 
6.3; 12.3) is unconvincing. “Flesh” never has sexual connotations in the Hodayot. 
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creaturely state of the human being. Instead, he looks toward the restoration of the 
human’s true creaturely characteristics.40 
A final set of expressions that highlight the human’s creaturely limitations are those 
that use the words “clay” and “dust.” The ideas expressed with these terms have already 
been noted in the discussion of 1QHa 18.1–7 above. The hymnist uses the phrases 
“creature of clay” (rmxÎhÐ rcy) and “creature of dust” (rp[ÎhÐ rcy) several times.41 As a 
creature of clay, the hymnist is amazed that God would bring one of such humble origins 
into eternal life and give him the opportunity to praise God with the sons of heaven 
(11.22–24). The terms conveniently highlight the idea that humans are creatures formed 
from perishable material. The dusty origins of humanity distinguish it from God (12.29; 
18.3–12), for he is the Creator and eternal. He is omnipotent and omniscient, while 
humans, because they are from clay and dust, are unable to understand God’s ways 
(20.27) or even determine their own (18.5). These various statements highlight the 
weakness of humans. They are frail creatures formed from the ground and are wasting 
away. The statements also draw attention to the insignificance of the human being. Being 
a creature made from dust denotes mortality and weakness and underscores the fact that 
humans were created and are, thus, infinitely distinct from their Creator. 
At the end of their earthly existence, humans will return to the dust, which reminds 
them that they are creatures and not eternal beings (18.3–4; 20.26–27; 23(bottom).4–5). 
The idea of humans returning to the dust at death is widespread throughout the OT (see 
Job 17.16; 20.11; 21.26; 34.15; Ps 7.6 [Eng 5]; 22.15 [16], 30 [29]; 104.29; Qoh 3.20; 
12.7).42 These passages are based on the tradition recorded in Genesis 3.19. As a result of 
his transgression, God tells Adam that at the end of his life he will return to the ground. 
Adam’s existence will end the same way it began because he is a creature formed from 
the dust of the earth. The simple statement “for you are dust” reminds Adam that he is a 
part of the created world. His quest to become like God (cf. v.5) brings the humbling 
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 Holm-Nielsen’s contention that this interpretation results in a rejection of the flesh comparable to 
“Gnostic” views is mistaken (Hodayot, 231n.19). 
41
 E.g. column 21. See Lichtenberger, Menschenbild, 77–81. 
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 Isa 26.19 and Dan 12.2 describe the hope of resurrection by remarking that those lying in the dust 
will rise again (also contrast Ps 30.10 [9] with Isa 26.19).  
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reminder that he is nothing like God. The idea that humans return to the dust at death 
marks the end of their existence, thus signifying the frailty of their frames. Apart from 
divine intervention, humans will perish. 
Through these phrases and others, the hymnist sets forth clearly the frailty and 
weakness of the human creature. By using language from creation, the hymnist indicates 
that the problem of frailty and weakness is innate to the human being because he or she is 
a creature. The scriptural roots of some of the expressions and terms give a sense of 
authority to this description. The problem inherent to the human, though, goes further. 
Alongside these statements about humanity as frail, weak, and mortal creatures are 
statements that emphasise the sinfulness of the human nature. 
ii.  The Moral Weakness of Humanity  
The contrast between God as righteous and humans as sinners is evident throughout 
the hymns. Because this idea is widely recognised, it is not necessary to go into much 
detail. Left to his own devices, the human dwells in impurity, which results in him 
rejecting God’s ways (1QHa 4.19). In moments of doubt, the hymnist recalls his 
transgressions and those of his ancestors, and he worries that he may have forsaken God’s 
covenant (12.33–35). He writes, “I said, ‘Because of my transgression, I have forsaken 
your covenant’” (hktyrbm ytbz[n y[Xpb ytrma ynaw) (line 35).43 As he notes earlier, 
“righteousness does not belong to humans” (hqdc Xwnal awl) (line 30). By contrast, God is 
holy (5.7), full of truth (12.40) and knowledge (17.17). The hymnist exclaims repeatedly 
that righteousness belongs to God (4.20; 6.15; 7.27; 8.17, 19; 9.26; 12.31; 20.19, 31). His 
judgment is always in accordance with justice and impartial (7.27–28). 
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 For this translation, cf. García Martínez/Tigchelaar, DSSSE, 171; Stegemann, 1QHodayota, 166. 
Abegg translates as “I said in my transgression, I am abandoned by Your covenant” (“Thanksgiving 
Psalms,” 97; cf. Holm-Nielsen, Hodayot, 78, 86n.92; Mansoor, Thanksgiving Hymns, 130). y[Xpb, however, 
probably goes with the verb ytbz[n not ytrma, and it describes the reason why the hymnist thinks he has 
rejected the covenant. The b preposition is causative. His sin prevents him from partaking in the realm of 
salvation. This seems to fit the context better, since the hymnist is contemplating the possibility that he 
might be banned from salvation due to his sin. 
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Each human remains a sinner from birth until death (12.29–30). Even the righteous 
do not escape this sinful status when they enter the community of the redeemed.44 
VanLandingham argues, though, that statements about humans as sinners only apply to 
those outside the community because statements about human depravity are followed by 
statements about those in the community.45 His examples, however, do not support his 
claim that those in the community are freed entirely from their sinful dispositions. The 
constant use of the first person pronoun shows that the hymnist never thought he escaped 
his sinful state even after God redeemed him.46 Even after experiencing redemption, he 
describes himself as “a man of offense” (22(top).7) and sharing “the lot of the scoundrels 
(~yablx)” (11.25).47 While one may be more righteous than his neighbour, his 
righteousness will not suffice when he stands before God’s judgment seat (17.14–17; cf. 
9.25–26; 15.28–29; 22(bottom).10). Even the members of the community of the elect 
would be declared guilty if it were not for God’s grace since their own obedience does not 
count as righteousness before God’s judgment (cf. 9.23). Those destined for salvation still 
possess the same sinful nature as the rest of humanity. 
iii.  The Problem of Being a Creature 
The heuristically useful distinction between the descriptions of humans as materially 
weak and as morally weak is not maintained in the Hodayot. The hymnist consistently 
brings the two semantic fields together to present a composite picture of humans as 
physically frail and morally deficient individuals. The language seems to indicate that 
humans are sinners precisely because of their dusty origins. By combining the two 
language types, they both are redefined and inherit the meanings of the other one. 
Weakness in terms of mortality is transformed to mean weakness in terms of morality.48 
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 See also Merrill, Qumran and Predestination, 38–39; Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism, 274–
82; Condra Salvation for the Righteous Revealed, 179–80. 
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 VanLandingham, Judgment and Justification, 121. 
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 Kuhn, “New Light,” 102–03; cf. Frey, “Flesh and Spirit,” 382. 
47
 The translation of 11.25 is García Martínez/Tigchelaar, DSSSE, 167. Cf. Holm-Nielsen, Hodayot, 
69n.22. 
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 Cf. Braun, “Römer 7, 7–25,” 4–11; Smith, What Must I Do, 55–58. 
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Several times the hymnist simply lists descriptions of humans. For example, in the 
midst of a hymn about creation, he writes,  
I am a creature of clay and kneaded with water, a foundation of shame and spring of 
impurity, a furnace of iniquity and a building of sin, a spirit of error and perversion, 
without knowledge and terrified about (your) righteous judgment. (9.21–23; cf. 5.21) 
The two semantic categories are placed next to one another in order to develop a holistic 
picture of the human being as a frail and sinful being. There is no attempt here to explain 
any potential relationship between the terms. Within the context, though, one senses a 
critique of the human situation. In comparison with the rest of creation, the human is 
nothing because of his origins and disposition toward sin. 
Elsewhere the two semantic categories become mutually interpreting as the 
connotations of one are transferred to the other. This mixture of thought between humans 
as weak and sinful creatures can be seen in the use of hwr[ and hdn. The metaphorical 
meanings of these terms refer to the character of the individual based on his or her sinful 
deeds. A person incurs “shame” or is identified as “filthy” because he or she has 
disobeyed the commandments. The original application of these terms in a sexual way, 
though, remains in the background, and it is the combination of this original meaning 
with the metaphorical one that the hymnist exploits. He uses these terms precisely 
because they bring the ideas of creation and unrighteousness together.49 
In column 12, the hymnist recounts how God has established him as a leader within 
the community. Through God’s assistance, he has worked wonders among the people 
(lines 28–29). He proceeds to contrast this divinely given situation with his natural 
abilities: “What is flesh compared with this? What creature of clay can magnify 
wonders?” (line 29). Based on the use of “flesh” and “creature of clay,” one would expect 
the hymnist to claim that humans are incapable of such wondrous deeds because they are 
frail creatures and insignificant within the spectrum of creation, but he does not. Instead, 
he describes how humans are sinful: “He is in iniquity from the womb and until old age in 
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 Smith suggests that the phrase “shameful nakedeness” may allude to Adam’s and Eve’s realisation 
that they were naked (~roy[e) and the resulting “shame” (Gen 3.7) following Adam’s sin (What Must I Do, 
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the guilt of unfaithfulness” (line 30). The reason humans are incapable of doing such 
wonders is because they are predisposed from birth to sin. The human’s problem with sin 
is traced to his origins as a creature formed from clay and flesh. The hymn continues by 
contrasting the individual’s inability to establish his own path with God’s determination 
of every person’s way (lines 30–32). 
The same idea appears also in 11.19–25. The hymnist praises God for redeeming him 
from condemnation and placing him within the angelic community (lines 9–23). The 
connection between the human as a frail creature and as a sinner appears first in two 
parallel sentences: 
I know that there is hope  
for someone you formed from dust  
for an everlasting council. 
You have purified  
the depraved spirit from great transgression  
so that he can stand in service with the host of the holy ones  
and can enter into communion with the congregation of the sons of heaven. 
(lines 20–22) 
“Formed from dust” is parallel to “depraved spirit,” and “everlasting council” parallels 
“the host of the holy ones” and “the congregation of the sons of heaven.” What prevents 
the human from participating in these groups is both one’s material weakness and one’s 
moral weakness. The hymnist then asks, “But I, a creature of clay, what am I? Kneaded 
from water, and for whom am I to be reckoned? What is my strength?” (lines 23–24). As 
in 12.29, one would expect the hymnist to describe how humans are weak because of the 
material from which they were formed. Instead, just as in 12.30, he explains that humans 
are prone to wickedness: “For I stand at the border of wickedness and share the lot of the 
scoundrels” (lines 24–25). Being formed from the earth’s clay, the hymnist possesses no 
strength and the result is his sharing of the same lot as the scoundrels. The underlying 
logic seems to be this: because he is a weak creature, he is prone to evil. As he writes in 
9.27, “to the sons of Adam belongs the service of iniquity and deeds of deceit.” 
In column 5, the hymnist ponders his place within the vast realm of creation. He 
asks, “[But what is] the spirit of flesh to understand all these things and to have insight 
into the great [wonder] of [your] counsel? And what is someone born of a woman among 
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all your awesome works?” (5.19–20). The implication of the questions is that because the 
human is a creature, he has no great place within creation. As in 12.29–30, though, the 
hymnist continues by noting the human’s sinfulness: “He is a structure of dust, kneaded 
with water, his counsel is [the iniquity of sin], shame of dishonour, and a sp[ring of] 
impurity; and a corrupt spirit (hw[n xwrw) rules over him” (lines 21–22). The reason a 
human cannot understand God’s ways or is insignificant within the spectrum of creation 
is because he is both a creature and a sinner. The human is insignificant within creation 
because, unlike the rest of creation, he breaks God’s commands. 
The significance of the reply given to these questions about the place of the 
individual can be seen by comparing the hymnist’s answers with the answer given the 
question “what is man?” in Psalm 8. In Psalm 8, the psalmist expresses wonder over why 
God takes any interest in humanity. Compared with the majesty of the heavens, humanity 
deserves no accolades. He queries, “What is man that you are mindful of him, the son of 
man that you care for him? (v.4). God decided to elevate the status of humanity by 
placing humans just below the angels (v.5) and making them rulers over the rest of 
creation (vv.7–8). The psalmist takes an optimistic perspective of humanity. Already in 
the OT, one finds other answers being given to the question “what is man?” The answer 
in Psalm 144.3–4 is that humans are like breath and a fleeting shadow. This negative 
answer focuses on the frailty of humanity. Job queries also about God’s interest in 
humanity: “What is man that he could be pure, or one born of a woman that he could be 
righteous?” (15.14). As the question indicates, Job’s interest is in the moral capacity of 
humanity. The author of the Hodayot likewise does not recall the marvellous role 
assigned to humanity. He rather describes humans as sinful beings (1QHa 5.21; 12.30). 
The answer provided to the questions by the authors of 1QHa 5 and 12, Job, and Psalm 
144 is the precise opposite of that given by the psalmist of Psalm 8. Psalm 144 does not 
make explicit any connection between humans as creatures and as sinners. Job hints at a 
connection with the phrase “born of a woman,” but he does not draw out the implications 
of this connection. The negative answer to the question “what is man?” given by the 
hymnist, though, brings the problem associated with humanity’s creaturely condition 
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closer to humanity’s problem with sin. Noticing that Job 15.14 and Psalm 144.3–4 use the 
same language may have provided the necessary key for the hymnist to combine the two 
answers into one: humans are unworthy because they are sinful creatures. The reason that 
humans are not ascribed the same glorious role in the Hodayot as they are in Psalm 8 is 
because the hymnist views the creaturely condition as a fundamental problem because of 
its connections with sin.  
In each of these sections, the hymnist juxtaposes the human’s creaturely state, which 
signifies frailty and insignificance, with his or her sinful state. These questions address 
the place of the human within the vastness of creation by defining what it means to be 
human. The answers provided to them, however, indicate that the human’s problem is 
more than simply insignificance and frailty. The concept of being human has been 
defined as being a sinner through the combination of the language about the human as a 
creature and as a sinner. The human is frail and weak not only because he or she is a 
creature, but also because he or she is a sinner. 
In 20.24–35 the hymnist contrasts himself as a sinner and creature with God who is 
just and Creator. The one taken from the dust is nothing (line 31b), incapable of 
understanding God’s glory (line 30), and will return to the dust at death (lines 26–27, 31). 
The hymnist exclaims, “And I, from dust [I] have been taken [and from clay] I have been 
[pi]nched as a source (rwql) of impurity, and disgraceful shamelessness, a pile of dust, and 
mixed with [water . . .], and a dwelling of darkness” (lines 24–25).50 Assuming the 
reconstruction is correct,51 the opening statement “from dust [I] have been taken [and 
from the clay] I have been [pi]nched” is scriptural language. The first part comes from 
Genesis 2.7 and the tradition to which it belongs. The second part is from Job 33.6, which 
is the only place where the two words rmx and #rq appear together. In Elihu’s speech, the 
statement affirms his solidarity with Job as a human. He stands before God just as Job 
does, that is, as a created being drawn from the clay of the Earth. In the Hodayot, these 
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 Compare García Martínez/Tigchelaar, DSSSE, 193; Abegg, “Thanksgiving Psalms,” 109; Lohse, 
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expressions are clarified by the following list of descriptors. The l preposition on rwql 
indicates that the human has been created in a certain manner; in this case, “as a source of 
impurity,” that is, as a sinful being. In the opening statement, then, the hymnist is not 
interested solely in defining humans as created beings, as the language in its scriptural 
context indicates. Rather, the fact that humans are creatures testifies to their state as 
sinners. By connecting the human’s sinful condition with its origins, the issue of sin 
becomes inherent to the very essence of the human being. 
Some scholars find the notion of sinfulness particularly in the term “flesh” (rXb). It is 
depicted as frail and is associated with the evil ways of humanity (5.19–22). In 12.29–30 
the hymnist connects the two even closer. He queries about the place of “flesh” within the 
spectrum of creation and whether a “creature of clay” can do wonders like God. He 
remarks that those defined as flesh and creatures of clay are “in iniquity” from birth until 
death. Commenting on this text, which, he maintains, provides the closest connection 
between “flesh” and sin, Frey writes, “rfb does not only express human weakness and 
frailty, but also a state of being characterized by inescapable sinfulness and basic 
opposition with the creator.”52 The one formed from flesh and clay is incapable of doing 
anything but sin. Like the other terms and expressions derived from the realm of creation, 
rXb is juxtaposed with language depicting humans as morally corrupt and through this 
proximity, it comes to represent human sinfulness. The negative connotations attributed 
to the “flesh” do not extend as far as Paul’s statements, but it is clear that the hymnist 
intends to convey the moral and material weakness of humans through this term. 
The connection between “flesh” and sin should not be overemphasised, however. 
This is done, for example, when one attempts to categorise the hymns as either “Teacher 
Hymns” or “Community Hymns” based on whether this word refers to frailty or is 
connected with sin. The term appears three times in the so-called “Teacher Hymns” 
where it indicates particularly the frail state of humans (15.17; 16.31, 33).53 The lack of 
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any explicit connection with sin, though, is not uncommon for the Hodayot, and this 
cautions against using this word as a criterion for authorship.54 Flesh is undoubtedly 
portrayed as weak and insignificant and on several occasions assumes connotations of 
sinfulness and wickedness. 
Scholars have sought for the origins of the Hodayot’s pessimistic outlook. Rejecting 
any notions of “original sin,” Licht contends that the description of humans as sinful is a 
reflex of the claim that God alone is righteous.55 This formulation, however, probably 
establishes a logical framework that the hymnist did not perceive. Moreover, both ideas 
are clearly set forth in the scriptures, and because the hymns are so dependent on these 
texts, it is unlikely that the hymnist only arrived at the view that humans are sinful after 
he realised that God alone is just. VanLandingham points to the canonical Psalms as the 
source for the hymnist’s view. He catalogues several texts from the Psalms that portray 
humans as sinful, frail, and worthless. The Hodayot, he claims, emphasises and develops 
the same themes but does not change any of them.56 Certainly parallels can be detected, 
but VanLandingham downplays the radicalness of the Hodayot.57 Furthermore, he has not 
adequately noted the impact of Genesis 2–3 on the hymnist. Indeed, the closest parallels 
to the Hodayot in the Psalms (e.g. Pss 8; 103) are those that have lexical and thematic 
connections with Genesis 2–3. 
Fletcher-Louis rightly notes that “much of the Hodayot is a sustained and extended 
meditation on the anthropology of Genesis 2:7.”58 Yet, he fails to notice (partly because 
he downplays the pessimistic anthropology) that the hymnist’s interpretation of Genesis 
2.7 is mediated through his reading of the punishment given to Adam in 3.19. There 
Adam is told that he will return “to the ground,” “to the dust,” because he comes from the 
dust. This latter verse functions as the lens through which the hymnist interprets the 
description of the creation of the first man. Reading the creation of Adam in 2.7 in light 
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of his subsequent failure and punishment (3.1–19), the hymnist maintains that the very 
material used to create Adam is the ultimate cause of his failure. For the hymnist, then, 
the creation of humanity from dust becomes a negative reality that represents both frailty 
and moral weakness. Whatever the neutral statement about Adam’s formation from dust 
might have meant, in light of the form of punishment given by God, namely, the return to 
the dust, Adam’s dusty origins are interpreted as a significant problem. Because Adam 
functions as the representative of all humanity, his situation is then transposed to all 
humans, which means that his descendents assume his dusty origins and all that it implies 
(mortality, sinfulness, etc.). While the hymnist nowhere blames Adam for the current 
predicament of the human race, he nevertheless views Adam’s sin and assigned 
punishment as the reason that the human being is given to sin, frailty, and 
insignificance.59 
The hymnist’s view is not itself particularly new or novel, for parallels can be found 
elsewhere. Several statements in the OT join creation language with notions of sinfulness. 
In fact, the connection between frailty and sinfulness that the hymnist makes between 
Genesis 2.7 and 3.19 may have been spurred by Psalm 103. The psalmist is confident that 
God will remove his sins because God “knows our frame, remembering that we are dust” 
(vv.10–14). The Hodayot, however, offers a sustained reflection on this relationship and 
pushes the relationship further until his anthropology becomes “an almost pathological 
abhorrence of human nature.”60 This extreme criticism of the human being as a creature 
must not be downplayed by drawing endless comparisons. In the hymnist’s view, the 
ultimate cause of the human’s sinful condition is the material that forms his or her frame. 
“[H]is sins are not the result of error, carelessness, or human malice which may be 
overcome through the power of human will, nor are the consequence of having been 
misled. Rather, they are rooted in a basic human weakness as a created being, against 
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which man is powerless to act alone.”61 This flesh, dust formed, water kneaded, shameful, 
filthy, depraved spirit must be disposed of before the human can participate in the fullness 
of salvation. 
iv. Summary 
The picture of humanity pervading the Hodayot highlights weakness, insignificance, 
and ultimately sinfulness. The hymnist distinguishes sharply between God and humanity. 
The former is Creator of all things and always acts in accordance with justice, while the 
latter is one part of creation (although an important part) and when left to its own ways, 
always acts unjustly. Using language associated with creation, the hymnist describes 
humanity as frail and insignificant, formed from perishable material like dust, clay, and 
flesh. Terms associated with righteousness and sin depict the human as morally deficient. 
One cannot obey God’s demands and will be found guilty at the Final Judgment. The 
hymnist combines these two conceptions of the human so that each type of description 
helps explain the other. Humans are morally corrupt, incapable of acting righteously or 
understanding God’s ways because they are formed from the dust and are made of flesh. 
Although parallels can be found in other texts, the Hodayot stands out because of the 
connection made between the material and moral weaknesses of the human being. The 
human is necessarily immoral because he or she is created from feeble material. The 
combination of the two semantic fields results in a comprehensive critique of the human 
being. 
This picture of the human predicament differs remarkably from Ben Sira’s optimistic 
portrayal of humanity. For Ben Sira humans only sin because they choose to. 
Disobedience is not the evitable result of human nature because humans have a neutral 
disposition. They can obey or disobey, and the choice is solely up to the individual (Sir 
15.14–17). The ability to choose, in fact, is given to humans at creation. The contrast 
could not be more drastic. The ability that Ben Sira claims God gave at creation is denied 
by the hymnist who attributes the human’s moral failures to the material from which he or 
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she is formed. Just as Ben Sira’s optimism is fundamental to his conception of the divine-
human relationship, the hymnist’s pessimism is crucial. 
B. Divine Action as the Basis for Human Action 
The depravity of humanity, and the resulting incapacity to accomplish anything 
righteous, creates a significant problem for the human because this condition will keep 
one from attaining salvation. The solution to this problem is not a renewed effort on the 
human’s part, but instead divine intervention. The interaction of the divine and human 
agents in the Hodayot consistently gives priority to God. God determines from before 
creation who will be righteous or wicked, and through his Spirit, he enacts his eternal 
decree, gives knowledge, and purifies from sin. Through these divine acts, the human is 
empowered to obey God’s will because the Spirit of God is working through the human. 
A clear example of this perspective is 8.16–23, which brings together several 
important themes: divine action in the forms of predestination, giving knowledge, and 
purification, which are all enacted through the Spirit; and human response through Spirit-
enabled obedience. In this paragraph, two parallel statements describe the priority of 
divine action, which then serves as the basis for human action. In the first (lines 18–19a), 
the hymnist resolves to purify his hands and oppose all evil because he “knows” that God 
has “recorded (htmXr) the spirit of the righteous one.” Throughout the hymns, knowledge 
belongs to God alone who imparts it to those he elects. In this passage, the divinely given 
knowledge is the understanding that God establishes the human as righteous by giving his 
Spirit to the human, which is itself an act of predestination. With the verb ~Xr, the 
hymnist portrays God as writing down the person’s status prior to creation rather than 
God keeping an account of what the righteous person does.62 The only scriptural 
occurrence refers to what was written in the book of truth, which probably refers to a 
heavenly book that contains what will come in the future (Dan 10.21). What is inscribed 
is the “spirit of the righteous one” (1QHa 8.18). This could mean either that God has 
given a certain type of spirit (e.g. the spirit of holiness) to a person, which because of this 
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spirit the person becomes righteous. Alternatively, the “spirit” could be the human’s 
disposition—in this case, towards righteousness—and God by inscribing it confirms that 
a person’s disposition will become reality.63 The former option is a stronger form of 
predestination and coheres better with the context. The relevant part of line 19 reads al 
$yd[lbm Xya qrcy, “no one is righteous besides you.” Righteousness belongs to God alone. 
Because of this claim, line 18 cannot mean that the human is righteous according to his 
own inclination. The person described as righteous only has this characteristic because 
God has allowed him to be made this way. Line 18, then, means that God actively assigns 
a certain characteristic, which describes a certain lifestyle of obedience to the Torah, and 
this is accomplished by giving the spirit. The description of God’s work focuses on past 
actions that occurred apart from the hymnist’s present existence. 
The hymnist’s response that is described in line 18b arises from God’s gift of 
knowledge. He chooses to purify himself, which is further defined as avoiding evil. His 
response to God’s grace is obedience to the divine will. His desire to purify himself is 
confirmation that he is one worthy of the accolade “righteous” (qydc) that God assigned to 
him through predestination. God’s past act of determining the future of the righteous 
person provides the basis from which the person makes God’s decision a reality in the 
present. The hymnist’s response, therefore, is not a secondary step independent of God’s 
redemption. As the next lines make clear, his response is grounded in God giving him a 
certain type of spirit that moves him to perform certain tasks. 
The second statement (lines 19b–22a) describes how the hymnist “appeases” (hlxaw 
$ynp) God because God has given him a particular spirit (ÎybÐ httn rXa xwrb) to accomplish 
for him at least three tasks. The spirit was given by God “to lavish” (~ylXhl) his mercy on 
the hymnist, “to purify” (ynrhjl) him, and “to draw [him] near” (ynXyghl). Damage at this 
point in the scroll makes it impossible to know how lines 20–21 related to these clauses.64 
Nevertheless, the sequence of actions depicts God’s work as the basis for and reason that 
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 Sekki suggests that it is “nothing more than a reference to any righteous member of the sect,” and 
“ruah  could be dropped completely” without affecting the meaning (The Meaning of RuahI at Qumran, 
106). 
64
 twX[l at the end of line 20 may continue the sequence of infinitives, but the damage before and after 
prevents one from determining how it functioned in the sentence. 
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the hymnist acts. The l preposition on each of the infinitives indicates the purpose or 
reason that God gave his Spirit to the hymnist. The hymnist claims that the act of 
appeasing God is something done by himself, while ascribing it to God who placed his 
Spirit in the hymnist. There is no tension between divine and human action, as if placing 
an emphasis on God’s actions somehow lessens the significance and necessity of human 
action or vice versa. The two are interrelated but priority is also given to God. 
Lines 22–23 conclude this paragraph with an appeal for divine protection. The 
hymnist beseeches God to prevent something (perhaps an evil spirit or evil doers) from 
joining with him. He also asks God to keep him from abandoning the “statutes of the 
covenant” because of afflictions that he might encounter. Recognising his own inability 
and wayward nature, he seeks assistance from God. The expectation for obedience is 
underscored in this line, for the hymnist does not think that God’s gracious deliverance 
described in the previous lines can be abstracted from the demand for obedience. While 
his obedience is not the reason God acts to redeem him, it is nonetheless a necessary part 
of the life of the redeemed. 
Two points should be noted. First, the complementary relationship between divine 
and human action appears in the two statements about purification. On the one hand, the 
hymnist claims that he purifies himself (line 18), while on the other, he attributes his 
purification to God through his holy Spirit (line 20).65 The act of purification can be 
described as something accomplished by the hymnist or by God. The hymnist’s actions, 
however, are never accomplished apart from something done by God. Because God gave 
him knowledge, the hymnist vows to purify his ways and to avoid committing evil. The 
significance of the hymnist’s action is not lessened because it is rooted in God’s action, 
for it is precisely because God acted on behalf of the hymnist that he decides to act. In 
addition, God’s action is not somehow dependent on the hymnist’s willingness to reject 
wickedness. The underlying assumption seems to be that the human will act in 
accordance with God’s decisions. 
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 The two terms rrb and rhj are synonyms.  
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Second, one could argue on the basis of the phrases “for those who love you,” “for 
those who keep your comm[and]ments,” and “they who turn to you in truth and with a 
perfect heart” (lines 21, 25) that God’s decision to act for the human is either based on his 
foreknowledge of or is a response to the obedience of a human. Either way, God’s action 
is subsequent to and determined by human action. Such a conclusion, however, over-
interprets the intent of the expressions. The expressions identify those who are recipients 
of God’s gracious actions by indicating how they are best known, namely, as those who 
obey God’s commandments. They do not mean, however, that these people acted in such 
a manner as to earn God’s grace. The phrases indicate the importance of obedience, 
indeed the expectation for it, but they do not reverse the pattern of divine and human 
action. 
The pattern observed in this analysis of 8.16–23 appears throughout the Hodayot. 
God acts in a certain manner to overcome the ill effects of the human’s creaturely, sinful 
nature, and with this basic problem corrected, the human is enabled to understand, 
worship, and obey God, all the while relying on God for assistance. The following three 
sections investigate how the divine-human relationship works in relation to three key 
concepts: predestination, knowledge, and purification. In each section, attention will be 
drawn to the role assigned to the spirit. 
i. Predestination 
The idea of predestination assumes divine providence and foreknowledge. Before 
creating each being and part of creation, God knew what they would do (9.7–8, 24–25; 
15.13). His knowledge extends from before creation until its ending, and he has assigned 
each creature, whether in the heavens or on earth, its task (9.9–15). Specifically about 
humans, the hymnist writes, “In the wisdom of your knowledge you det[er]mine their 
course before they came, and according to [your] wi[ll] everything [happ]ens and apart 
from you nothing is done” (9.19–20; cf. 7.16–17). The preceding lines describe how God 
distributed the tasks of humanity throughout its generations (9.15–19). The hymnist 
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accepts many of the dualistic notions found in other Qumran texts.66 He affirms that the 
world is divided between good and evil, and humanity is split into the righteous and 
wicked. This division occurred when God created humanity (7.16–21; 12.38: “For you 
created the just and the wicked”) and, at least, implies double predestination.67 Although 
the Hodayot rarely mentions double predestination, some passages make good sense 
when interpreted with this idea as a background.68 God created the righteous for “eternal 
salvation and endless peace” and the wicked “for the day of slaughter” (7.19–20). The 
hymnist maintains that God is ultimately responsible for the final outcome of each human 
because he assigned to each a particular spirit (6.11–12). 
The concept of predestination has been thoroughly explored by others, and it is not 
necessary to cover the same ground again.69 Attention is drawn here to two motifs used to 
explain how God establishes his will in one’s life. The question of the purpose of this 
teaching will then be addressed, followed by a short explanation of how the hymnist 
relates predestination and “free will.” 
Motifs of Predestination. Among the many ways to explain God’s pre-temporal 
decisions, two in particular stand out in the Hodayot: God establishes each human’s path, 
and God assigns a particular spirit to each person. 
The hymnist asserts, “From [God] comes the path of every living being” (7.25). This 
statement follows the hymnist’s reflections on the creation of the righteous and wicked. 
God created the just one in order for him “to walk on all (your paths)” (lines 17–18). The 
wicked, who were created “for the day of slaughter,” walk on an evil path (lines 20–21). 
God determined the destinies of these two persons when he created them. Ultimately, a 
human’s destiny depends on the spirit that God created for him or her: “The path of man 
is not established (!wkt) except by the spirit which God formed for him to perfect the path 
of the sons of Adam” (12.31–32). Unlike Ben Sira, who envisions God placing the human 
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 On dualism in the Dead Sea Scrolls, see Frey, “Different Patterns,” 280–85. 
67
 12.38 cannot mean simply that God created all human beings, as Wernberg-Moeller suggests 
(“Reconsideration of the Two Spirits,” 415n.5), not least because it is a condensed form of 7.16–21. 
68
 Merrill, Qumran and Predestination, 41–42. 
69
 On the Hodayot see Merrill, Qumran and Predestination. For the Dead Sea Scrolls generally, see 
Lange, “Wisdom and Predestination in the Dead Sea Scrolls.” 
  
121 
 
before two paths and instructing the human to choose his or her own destiny, the hymnist 
maintains that God determines the human’s destiny when he places the human on the path 
of righteousness or wickedness. 
As a descendent of Adam and formed from clay, the human cannot establish his own 
path (7.15–16, 24; 12.30), and apart from divine intervention, the human remains captive 
to this inability. Thus, the hymnist appeals to God, “How can I make straight (my) path 
unless you establish [my] ste[ps? How] can [my] steps stand [unless you] strengthen (me) 
with strength?” (20.34–35). He places his hope in God because, as a human, he is unable 
to follow the path of righteousness. The hymnist’s view is adopted from the scriptures. 
While humans are instructed to follow the righteous path (Deut 11.28; 28.9; Prov 4.26–
27), it is recognised that they cannot fully establish their paths (Prov 20.24; Jer 10.23) and 
are dependent on God, who firmly plants each person (2 Sam 22.33; Ps 37.23; 139–24; 
Prov 3.6; 16.9).70 Only by divine assistance will the hymnist be able to walk before God 
on the path that leads to life (1QHa 15.14).71 
Along with indicating predestination, this image also reveals the connection between 
predestination and obedience. The language of walking according to God’s ways appears 
in Deuteronomy alongside “commandments,” “statute,” and “judgments” (26.17) and 
indicates that walking according to God’s way means keeping the Torah.72 In later 
traditions, the kings are evaluated according to whether they follow God’s way like David 
and Asa73 or the evil ways of Jeroboam and the Israelite kings.74 The image, therefore, 
has an ethical orientation. Within the Hodayot, this connection is made when the hymnist 
contrasts those who have not followed God’s path with those who do follow God’s will 
(12.17–27). The just are those who “keep your covenant” and “walk on all (your paths),” 
while the wicked are those who “walk on a path that is not good” and “reject your 
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 See Koch, %r<d<, TDOT 3:282–93; Merrill, $rd, NIDOTTE 1:989–93. 
71
 4.21 likely conveys the same idea: “But I know that [. . .] the path of your chosen one.” García 
Martínez/Tigchelaar (DSSSE, 148) reconstruct ÎrXytÐ (“you smoothen”), while Stegemann (1QHodayota, 71) 
suggests ÎhtwnykÐhْ (“you determine;” cf. Holm-Nielsen, Hodayot, 249n.18). 
72
 Cf. Ex 18.20; Deut 10.12; 11.22; 19.9; 28.9; 30.16; Jos 22.5; 1 Kings 2.3, 4. 
73
 E.g. 1 Kings 3.14; 8.25; 22.43. 
74
 E.g. 1 Kings 15.26, 34; 16.2, 19, 26; 2 Kings 8.18. 
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covenant” (7.18, 21). Adherence to God’s way means obeying the demands of the 
covenant. 
Predestination, therefore, is not an abstract doctrine that stands by itself. It is rather a 
practical concept that emphasises God’s sovereignty, while also establishing human 
ability. The connection between predestination and obedience also shows that the divine 
and human are not competing agents. Predestination does not dismiss or devalue human 
action. It enables the human to obey the divine demand because when God chooses the 
person for righteousness he establishes the person on the path of life. While it is correct 
that one is elected to be obedient, one should not deduce from this that salvation (or 
election) is based on obedience.75 Obedience is the outcome and purpose of the divine 
decision. 
This connection between predestination and obedience may help to explain those 
instances in which the hymnist describes the wicked as refusing to walk in God’s ways. In 
12.17 the wicked are described as those who “have not chosen the p[ath of] your [heart].” 
Their rejection of God is not attributed to a pre-temporal decision, but to their own 
wayward actions. Similarly, 14.19–21 the hymnist complains about those who once 
followed his teaching but, having been enticed by deception, have rejected him and God. 
They have disobeyed God, who “commanded them to seek fortune far from the paths” of 
the deceivers. The point in both texts is not to teach free will, but to indicate that the 
righteous are those who observe the Torah. In 7.20–21 predestination and human freedom 
are set side by side: “But the wicked you have created for the [pur]pose of your anger and 
from the womb you set them apart for the day of destruction, for (yk) they do not walk on 
a path that is good but they reject your covenant.”76 The hymnist seems to present two 
contradictory ideas in these lines since he says that God predestined the wicked for 
destruction but their end is determined by which path they have chosen.77 Rather than 
accusing the hymnist of contradiction in the space of one sentence, the statement, along 
with the others just noted, can be interpreted as describing human responsibility not 
                                                 
75
 Contra VanLandingham, Judgment and Justification, 106. 
76
 For this reconstruction see Stegemann, 1QHodayota, 104. 
77
 Licht, “Doctrine,” 7; VanLandingham, Judgment and Justification, 114. 
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necessarily free will. God is just in punishing the wicked because they have actually 
disobeyed, but, at the same time, they were predisposed to disobedience because God 
determined that they would walk on evil paths. While this solution may not be 
philosophically acceptable to many today, it is coherent with the hymnist’s view of 
predestination and responsibility. 
Another way of speaking about God’s determination of a person’s destiny is through 
the motif of God allocating to a person a particular type of “spirit” (xwr). The divine will is 
manifest in the present by the spirit that God assigns to each person. While the term xwr 
has a variety of referents in the Dead Sea Scrolls, in the Hodayot two connotations are 
important for the teaching about predestination.78 It stands for spiritual beings that 
influence humans either positively by assisting them to be obedient or negatively by 
attempting to cause the righteous to sin. In the former case, the spirit can be connected 
directly with God, for it is “the spirit of your holiness” (6.13). The other important use 
connects directly with the human being and indicates the person’s disposition toward a 
certain type of lifestyle, either righteousness or wickedness. God ultimately determines 
the person’s disposition when he creates a person and assigns a certain spirit to him or 
her. The two connotations are brought together when the hymnist describes God giving 
his holy Spirit to some humans. 
In the creation hymn in column 9, the term xwr functions as a convenient term to 
summarise all the aspects of creation. God is credited with creating every spirit: “You 
formed every spirit and [their] work [you determine]ed and the judgment of all their 
deeds” (9.8–9).79 In lines 10–11, the term refers to angels. In the following lines, it refers 
to heavenly beings such as the sun and stars (lines 11–12) and to meteorological events 
(lines 12–13). Finally, humans possess a “spirit” (line 15). God assigns to each type of 
spirit certain tasks according to his own pleasure. The sun, moon, and stars travel their 
paths, while the storms accomplish their purposes (lines 11–13). “The spirit of humanity” 
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 For the Dead Sea Scrolls generally, see Sekki, Meaning of RuahI. His treatment addresses the 
syntactical use of xwr, which does have its limitations since it assumes more consistency than may have 
existed. 
79
 ~hyX[m lwkl jpXmw hْÎtwnykh mÐtْlْw[pْw xwr lwk htrcy hta. Stegemann’s reconstruction and Newsom’s 
translation (1QHodayota, 118, 130). See the notes on p.123 for explanation. 
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was created to live eternally and to each generation certain tasks have been assigned 
(lines 15–16). God has determined the course of each generation (lines 19–20) and 
rewards or punishes each generation for the actions of the previous one (lines 17–18). 
Holm-Nielsen and Hübner claim that in lines 9–10 the hymnist is referring to two 
governing beings that rule over humanity and fight against one another.80 The doctrine is 
most fully explained in the Two-Spirits sermon of 1QS 3.13–4.26, which describes how 
God created two governing spirits, the Spirits of Truth and Deceit, and assigned to them a 
portion of humanity. This pre-temporal decision determines one’s final destiny. Although 
one can be influenced by either Spirit (3.19), a person’s lot is determined prior to creation 
(4.16, 25). The sins of the sons of light are traced to the Angel of Darkness and his 
cohorts, but God assists his chosen ones (3.24). He purifies them by the spirit of holiness 
and provides knowledge and wisdom (4.20–23). This text does not only describe a 
psychological battle raging in the mind of one desiring to join the community, although it 
does depict the conflict between choosing good or evil.81 A clear cosmic dualism and 
predestination underlies this text, since humanity is divided into two groups based on 
God’s decision and ruled over by one of the two spirits. 
In spite of sharing the focus on divine sovereignty, predestination, and using the 
word xwr, the two texts have no other similarities. The hymn in 1QHa 9 nowhere mentions 
the two spirits or even implies that cosmic spirits rule over part of humanity or wage war 
against one another. Humanity is not divided into “lots” but viewed instead as a whole. 
The cosmic dualism that lies at the heart of the Two-Spirits sermon is missing from this 
creation hymn. The idea could have been inserted easily and would have cohered with the 
general teaching of the hymn, but to find the two-spirits doctrine here is to read the 
concept into the text not to derive it from the sentence. 
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 Holm-Nielsen, Hodayot, 20n.10; Hübner, “Anthropologischer Dualismus,” 269–70. Sekki thinks the 
statement refers to “demons” because of the syntactical construction lwk xwr and because the hymnist is 
contrasting the creation of the spiritual and material worlds with humanity (Meaning of RuahI, 168–69). The 
syntactical construction, however, is not as uniform as Sekki maintains since lwk as a modifier of xwr is not 
used exclusively as a reference to spiritual beings (cf. 7.13). He also has misunderstood the context, for the 
contrast is not between, on the one hand, the spiritual and material worlds and, on the other, humanity but 
between the heavens (9.9b–13a) and the earth (lines 13b–20). 
81
 Contra Wernberg-Moeller, “Reconsideration of the Two Spirits.” See Charlesworth, “Critical 
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The creation hymn emphasises God’s role in determining how each being or aspect 
of creation remains under his control and does as he intends. It uses the term “spirit” as a 
summarizing word to indicate the similarities between the various aspects of creation. 
While differences between the beings can be identified, each is united in that they are all 
spiritual beings under the direction of God.    
The same statement, with slight modifications, found in 9.9–10 occurs also in 7.25. 
Because of human weakness, God “created the spirit (xwr htrcy hta) and established its 
tasks [before eternity], and from you is the way of all living beings (yx lwk).” Again, the 
characteristic features of the Two-Spirits sermon are missing.82 There is no mention of a 
Good or Evil Spirit nor are humans divided into lots under the control of a governing 
spirit.83 The second part of the line, “from you is the way of all living beings,” parallels 
the first. xwr and yx lwk are either synonymous, referring to the human being, or xwr may be 
more specific in that it might refer to the human’s disposition. The use of xwr earlier in 
this hymn (line 16) suggests the latter interpretation. God gives to each person a certain 
spirit, and he also determines what each person will do. In contrast to the inability of the 
human to direct his or her own ways (line 24), God secures the person’s future. The 
statements in lines 24–25 parallel those in lines 15–17, which also develop the contrast 
between human weakness due to its creaturely condition and God’s sovereignty as the 
one who possess control over “the impulse of every spirit” (xwr lwk rcy) (line 16) and 
determines its tasks before even creating it. 
The phrase xwr htrcy hta found in 7.25 and 9.8–9 also appears in 18.22: “for you 
have formed the sp[irit of your servant and according to] your [wi]ll you have established 
me.”84 Rather than describing God as the Creator of all humanity, the statement focuses 
on God’s role in the life of the elect. The statement is more specific than the others since 
it indicates the creation of the elect, which brings the concept of predestination to the 
foreground.      
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 Contra Hübner, “Anthropologischer Dualismus,” 269; cf. Frey, “Flesh and Spirit,” 380. 
83
 Sekki connects this line and line 16 with the two-spirits doctrine because he understands “spirit” in 
1QS 3 as a spiritual disposition (Meaning of RuahI, 134). His reading of 1QS 3.13–15 is incorrect at this 
point. 
84
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The connection between “spirit” language and predestination also appears in 1QHa 
6.11–12. Stegemann reconstructs the text as follows: ypl yk Xwna twْlْÎrwg      bÐ $db[ lkXtw 
~tlw[p ~tÙÙÎ   Ð !ktْÎwÐ ([Xrl bwj !yb ~lyْpْtْ twxwr. The translation provided is: “And you have 
caused your servant to have insight [    lo]ts of humankind. For according to (their) spirits 
you cast (the lot) for them between good and evil, [and] you have determined [   ] tm their 
recompense.”85 The lacunae make the text very ambiguous, and several alternative 
reconstructions and a variety of interpretations have been offered.86 The first two words 
are arrived at by the placement of fragments 44.3 (tw), the third line of SHR 4284 frg 
(lkX), and 22.7 (upper part of lamed and $db[). Stegemann’s reconstruction of twْlْÎrwg is 
rare.87 Others opt for a form of xwr88or leave the space blank.89 The letters prior to ~l- on 
Stegemann’s ~lyْpْtْ have been reconstructed in several ways. Most agree that a waw or yod 
preceded the letters. Mansoor restores ~lwÎ[Ð (“[ete]rnal”),90 but this does not fill the space, 
which seems to have room for 2–4 letters.91 Others propose a form of the verb ldb (“to 
divide, separate”).92 This seems to be what lies behind the translation by Abegg: “For by 
their spirits You distinguish between the good and the wicked.”93 If one accepts this 
reconstruction, then second person masculine singular (~lyÎdbtÐ) is more likely than third 
masculine singular (Lohse) because of the context. The mem on ~lyÎdbtÐ would be the 
third masculine plural suffix,94 and it most likely refers to humanity as a whole.95 
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 Stegemann, 1QHodayota, 88, 96. See also p.92 for the notes on the text and plate IV. 
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 García Martínez/Tigchelaar reconstruct the sentence as ~lw… twxwr ypl yk Xwna tÎwxwr…Ð $db[ lkXtw 
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 Sukenik, Dead Sea Scrolls, plate 48; Lohse, Texte, 162. 
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 Mansoor, Thanksgiving Hymns, 181n.4; also Dupont-Sommer, Essene Writings, 244. 
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 Cf. Holm-Nielsen, Hodayot, 220n.5. 
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hiphil infinitive (Hodayot, 220n.5). 
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 Abegg, “Thanksgiving Psalms,” 88. Cf. Vermes, Complete Dead Sea Scrolls, 248: “[For Thou hast 
divided men] into good and evil in accordance with the spirits of their lot;” Gaster, Dead Sea Scriptures, 
196: “[and stray not in the waywar]dness of men, but, through the spirit of [discern]ment which is theirs, 
[distinguish] the good from the wicked [and keep] their deeds undefiled.” 
94
 Cf. the translation of García Martínez/Tigchelaar (n.86 above) and Lohse (n.92 above). 
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 Cf. Holm-Nielsen, Hodayot, 220n.5. 
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Stegemann thinks the gap is not large enough for this word.96 His proposal of ~lypt 
requires only space for two letters, and he thinks it is more probable because twlrwg often 
occurs with lpn (cf. 11.22; 15.34). His argument is circular, however, since he 
reconstructs twْlْÎrwg on the basis of his reconstruction of ~lypt, and then uses the 
reconstruction of twْlْÎrwg to justify reconstructing ~lypt. The space prior to ~tÙÙÎ   Ð is also 
filled in various ways. Many read ~tÎhlÐ (from ~mt), translating it as either “to destroy”97 
or with the idea of perfection,98 but this does not adequately fill the gap. 
Although the textual issues make any interpretation uncertain, one can still judge 
some more plausible than others. Many commentators find in this text the notion of the 
two-spirits doctrine.99 This suggestion has more to commend it than attempts to find the 
concept in 7.25 and 9.9. Not only is the term xwr used, but also the contrast between good 
and evil coheres with the description in 1QS 3–4. The statement seems to develop a 
notion of predestination or determinism. Nevertheless, it is doubtful that the hymnist is 
drawing on this concept, at least explicitly. The context does not develop the idea, and the 
lack of cosmic dualism in the rest of the Hodayot makes it somewhat suspect to find it 
here and only here.100 One can make good sense of the statement without importing a 
concept that is not explicitly mentioned or required. While the “two spirit” idea may 
reside in the background,101 at the very least, one cannot agree with Merrill that “the two 
spirits are clearly mentioned.”102 
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 He claims that one must presume that the material “has crumpled laterally about 2 mm” which it 
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(Stegemann, 1QHodayota, 93). 
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 Mansoor, Thanksgiving Hymns, 181. 
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Reconstructing ldb as a hiphil infinitive, Holm-Nielsen proposes that the lines 
describe the righteous person’s capability to differentiate between good and evil.103 He 
bases his interpretation on the analogous statement in 15.12, which uses similar terms. 
The hymnist describes his role in God’s judgment of each human: “For all those who 
strive against me, you condemn guilty at the judgment, dividing (lydbhl) by me between 
the righteous and the wicked ([Xrl qydc !yb).” Two problems arise, however. First, 15.12 
is not an accurate parallel, since it describes the role of the righteous hymnist in God’s 
judgment of wicked and righteous persons. It does not refer to “spirits,” nor does it 
describe the moral choice that the righteous person makes. Second, the Hodayot does not 
depict humans as choosing between either a spirit of good or evil. The righteous person 
remains a sinner and a depraved spirit until death, but the Hodayot never depicts a 
psychological battle within one’s will. 
Sekki disputes the widely accepted claim that this statement (6.11–12) develops the 
notion that God predestines a person’s spiritual disposition. He notes that the following 
lines portray the hymnist’s religious attitude as changing as he progresses within the 
community. The statements imply spiritual growth and human activity, which Sekki takes 
to mean that a person’s spiritual disposition could not have been “determined 
unchangeably from birth.”104 His conclusion, however, fails to account for statements 
throughout the Hodayot (and even in 1QS 3–4) that those predestined for salvation will 
still sin. The disposition is unchangeable in that God determines that it will be manifest 
during the person’s life and culminate in the person’s final salvation, but this does not 
mean that the person always and only lives in accordance with it. Moreover, Sekki’s 
contention that human activity renders the notion of predestination inappropriate is 
inaccurate because throughout the Hodayot human action is seen as the outworking of a 
prior divine action. There is, then, no opposition to understanding 6.11–12 as describing 
God assigning to individual humans a disposition toward good or evil. 
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The sentence in 6.11–12 most likely describes God assigning one type of spirit to 
each human rather than God giving each human over to a certain Spirit. The dualistic idea 
is found not in the cosmic realm but on the individual level as God distinguishes between 
the righteous and the wicked according to the spirit he has assigned them. Whereas the 
cosmic dualism evident in the Two-Spirits sermon focuses on groups of individual 
persons, the Hymns focus on the individual person. 6.11–12 utilise an ethical dualism to 
demonstrate God’s sovereign control over the destinies of each human being. 
The texts analysed thus far indicate a close relationship between the concept of 
divine sovereignty and the term “spirit” (xwr). God rules over all the “spirits,” whether 
spiritual or material beings, because he is the Creator. He determines the tasks that each 
will do. He separates humanity according to the type of spirit he assigns them, whether 
good or evil, which suggests a notion of double predestination. 6.11–12 evidences the use 
of “spirit” to refer to a spiritual disposition, which in this case is assigned by God. Licht 
aptly summarises, “The term spirit . . . is thus best defined as the vehicle of 
determination, or as the carrier of divinely ordained characteristic, or that part of the 
human being which receives these characteristic traits—i.e. man’s personality.”105 
Apart from divine intervention, humans are “a spirit of flesh” (5.19). The 
combination of xwr and rXb indicates that the human has a disposition associated with the 
status of being a creature. “Flesh” stands in this context for weakness, inability, and 
ultimately sinfulness. A “corrupt spirit” also rules the human (lines 21–22). Although the 
verb “rules” (hlXm) could suggest that the hymnist is thinking about an external force that 
asserts its own will and desires onto the human,106 it probably indicates the control that 
the sinful condition of the human spirit has over the human. The expression is the last in a 
string of phrases intended to demonstrate the complete worthlessness and sinfulness of 
the human. Each of these phrases describes how the hymnist views the human agent. He 
is not concerned with external, personal beings that influence humanity, but rather with 
the control exerted over the human by his or her own depraved nature.107 This is 
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consistent with the other uses of the phrase hw[n xwr (9.22; 11.21; 19.12; frag. 12.6[= 8.18 
Stegemann]). This “depraved spirit” is something from which God redeems the elect. 
Unlike the wicked, who are left to their depraved spirits, the righteous are given 
another spirit. God himself intervenes by putting his Spirit into the righteous, thereby 
both electing some unto salvation while also overcoming the negative impact and effects 
of their depraved spirits. Since humans are unable to direct their paths because they are 
“flesh” and “creatures of clay,” God “creates” for some a spirit that “establishes” their 
path (12.31).108 The statement highlights divine action in the specific form of 
predestination, for God gives to some a spirit that overcomes their creaturely weaknesses. 
The term “spirit,” Sekki rightly concludes, refers to the type of disposition that God gives 
to the human.109 Sekki, however, downplays the act of predestination, choosing instead to 
emphasise human action. He argues that the statement, in dependence on Ezekiel 36, 
means “that God himself must create the kind of disposition in man which enables him to 
lead a godly life.”110 The context indicates precisely the opposite conclusion. 
Predestination is clearly evident in line 38 (“for you created the just and wicked”), and 
this portion of the hymn is devoted to God’s redemptive acts. It is not by human action 
that one overcomes the effects of one’s creaturely, sinful condition and secures one’s own 
path. Rather, it is by God’s mercy, and to this one clings despite affliction (line 36). 
 The expression “by the spirit which you put in me” (yb httn rXa xwrb) functions as a 
technical phrase to denote God’s salvific actions (5.25; 8.19; 20.11–12; 21(bottom).14). 
God intervenes in the human’s life and not only alters one’s being, but also actually 
imparts a new spirit, his own Spirit, that leads the human into knowledge and teaches him 
how to obey God. The language is reminiscent of Ezekiel 11 and 36–37. The Lord 
declares to Ezekiel his intention to give a new spirit to the people and to replace their 
heart of stone with a heart of flesh (11.19; 36.26). This new spirit is identified with God’s 
own Spirit (36.27; 37.14). God also will purify the people from their uncleanliness and 
idol worship (11.18; 36.25). Because God has cleansed them and given a new spirit, the 
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people will obey his commandments (11.20; 36.27). Although key points from these 
chapters are missing, the hymnist likely derives the phrase yb httn rXa xwrb from these 
sections.111 He finds here a clear statement of God’s intent to redeem his people. The 
hymnist transposes the language from its original application to the people as a whole to 
reflect his individualistic theology. God’s Spirit is placed in him personally, not just the 
community of the redeemed. From this perspective, God’s decision to give his Spirit 
represents predestination since not all receive the Spirit. The hymnist never ponders why 
he is chosen, but he likely views his acceptance as an act of grace. He learns from Ezekiel 
36.31 that God gives his Spirit and restores the people despite their sin. 
The Spirit is assigned several titles that relate to the various functions that it has. It is 
the “spirit of knowledge” (6.25), who unveils God’s mysteries, exposes human sinfulness, 
and reveals the way of righteousness. The Spirit is associated with God’s holiness and in 
this role purifies sinners (8.20).112 The two titles and the roles they represent are not 
carefully distinguished, for the “spirit of your holiness” often reveals knowledge. The 
hymnist can also speak of God placing “spirits” in him (yb httn rXa twxwrm) (4.17), which 
likely stands for the various roles that the single Spirit of God has.113 Within these roles, 
the Spirit, as an external being, assists the human to be obedient to God’s 
commandments. He works against the “fleshly spirit” of the human. The Spirit is not a 
reward for obedience, but rather the cause of one’s obedience.114 The idea that God gives 
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his Spirit apart from human obedience reinforces the doctrine of predestination as well as 
underscores the gracious nature of God’s actions. 
These motifs discussed above indicate God’s involvement in the lives of all humans 
right from the outset. He determines who will be among the righteous or the wicked prior 
to birth. The righteous he creates to be obedient and to enjoy eternal life, but the wicked 
he creates for destruction. He establishes the path of the righteous and gives to them his 
Spirit of holiness. The concepts analysed develop a doctrine of predestination that 
informs much of the hymnist’s thoughts about the divine-human relationship. 
Purpose of Predestination. The scholarly discussion about the Qumran doctrine of 
predestination (1) has focused primarily on the relationship between predestination and 
free will and (2) usually combines various statements from diverse documents without 
first understanding the function of predestination within a certain text. While an 
explanation of the concept may appear to handle the texts as a whole, one often finds that 
the explanation fails to address adequately the particulars of a single text. In terms of the 
Hodayot, Merrill’s Qumran and Predestination focuses on this document. He traces the 
connection of predestination with various other teachings and demonstrates its importance 
for the hymnist, even concluding that it is the fundamental doctrine of the Hodayot.115 
Nevertheless, he provides no rationale for why predestination is so important to the 
hymnist.116 While possible reasons are hinted at occasionally, a full explanation is never 
provided. 
A reason for the focus on predestination does present itself: this teaching serves to 
counter the pessimistic anthropology. Because the hymnist’s moral failings extend back 
to his origin, God’s actions must extend back that far also. Predestination sets God’s 
actions prior to any human action, thereby overcoming the negative effects of human 
nature and making the human completely dependent on God’s grace. The hymnist 
explains how God knew him prior to his birth and watched over him even as a child 
(17.29–30). Concerning the just one, he writes, “From the womb you established him for 
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the period of approval,” and his obedience was determined by God at the outset (7.17–
20). He will be redeemed from the inabilities that plague him as a creature (cf. lines 15–
17). In other instances, the hymnist explains how God reverses the problem of his sinful 
nature by overcoming his creaturely status. As a creature of clay, a human cannot 
understand God’s ways without him opening one’s ears and eyes, thus making it possible 
for one to grasp the truth.117 The doctrine of predestination provides the solution to 
humanity’s problem with sin since according to this teaching God acts for his own 
pleasure to redeem those whom he chooses. He reverses the effects of their depraved 
natures. 
The contrast between the human spirit that is “fleshy” and “corrupt” and the divine 
Spirit that purifies and gives knowledge further enhances the suggestion that the concept 
of predestination counters the problem of human sin by overcoming it from its beginning 
point. The human spirit is characterised by inability, weakness, and sinfulness, and 
because of the human’s natural spirit, no human can comprehend God’s mysteries or obey 
the covenant’s demands. The intervention of God, however, marks a drastic change, for 
the human’s wretched spirit is replaced by God’s Spirit of holiness and knowledge, which 
then enables the human to understand and obey. God overcomes the human’s creaturely 
condition by giving his own Spirit that is not limited by the sinfulness of the creature. 
This gracious divine act represents predestination since God gives his new Spirit only to 
those he desires. The inherent problem faced by the human due to one’s creaturely 
sinfulness is addressed prior to one’s birth, although it takes a lifetime for the solution to 
manifest itself fully. 
It is incorrect, therefore, to claim, as some do, that predestination functions as the 
basis of the hymnist’s thought and spurs his reflections on human depravity.118 These two 
vital teachings seem to be interlocking blocks that support and develop one another. One 
cannot determine simply from the hymns which idea the hymnist developed first. Both 
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ideas are found in the scriptures, and it is more likely that the hymnist radicalised the 
scriptural teachings than that he conceived of one idea prior to the other.  
The concept of predestination emphasises divine action and is ultimately an 
expression of God’s grace.119 The decision to elect someone occurs apart from and 
without any regard for what a human being does. The concept cannot be reduced to 
foreknowledge in the Hodayot because predestination is viewed as an eternal decision 
made by God prior to creation. The concept, however, should not be considered abstractly 
and apart from its intended goal. The notion is not devoid of human action since the goal 
of God’s decision to elect someone is that the depraved, creaturely condition will be 
altered in order that the human may be obedient. The reason God assigns his Spirit to 
certain individuals is his sovereign will, and by the Spirit, the human is able to obey 
God’s commands. The language of walking according to God’s way refers to obedience 
to the Torah. When God establishes the righteous person’s path, he determines that he or 
she will obey the Mosaic Torah (as interpreted by the community). Obedience is the 
intended goal and outcome of God’s decision to act. Predestination is not a speculative 
doctrine concerned only with the mysterious, hidden will of God. It is, instead, a practical 
doctrine focused on addressing a particular problem, human sinfulness, in order to 
accomplish a particular result, human obedience. 
Predestination and “Free Will.” While the doctrine of predestination establishes 
divine action at the forefront of the divine-human relationship, this idea does not absolve 
the human agent of responsibility for one’s actions. The hymnist maintains throughout 
that humans are ultimately responsible for their action. The seeming incoherence of the 
relationship between statements about human agency and those about predestination 
(divine agency) reflects, according to many scholars, a profound difficulty that runs 
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throughout the Hodayot and the other Qumran literature.120 In terms of the Hodayot 
specifically, several solutions have been offered, none of which are satisfactory.121 
VanLandingham thinks the hymns are unclear, due of course to their genre, and that 
Qumran theology must have included human freedom. He bases this claim on the various 
commands, vows, and prayers for repentance found in the Hodayot, which “make no 
sense unless humans can choose their own path.”122 Two points should be noted, 
however. First, this argument fails to account for the hymnist’s pessimistic anthropology. 
The human agent cannot obey God’s commands by virtue of his or her nature. The 
hymnist’s understanding of sin and the human nature rule out an absolute freedom. 
Second, the commands are only given to the elect not the general population, and the 
prayers for assistance and forgiveness can only be offered by those in the community. 
The hymnist does not describe a situation in which one is free to do as one pleases. Each 
is under the constraint of one’s spirit or inclination, a disposition assigned by God prior to 
creation. 
Merrill advocates another position. God has put spirits into the world to influence 
human beings, and he knows who will respond to which spiritual influence. Those who 
will respond to his grace, Merrill argues, God draws to himself through the community. 
Those who choose to act wickedly, he rejects.123 In this perspective, predestination is a 
response to human decisions. This solution, however, reduces predestination to 
foreknowledge, thus emptying it of any meaning for the hymnist. Nowhere in the 
Hodayot is obedience made the basis for God’s decision to elect someone to salvation. 
Rejecting these types of solutions, Hopkins proposes that God gives to certain 
persons the ability to respond to his revelation, which they may accept or reject according 
to their own decision, while assigning others to wickedness, thereby making it impossible 
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for them to respond to his revelation even if they so desired.124 As with the other attempts 
noted above, this explanation should be rejected. Not only is Hopkins forced to turn to 
1QS and CD as a basis for this view, a methodology that she repeatedly chastises other 
scholars for adopting,125 but it is the exact opposite of what one might deduce from some 
statements in the Hodayot. According to the common interpretation of 7.17–22, which 
provides the clearest explanation for double predestination in the Hodayot, the hymnist 
gives a reason for why the wicked are predestined for the day of slaughter, but the 
righteous are not said to accept God’s revelation.126 It is the wicked who have rejected 
God, not the righteous who have chosen God.127 
These three proposals also impose a particular definition of “free will” onto the 
Hodayot. For these actions to be genuine human actions, it is implied, humans must be 
morally free and thus capable of determining their own direction. The hymnist, however, 
does not conceive of human action in this manner. The only genuine human actions are 
those accomplished with divine assistance. The human agent is not human because he can 
act independently of God; rather, one is truly human because he or she depends on God 
for empowerment. The contradiction between predestination and free will that some 
commentators find in the Hodayot judges it solely based on their own conceptions of 
what true freedom is. For the hymnist, however, these ideas of freedom fail to grasp both 
the radical inability of humanity and the all-encompassing power of God.  
This difficulty in relating predestination with certain understandings of free will 
ignores or downplays the hymnist’s understanding of the relationship between human and 
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divine action. According to the hymnist, underlying every action taken by a human is a 
corresponding action made by God. To walk according to God’s heart means God must 
have established this as the path for one to walk. One acquires knowledge only because 
God has revealed it. The wicked perform deeds of unrighteousness because God gave 
them a spirit of wickedness. A person's actions reveal the category to which one belongs, 
and one’s actions are the outworking of a decision made by God. There are no random 
coincidences; rather, there is always a cause and effect, which has God as the ultimate 
cause. 
The hymnist can exhort one to obedience or describe himself as avoiding sin because 
he knows, by virtue of God’s revelation, that God has already empowered him to obey 
and avoid sin. Likewise, he can claim that one is damned based on disobedience, while 
claiming that God’s eternal decision underlies this person’s actions. Thus, the “blatant 
contradiction” in 7.20–21, as Licht calls it, arises more from the interpreter’s failure to 
perceive the underlying logic than the hymnist’s inability to think clearly.128 God’s pre-
temporal decision to create some people righteous and others wicked is repeatedly stated 
in the context (see lines 17–18, 20, 25, 27). When the wicked actually reject God’s 
covenant and do evil, they manifest the decision made by God.129 
With this emphasis on divine providence, the hymnist differs considerably from Ben 
Sira. According to Ben Sira, God created humans with free will and the moral capacity to 
obey. Human freedom is absolutely necessary in order to protect God from the charge of 
being responsible for evil (Sir 15.14–17). The hymnist, however, does not give thought to 
this tension because he does not think humans are capable of living morally apart from 
divine assistance. He comes close to attributing the origin of evil to God with his idea that 
humans are morally depraved due to the material from which they are created and his 
claim that God created the wicked. Nevertheless, he maintains that the wicked are 
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ultimately responsible for their disobedience. The pessimistic anthropology in the 
Hodayot necessitates, for the hymnist, divine intervention, and the possibility of a human 
obeying of his or her own will is simply ludicrous. 
To summarise: Predestination functions to counteract the anthropological problem by 
setting divine action temporally before the human comes into existence. God determines 
what path each person will travel and assigns to each a particular spirit. For those destined 
to righteousness, he imparts his own Spirit as the means of predestination. The hymnist’s 
focus on predestination highlights the basic pattern of the divine-human relationship. God 
initiates the salvation process and sustains those he elects. The emphasis on divine action, 
however, does not eliminate the human. Those elected for salvation by God reveal the 
divine decision when they obey the Torah. Predestination is not an abstract teaching. It 
rather leads to the human becoming a real agent, one empowered by God to obey his will. 
ii. The Gift of Knowledge 
In his account of creation, Ben Sira explained that God gave knowledge of good and 
evil to humans (Sir 17.6–7). God did this to enable humans to determine their own 
destiny. With knowledge comes responsibility and power. Ben Sira’s interest is the 
human. The statements about knowledge in the Hodayot, though, focus on God’s gracious 
act, not the human’s capacity to choose. Knowledge is imparted only to the elect. 
Whereas Ben Sira prioritised the human over God, the hymnist does the opposite. As will 
be noted below, the emphasis placed on God is necessary because of the hymnist’s 
pessimistic anthropology, but it does not eliminate the human. The divine act of imparting 
knowledge becomes a means through which one obeys. Again, the Spirit plays a crucial 
role. 
The gift aspect of knowledge is evident in the claim that only the elect possess God’s 
knowledge. “To the sons of truth you have given intelligence” (18.27). The hymnist 
thanks God because “you have made known to me (ynt[dwh) the foundation of truth” 
(19.16), and the servant of God is the one who has “the insight of knowledge to 
understand your wonders” (lines 27–28). Knowledge cannot be acquired apart from God 
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revealing it to an individual. Sanders has correctly argued that “knowledge is the means 
and sign of election. One is brought into the covenant by being given knowledge and 
knowledge of God’s secrets characterizes the elect.”130 Possessing knowledge serves to 
distinguish the elect from the non-elect, and it is on this basis that the community will 
allow a person to join.131 In one of the few references to the community and particularly 
entrance into the community, the hymnist explains that a person is brought near (wnXyga) 
“according to his intelligence” (6.18–19).132 This indicates that a person possesses some 
insight before entering the community. The fact that a person has some intelligence likely 
indicated to the community authorities that the person was elected by God. In this respect, 
knowledge has a very real function as a “sign of election.” 
The knowledge of God’s dealings with humanity is beyond the grasp of the human 
because of one’s creaturely, sinful state. One remains ignorant of God and his ways 
unless God intervenes. As the rhetorical questions at the end of column 20 show, God 
alone can enlighten and instruct. The focus throughout this hymn is on God’s position 
over creation.133 Creation works like a clock (lines 1–11), never faltering from its 
predetermined tasks “because the God of knowledge has established it” (lines 10–11). 
Despite God revealing the order of creation to him, the instructor admits that he does not 
fully understand God’s mysteries (lines 19–20). His inability to understand results from 
his sinful state, for he is formed from clay and he will return to the dust. Even at the 
judgment, he will not be able to provide an account of his actions (lines 24–31). His only 
hope is for God to give him knowledge. Thus, he appeals to God: 
What can I say unless you open my mouth? How can I understand unless you instruct 
me? What can I [say] without you opening my heart? How can I make straight (my) 
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path unless you establish [my] ste[ps? How] can [my] steps stand [unless you] 
strengthen (me) with strength? How can I arise [. . .]? (lines 33–35) 
The hymnist declares his inability and places himself completely at the mercy of God. He 
turns to the God of knowledge for he recognises, only because God has revealed it to him, 
that he stands in need of enlightening (cf. 6.25; 12.5; 21(top).4–5). He acknowledges that 
God alone can instruct him and give him knowledge. 
In a hymn about creation, the hymnist remarks, “These things I know through your 
knowledge because you opened my ears to wondrous mysteries” (9.21). These “wondrous 
mysteries” are the order and regulation of creation (lines 7–20), which God established by 
his wisdom and knowledge (lines 7, 14, 19). The human cannot comprehend how God 
created the world because he himself is a product of the world, a creature who remains in 
sin and “depraved without knowledge” (lines 21–23). The “God of knowledge” (line 26) 
must reveal himself and his ways to the human. The pattern of divine and human action is 
clear from this sentence, for the hymnist claims knowledge of God’s actions because God 
has revealed it to him. 
The expressions “you open my ears/eyes/heart” appear throughout the hymns as a 
statement about what God has done in order to reveal himself and his ways to humanity. 
The expressions denote how the human was previously closed off to God and the path to 
salvation, but now how God, by mercy and grace, has imparted his knowledge to the 
human and revealed the means to salvation. The hymnist is limited in his abilities, so he 
asks of God: “[Ho]w can I see without you opening my eyes and hear [without you 
opening my ears]?” (21(top).4–5). God opens one’s ears and heart to hear his truth (9.21; 
14.4; 22(bottom).12), thereby empowering his elect to obey his commandments 
(21(top).9) and to proclaim his knowledge (20.33–34). God’s action perplexes the 
hymnist for God has not revealed the truth to the righteous but to one who has 
“uncircumcised ears” (21(top).5). These expressions contrast with the pessimistic 
anthropology, which attribute human inability to one’s creatureliness. A human cannot 
understand God because his or her ears are unable to hear and his or her eyes incapable of 
seeing. The hymnist knows about the order of creation only because God has “opened my 
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ears,” and God has done this “although I am a creature of clay” (9.21). By opening one’s 
ears, eyes, or heart, God intervenes directly at the source of the problem. 
Elsewhere the hymnist thanks God for giving him a “spirit of knowledge.”134 Lying 
behind this simple statement is an elaborate theology, part of which has already been 
discussed. The connection between predestination and the divine Spirit was observed 
above. In this context, one should note how the divinely appointed means for giving 
knowledge is though the Spirit. On several occasions, the hymnist writes, “I know 
because of the Spirit which you have given me” (5.24–25; 20.11–12; 21(bottom).14). The 
Spirit is the imparter of knowledge. 
By giving the Spirit, who reveals God and his ways to the human, God takes the 
initiative in the salvation process. Because of this divine action, the human agent acts. 
The progression is clear in 6.12–14: “I know because of your knowledge that in your 
kindness toward m[a]n [you] have enlar[ged his share with] your holy spirit. Therefore, 
you cause me to draw near to your knowledge ($tnybl ynXygt), and as I approach, I oppose 
all doers of evil and men of guile.” The relationship is initiated by God who reveals 
himself to the hymnist through his holy Spirit, the bearer of divine knowledge. The hiphil 
verb ynXygt suggests that God remains the underlying cause of the hymnist’s actions. 
Although the hymnist can describe himself as approaching God, he acknowledges that his 
opposition to wickedness is the result of God drawing him. He would not oppose evil if 
God had not revealed the truth to him and given him the Spirit to assist him. The action, 
though, is not attributed to God in such a manner as to eliminate the reality of the 
hymnist’s action. He can claim to approach God and to oppose evil as his own doings 
even while acknowledging God’s underlying work. Divine and human are not set in 
opposition here, and although divine action is given priority, this does not make the 
human action insignificant or negotiable. The expected result of God’s action is human 
obedience. 
The crucial role of the Spirit in the imparting of knowledge appears in 20.11–13, 
which also juxtaposes divine and human action. The instructor knows God “because of 
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the spirit which you put in me” (yb httn rXa xwrb) (lines 11–12). Although God has 
revealed himself to Moses and the prophets, this knowledge can only be accessed if God 
has given the Spirit. The giving of the Spirit and understanding motivates the hymnist to 
“listen faithfully” to God’s “wonderful counsel” (line 12). The hymnist has prioritised 
divine action and made it the basis from which he acts. The phrase “through your spirit of 
holiness” (hkXdwq xwrb) modifies “listen.”135 In 1QHa xwrb always modifies the preceding 
verb, and often it explains how the hymnist accomplishes something. The hymnist’s 
ability to listen to God comes by means of the Spirit. This modifying phrase places the 
emphasis on divine action, but it does not negate the hymnist’s part. 
Because of his insight into God’s actions, the hymnist worships God, seeks 
forgiveness for his transgressions, and desires to serve God more faithfully (8.14–15). 
Knowledge of God’s dealings spurs him to greater obedience (6.8–10; 8.18). His vow to 
not sin is rooted in the prior revelation given by God. He asserts “I know” (ynÎawÐ yt[dy), 
which summarises in the simplest manner possible all that God has revealed to and 
accomplished for him (6.17–18).136 Similarly, in lines 8–10, the hymnist thanks God for 
“putting instruction in the heart of your servant,” which results in him restraining himself 
from sin. The knowledge of God’s dealings with humans provides a basis from which one 
can act righteously. With knowledge comes the power to avoid wickedness and to live 
righteously. 
These texts reveal a close connection between obedience and knowledge. In order for 
one to actually obey, God must have revealed his knowledge to the person. Without this 
revelation a person will be misled by the “hypocrites” who exchange God’s law with 
“flattering teachings” (12.10). VanLandingham misses this connection between 
knowledge and obedience. His preoccupation with “works” has led him to downplay the 
importance given to knowledge in the Hodayot. In his attempt to dismiss the idea of 
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predestination in the Hodayot and the Dead Sea Scrolls generally, he remarks, 
“Ultimately, responsibility lies in what one does, not in what one knows.”137 He fails to 
realise that obedience is possible only because God has revealed to a person the correct 
manner in which to obey. The dividing line between the elect and non-elect is not simply 
knowledge, but neither is it solely obedience. Knowledge of God’s ways indicates how 
one should obey. Torah observance is not straightforward until a person knows how a 
particular command should be interpreted.138 Those outside the community cannot obey 
until God gives insight and understanding. When a person is removed from the 
community because of his disobedience, this is proof that he never possessed knowledge 
and was never among the elect. If he had possessed knowledge, then he would not have 
disobeyed. The community does not set works and knowledge in opposition, for the 
means to correct obedience is through understanding. 
iii. Purification from Sin 
A final divine act to note is the claim that God himself purifies one from sin. The 
community was painfully aware of their sinful deeds and the need for purification. This 
acute understanding of human sinfulness pervades the Hodayot, and the hymnist mentions 
often the need for purification. He maintains that only God can accomplish purification. 
Relying on God’s own testimony to Moses about his character, the hymnist recounts that 
God forgives transgression and sin and atones for unfaithfulness. Although God judges 
with fire, he protects his servants and establishes them by forgiving their sin and giving to 
them “all the glory of Adam” and eternal life (4.11–15; cf. Ex 34.5–8). God himself “will 
purify” his people “in order to cleanse (them) from guilt” (1QHa 14.8). As is written 
elsewhere, “All the sons of your truth you bring to forgiveness before you in order to 
[cl]eanse them from their transgressions by your great goodness and by the abundance of 
your me[r]cy, in order to make them stand before you forever” (15.29–31; cf. 5.22–24). 
In the lines prior to this statement, God’s justice is contrasted with the sinfulness of 
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creation. No human can withstand God’s anger. Because of his grace (dsx) and mercy 
(~xr), however, he has revealed his ways to the hymnist (15.27). Because he has forgiven 
one’s sins, he has reversed the impending result of judgment.139 The result of God 
purifying a person is that he is able to stand “with the hosts of the holy ones and enter into 
communion with the sons of heaven” (11.21–22). The act of purification, therefore, is 
directed not only at the problem of sin and guilt, but it also is a “cleansing of impurity 
associated with being human” (cf. lines 10–14).140 The very one who falters before God 
and deserves punishment now stands in God’s presence because God forgave and 
cleansed him. 
As with so many other themes, the Spirit of God has a crucial role in the purification 
of God’s elect. It is by the holy Spirit that one is purified (8.20) and guilt is removed 
(23(bottom).13). The contrast between the God-given holy Spirit that purifies and the 
depraved human spirit further heightens the notion of human sinfulness. The human 
cannot free himself from bondage to his own creaturely, sinful state without divine 
assistance. God gives to those he elects a Spirit that works to overcome the fleshly, sinful 
nature of the human. The Spirit functions as the bearer of predestination as well as the 
cleansing agent. One might even say that it is the enactor and maintainer of election. 
Purification from sin does not become a foundation for licentiousness, but rather the 
motivation for the human to pursue righteousness.141 The hymnist’s knowledge that God 
has established him as righteous motivates him to purify himself and avoid all evil (8.18). 
The hymnist attributes his desire to be holy to God’s previous cleansing action: “For the 
sake of your glory, you cleanse (htrhj) man from his transgression in order that he might 
make himself holy (Xdqthl) for you from all abominations of impurity and from guilt of 
unfaithfulness” (19.10–11). Xdqthl is the first of five infinitives that describe the results 
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of God’s cleansing work.142 These infinitives summarise the totality of salvation as one is 
united with the community of the redeemed and transferred from death to life, which 
results in one being a part of the new creation (lines 11–14). Divine and human action are 
not in opposition; rather, divine action enables human action. The symmetry of divine and 
human action stands out in the clauses indicating from what God has cleansed humans, 
namely “transgression,” and the human decision to pursue holiness by avoiding “all 
abominations of impurity and guilt of unfaithfulness.” Holm-Nielsen correctly notes “that 
it is God’s cleansing which forms the background; as a mortal being, man is quite unable 
to sanctify himself.”143 Because God has acted on behalf of the human, though, the 
human can pursue what God set out to accomplish. Without God undertaking this task, 
the human remains incapable of living righteously, but because God cleanses his chosen 
people, one can live in accordance with God’s commands. 
Along with purifying the elect from sin, God strengthens them so that they will not 
continue to commit sins or fall prey to spirits of wickedness (4.23; 9.32; 15.6–9). The 
hymnist recognises that the human spirit is weak and given to transgress God’s will. With 
God’s assistance and protection, though, the human can obey God’s will: 
[Prevent] your servant from sinning against you and from stumbling over all the 
words of your will. Strengthen [. . .] against spirits of [wickedness in order that he 
might] walk ($lhtÎhlÐ) in all that you love and to despise all that [you] hate [and in 
order to do] good in your eyes. [. . .] in my bowels, for your servant (is) a spirit of 
fle[sh]. (4.23–25)144 
Two types of human action are available. Apart from divine action, the hymnist can only 
follow the will of his fleshly spirit. When God intervenes, the hymnist can then imitate 
God. In order to obey God’s will, the human is dependent on God, who alone can 
overcome the effects of the human’s depraved spirit.145 
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iv. The Hodayot as Covenantal Nomism? 
This study has shown that the divine-human relationship revolves around God’s 
gracious acts of deliverance for the individual. Obedience does not merit salvation. It is 
instead the outworking of God’s mercy. In concluding this study of the Hodayot, it is 
worth briefly commenting on the similarities between this study’s explanation of the 
divine-human relationship and covenantal nomism. In Sanders’ definition of covenantal 
nomism not only is grace prioritised over works, but also the interaction between God and 
humans is set firmly within a covenantal framework. He writes, “[C]ovenantal nomism is 
the view that one’s place in God’s plan is established on the basis of the covenant and that 
the covenant requires as the proper response of man his obedience to its commandments, 
while providing means of atonement for transgression.”146 At one level, covenantal 
nomism may be a succinct summary of the salvific pattern found in the Hodayot. The 
emphasis, as this study has shown, clearly falls on God’s gracious acts of deliverance. He 
predestines based on grace, gives knowledge to whom he wishes, purifies the sinners, and 
all this is done despite the human’s sinfulness. Nothing the human does has merit before 
God. Along with initiating the relationship, God sustains it. His Spirit is the source of 
obedience, and the human cannot act in a manner pleasing to God apart from his 
assistance. The central focus of the hymns is God’s grace and mercy.  
At this level, covenantal nomism accurately captures the salvific pattern depicted in 
the Hodayot: God acts first in grace, and the human responds with obedience. This 
similarity, however, requires one to work with a reduced definition of covenantal 
nomism.147 In this definition, covenantal nomism stands for any soteriological pattern that 
prioritises grace over works. The specifics of covenantal nomism are lost entirely, despite 
the fact that it is these specific aspects that make covenantal nomism a viable concept. 
One way to assess more accurately the appropriateness of defining the soteriological 
pattern in the Hodayot as covenantal nomism is to ask how the hymnist understood the 
interaction between God and the individual in relation to “getting in” and “staying in.” 
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“Getting in” according to Sanders is by grace not works. He pointed to God’s 
election of Israel as a sign of this gracious aspect. The Hodayot likewise emphasises 
God’s role in establishing the relationship. “Getting in” is only possible through divine 
intervention because the human is a sinner. The individual can do nothing to merit God’s 
mercy. On this point, the Hodayot and covenantal nomism agree. 
According to Sanders, “staying in” the covenant is through obedience. Obedience is 
the “proper response”of the elect and, he claims, it “maintains one’s position in the 
covenant, but it does not earn God’s grace as such.”148 Several lines in the Hodayot imply 
that obedience is both the response of the elect and necessary to maintain the relationship. 
For example, the hymnist purifies himself in light of what he knows God has done for 
him (8.18). Those who have abandoned the hymnist’s teachings for the path of Belial 
have forfeited their place among the redeemed (14.19–21; cf. 22(bottom).8). This loss of 
salvation suggests that obedience has the role of maintaining one’s place within the 
community of the redeemed. 
Concerning the issue of “getting in” and “staying in,” one finds in the Hodayot ideas 
that cohere well with Sanders’ definition of covenantal nomism. Gathercole has 
challenged the accuracy of covenantal nomism because it lacks an eschatological 
perspective.149 He suggests that the issue at stake is not only getting in and staying in, but 
also, and perhaps more importantly, getting into the next age. He demonstrates that 
according to many Second Temple texts entrance into the next age was based on both 
election and obedience. According to the Hodayot, though, entrance into the next stage is 
dependent solely on election. Without obedience in this life, one will not enter into the 
next age, but entrance into the next age is solely according to God’s grace. Those few 
instances that do mention judgment reflect on how no one will endure it without God’s 
grace. Human obedience will not stand at the judgment. 
Although Gathercole’s critique of covenantal nomism exposes a serious flaw in 
Sanders’ description of Judaism, it does not render the idea of covenantal nomism 
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inappropriate for the Hodayot. A problem with summarizing the Hodayot under the 
heading covenantal nomism does appear, though, in the role assigned to the Spirit. 
Sanders did maintain that the salvation process was undergirded throughout by God’s 
grace, but nowhere does he make sufficient room for the Spirit as an enabling agent.150 
Sanders’ formulation of getting in through grace (divine activity) and staying in through 
obedience (human activity) distinguishes too sharply between divine and human action. 
The Hodayot portrays obedience as something done by the human through the Spirit. The 
human can claim to act because he is convinced that God is working in him. Obedience is 
not simply the “proper response” of the elect, but rather it follows necessarily from God’s 
gift of the Spirit. The separation between divine and human activity created by Sanders’ 
formulation does not cohere with the combination found in the Hodayot. 
While covenantal nomism accurately captures much of the thought in the Hodayot, 
its inability to account fully for the role assigned to the Spirit cautions against claiming 
that the interaction between God and humanity in the Hodayot is formulated on the 
pattern of covenantal nomism. This conclusion does not invalidate covenantal nomism as 
an accurate description of other texts nor even of the sectarian Dead Sea Scrolls 
themselves. The validity of covenantal nomism must be tested text by text since 
wholesale acceptance or rejection will result in distortions or generalisations. 
C. Summary 
It would be an understatement to claim that the hymnist thinks salvation is 
accomplished by God. In the hymns, he repeatedly praises God for his bestowal of grace 
and mercy onto a frail, sinful creature. This section has highlighted three crucial 
expressions of divine salvific acts: predestination, the giving of knowledge, and 
purification from sin. God initiates the salvation process as the teaching on predestination 
demonstrates. God’s role is not confined only to the initial stage. Rather, he continues 
working in the individual through his Spirit. The stress placed on divine agency does not 
eliminate human agency. On the contrary, each of the ideas discussed here contained not 
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only clear statements about what God does, each also connects to how the human lives. 
Predestination was to a particular way of life, while knowledge reveals itself in obedience 
to the Torah. Purification leads to obedience not more sinning. The divine acts produce a 
human agent who through the Spirit obeys the Torah. Ultimately God’s decisive acts of 
mercy overcome the creaturely problems of frailty and sinfulness. It is in reliance on God 
that the human being becomes truly human. 
3. Conclusion 
Running throughout the Hodayot are two interlocking themes. On the one hand, 
humans are described as frail, sinful creatures. Their creation from the dust means that 
they are morally deficient, and the only outcome is death since none can stand before 
God. On the other hand, every opportunity is taken to describe how God delivers from 
this predicament. God intervenes into the human dilemma when he decides before 
creation who will be saved and who will not. God purifies the elect and gives knowledge 
to them. These divine saving acts of mercy are accomplished through God’s Spirit, which, 
functioning as the agent of predestination, sustains and enables the human being. The 
emphasis on divine action does not turn the human agent into purely a passive recipient. 
These divine acts ultimately culminate in the individual following the Torah as 
interpreted by the community. Human obedience is made possible because God himself 
has intervened. 
The Hodayot provides an example of Josephus’ claim that the Essenes attributed 
everything to God, and it is the exact opposite of Ben Sira. At the most fundamental level, 
the two texts differ in which character takes centre stage. Ben Sira focuses his attention 
on the human, while the hymnist emphasises how God has acted. This crucial difference 
results in conceptions of the divine-human relationship that are fundamentally opposed to 
one another. Here are four key differences: 
1) Ben Sira views the human as fully capable of determining his or her own 
destiny. The hymnist describes the human as a creature of dust bent to sin and 
without the ability to obey God. 
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2) Both authors maintain that God is sovereign, but the hymnist highlights 
predestination. God determines the way of each human. Ben Sira argues that 
each human determines his or her own way by choosing to obey or disobey 
the Torah. 
3) In the Hodayot, divine action is the basis for human action, while in Ben Sira 
the relationship is reversed. God responds to the human by rewarding with 
“life” or punishing with “death.” 
4) In accomplishing the task of obedience, the hymnist insists that the human 
remains fully dependent on God, who gives his Spirit to assist the elect. Ben 
Sira views divine assistance through Wisdom as the reward for perseverance. 
Divine assistance is not an important idea for Ben Sira because the human 
possesses within himself or herself the ability to obey the divine will. 
These points highlight the fundamental differences between Ben Sira and the hymnist. 
While their conceptions of the divine-human relationship have the same goal, namely 
salvation (although they view this differently), they present contrasting and conflicting 
ways of attaining the goal. According to Ben Sira, the divine-human relationship is 
initiated and sustained by humans, while the hymnist thinks it is initiated and sustained by 
God. Where one speaks of God, the other speaks of humans. 
The divergences between the two texts indicate the variety of views held among Jews 
of this time period. Judaism was not monolithic. While each works with the same 
concepts, images, and language and even in dependence on the same scriptures, they 
arrive at different understandings. Neither is less Jewish for taking a different perspective, 
but neither does their Jewish heritage bind them to certain conclusions. These diverging 
views between two thoroughly Jewish authors provide a context within which to explore 
Paul’s description of what God did through Jesus the Messiah and its impact on the 
divine-human relationship. 
151 
CHAPTER 3 
Sin, the Spirit, and Human Obedience in Romans 7–8 
When considering what Paul expected of the human agent in salvation, the most 
natural starting point, since at least the Reformation, has been the Pauline antithesis 
between justification by faith (in Christ) versus works (of the law) (Gal 2.16; Rom 3.20–
26; cf. Phil 3.9). The antithesis has served as a hermeneutical framework for interpreting 
all of Paul’s soteriological statements. A common interpretation runs along these lines.1 
In the antithesis, both aspects refer to actions taken by humans, but they are qualitatively 
different. Faith in Christ is not a deed, but an acknowledgement of what God has done 
apart from human obedience and in spite of the human’s sinfulness.2 Salvation, according 
to this part of the antithesis, is given entirely apart from any human doing. It is an act of 
grace, pure and simple. Works of the law stands for legalism. That was the problem of the 
Jews who sought through their law observance to earn salvation and to put God in their 
debt. “Works of the law” is a subcategory of “works,” which means that Paul is rejecting 
any deeds not just obedience to the Torah. The antithesis, in this reading, is used to 
oppose any possibility of human action in the salvation process. 
This reading of the antithesis has been questioned at almost every point. First, 
Sanders’ description of Judaism as covenantal nomism leads to a re-evaluation of the 
opposition between faith and works that the traditional reading has found in the antithesis. 
If all Jews agreed that salvation was by grace not works, then the opposition between 
divine and human action has no historical basis. The antithesis simply cannot be between 
faith and “doing.” Thus, for Sanders, the key contrast of the antithesis is Christ and the 
law.3 Sanders’ account of Judaism provides the context for the interpretation of the 
antithesis as a conflict over whether Gentiles had to become Jews in order to be full 
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members of the people of God.4 Because all agreed that salvation was based entirely on 
God’s grace, the polemic that the traditional reading finds in the antithesis between faith 
and works is removed. “Works of the law” indicates obedience to the Torah, and, 
according to Dunn, represents the “nomism” aspect of “covenantal nomism.”5 In the 
antithesis, then, Paul is arguing that Gentiles do not need to adopt the particular practices 
of the Jewish people in order to enjoy the covenantal blessings. This reading, while not 
necessarily opposed to the Reformation reading, does at least soften the harsh polemic 
against “works” and Judaism that others have found in the antithesis.6 The issue in the 
antithesis is not “how is one saved—by faith or by works?” but “how do Gentiles become 
full members of God’s people—by faith in Christ or by works of the law?”7 For our 
purposes, this criticism of the traditional reading questions the opposition between divine 
and human action that the traditional interpretation identified. 
A second challenge to the traditional reading arises from those who interpret the 
phrase p i ,st i j  Cri sto u/ as referring to Christ’s faithfulness (Gal 2.16 [2x], 20; 3.22; Phil 
3.9; Rom 3.22, 26).8 The content of the antithesis according to this reading is more 
“Christological” than “anthropological” since the issue is not what the individual human 
does but what Christ has done.9 Christ’s fidelity is his obedience to God’s call for him to 
die on the cross. Paul’s antithesis, therefore, contrasts human action (“works of the law”) 
with divine action, thus removing the particular issue that the traditional interpretation 
found in it. This second challenge, unlike the first, agrees with the traditional reading that 
the antithesis is about the divine-human relationship, but in focusing on Christ’s 
faithfulness/obedience, it is a significant challenge to the traditional reading. 
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Alongside these two alternative interpretations of the antithesis, other issues have 
been raised against the traditional understanding of the antithesis as an opposition 
between the human acts of faith and works. For example, how does judgment by works fit 
into this scheme that rejects works as necessary for salvation?10 Should “works of the 
law” be understood as a subcategory of “works” or is “works” shorthand for the longer 
phrase?11 Is Paul only criticizing obedience to the Torah, but not rejecting “works” 
outright as necessary for salvation? What do “faith (in Christ)” and “works (of the law)” 
mean?12 
Regardless of how one answers these questions and which position is taken on the 
antithesis, the controversy indicates that it is no longer profitable to begin a discussion of 
divine and human agency in Paul from the antithesis. Indeed, the antithesis is not only too 
controversial, it is incomplete in itself to address fully the issue of divine and human 
agency. The antithesis is a piece of rhetoric, a shorthand catch phrase of a much larger 
issue in Paul. As such, it must be placed within a broader context to make sense. It cannot 
be the controlling criterion for how one understands the relationship between faith and 
obedience and divine and human action in Paul, not least because it is intended to 
summarise (not dictate) Paul’s view.  
In place of the antithesis as the starting point, Romans 7.7–8.13 presents itself as a 
viable candidate. Here is an argument about contrasting patterns of human activity 
developed as an intra-Jewish debate. In 7.7–25 Paul explains what life under the Torah 
looks like. The Torah gave a commandment—“You shall not covet” (v.7; cf. Ex 20.17; 
Deut 5.21)—to its hearers, and they were to obey it.13 Romans 7 focuses on human 
                                                 
10
 VanLandingham argues vehemently in his Judgment and Justification that the antithesis has no 
implications for the Final Judgment, which is determined solely on the basis of obedience. 
11
 See Moo, “‘Law,’” 94–99; Rapa, Meaning, 53–70. On the scholarly debate over the phrase “works 
of the law” in Paul and Qumran, see de Roo, ‘Works of the Law’. 
12
 E.g., Watson argues that “faith in Christ” refers to the way of living within the Christian community 
and “works of the law” is the way of life in the Jewish community (Paul, Judaism, and the Gentiles2, 148, 
212). Similarly, Jewett emphasises the communal dimensions of faith and explicitly rejects any hint of 
individual response to the Gospel in Paul’s faith language (Romans, 146, 276–78). 
13
 Throughout this section, Paul constantly emphasises the idea of “doing” or “practising” the law. 
Note the various terms used: p ra ,ssei n (vv.15, 19); poiei/n (vv.15, 16, 19, 20, 21); ka ter ga ,zesq a i (vv.15, 
18). 
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inability, as Paul describes the human’s failure to obey the Torah. The result is nothing 
less than death. In Romans 8, the situation is the opposite. Now because of and on the 
basis of God’s intervention, obedience becomes a possibility, and life is a reality because 
of the indwelling Spirit. Whereas the former path takes its direction from a word found on 
a stone tablet (cf. 2 Cor 3.7), this path takes its direction from the divine Spirit who now 
indwells those found in Christ. The goal of obedience in both patterns is “life,” for this is 
what the law offered to the one who successfully kept the commandment (7.10) and what 
is attained by the Son’s death and given to the one in whom the Spirit dwells (8.6, 11, 13). 
Paul’s argument in 7.7–25 is about the human’s (failed) attempt to please God (cf. 8.8) by 
keeping the commandment of the Torah, and in 8.1–13 it is about the human’s 
(successful) act of pleasing God through the Spirit’s guidance. 
This chapter explores how Paul develops the two patterns for obedience. It will be 
argued that in 7.7–25 Paul portrays the e vgw, as the human agent of the two-ways pattern. 
Paul seeks to show the powerlessness of the two-ways tradition to produce an adequate 
obedience to the Torah. By contrast, in 8.1–13, he adopts an alternative Jewish 
understanding of the divine-human relationship that focuses on God’s act of deliverance 
and the imparting of his Spirit as the empowering agent. Obedience is possible because of 
the Spirit of God. Paul contends that under the law the human has no agency, but in 
Christ the human becomes an agent.  
1. Paul’s Critique of the Two-Ways Theology (7.7–25) 
Romans 7.7–8.13 is typically recognised as two parts of an argument, although there 
is little agreement over the precise connection.14 The recounting of God’s act in Christ in 
                                                 
14
 Most scholars make a paragraph break between 8.11–12. This seems incorrect, however, for two 
reasons. First, vv.12–13 continue the contrast between “Spirit” and “flesh” found in vv.4–11, and the theme 
of “life” continues until v.13 (Moo, Romans, 473; Byrne, “Living Out,” 580). Second, aside from Romans 
8.12, the phrase a ;ra  ou=n occurs 10x or 11x in the Pauline corpus, but in none of these instances does it start 
a new paragraph (Rom 5.18; 7.3, 25; 9.16, 18; 14.12 [disputed], 19; Gal 6.10; Eph 2.19; 1 Thess 5.6; 2 
Thess 2.15). It functions the same in Romans 8.12 where Paul draws out the practical conclusion of his 
description of life according to the Spirit or according to the flesh. The paragraph should not be extended to 
v.17, for, although v.14a functions as a transition, the concept of adoption is introduced in v.14b and is the 
main point of vv.14–17. Verse 17 concludes with the idea of suffering that occupies Paul’s thought 
throughout the rest of chapter 8. Verses 14–17 function as a hinge, reassuring believers of their status as 
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8.1–4 is the response to the desperate cry for redemption that concluded chapter 7. 
Although recognising this connection, scholars still struggle to identify clearly the main 
point of the two sections and their place within the argument of Romans. Some regard 
7.7–25 as an excursus in which Paul seeks to clarify his position on the law.15 While 
others reject the idea that 7.7–25 is an excursus, they also hold that it is centrally about 
the Torah. Here Paul, it is claimed, gives his great “defence” of the law.16 Having linked 
the Torah so closely with sin earlier in the letter (3.20; 4.15; 5.20; 6.14; 7.5), he now 
qualifies those statements. He emphatically declares the law as “good” (7.13), indeed as 
“holy” and “the commandment” as “holy, just, and good” (v.12). He argues that the law 
was the “unwilling” partner, usurped by Sin.17 The law was intended for humanity’s 
good, but in the hands of Sin, it could not fulfil its goal of giving life. Instead, it was used 
as an instrument of death. 
A reading along these lines has almost universal support. Nevertheless, it is 
questionable on several grounds. There is, in fact, little reason to think that Paul is 
interested in defending the Torah itself. Actually, it is Paul’s view of the law and 
especially its relationship to sin that needs defending. As Seifrid notes, “Paul here 
defends his Gospel against the potential Jewish objection that it compromises the holiness 
of Torah.”18 Although this reading offered by Seifrid and others is better, it also does not 
represent accurately what Paul does in this section. Paul does not soften any of his 
previous comments about the relationship of the law to sin.19 He remains on the offensive 
and has no intent to reverse his previous statements. He maintains an intimate connection 
between the law and sin, while clarifying that the law itself is not evil. If this is a defence 
                                                                                                                                                  
God’s children and introducing the idea of suffering as preparation for the discussion of hope (vv.31–39; cf. 
5.1–11).  
15
 Moo, Romans, 424. 
16
 Kummel, Römer 7, 9; Bultmann, “Romans 7,” 153; Bornkamm, “Sin, Law and Death,” 88–89; 
Beker, Paul the Apostle, 104–08; Stuhlmacher, Romans, 105; Dunn, Romans, 1:376–77; idem, Theology of 
Paul, 157–59; Fee, God’s Empowering Presence, 509; Moo, Romans, 423; Garlington, Faith, Obedience 
and Perseverance, 118; Schreiner, Romans, 358–59; Tobin, Paul’s Rhetoric, 219. 
17
 Kruse, Paul, the Law, and Justification, 211. 
18
 Seifrid, “Subject of Rom 7:14–25,” 324; cf. Räisänen, Paul and the Law, 67; Kruse, Paul, the Law, 
208; Byrne, Romans, 209; Kuula, The Law, the Covenant, 242; Esler, Conflict and Identity, 239. 
19
 Cf. Romanello, “Impotence of the Law,” 522–23. 
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of the law or even his own view of the law, then Paul fails miserably since he introduces 
ideas that his Jewish contemporaries would find objectionable. For example, he describes 
God’s law as being taken hostage by Sin. What Jew would find in this a defence of the 
law? Paul also declares the law as incapable of dealing with the problem of Sin. Paul’s 
fellow Jews, however, thought the law was God’s solution to the evilness of humanity.20 
Far from separating the law from Sin, Paul maintains that the law is intimately connected 
with Sin, and this despite being holy. 
Also questionable is the argument that Paul is primarily focused on the Torah in 7.7–
25. Moo, for example, contends that throughout chapter 7 “[t]he main topic is the Mosaic 
law” while “anthropology—the identity and situation of the ‘I’ of vv.7–25—is a 
subordinate issue in Rom. 7.”21 Similarly, Schreiner writes, “The theme of verses 7–25, 
therefore, is not anthropology and existential human experience but the goodness of 
God’s law.”22 Undoubtedly, Moo, Schreiner, and others are correct to oppose the view 
espoused by, for example, Käsemann, who claimed that with the exception of v.14a in 
vv.14–25 “the Torah recedes completely into the background and everything focuses on 
anthropology, which in turn is no less important than the question of the law in vv.7–
13.”23 Certainly the unceasing interest in the identity of the e vgw , gives the impression that 
anthropology is the main point of the passage.24 Reducing anthropology to a “subordinate 
issue,” however, is not the appropriate way to correct the imbalance. Maintaining that 
Paul is interested in only either anthropology or the Torah arises from a serious 
methodological error, namely, the false assumption that a passage has only one dominant  
                                                 
20
 See Sir 21.11 (“whoever keeps the law masters his thoughts”); 4 Ezra 7.116–131. Although much 
later, R. Raba (d. AD 352) remarks, “Though God created the evil inclination, he created the law as an 
antidote against it” (b. B. Bat. 16a; cf. b. Qidd. 30b; Sifre Deut. 45; ‘Avod. Zar. 5b; b. Sukkah 52b). See 
Porter, “The Yeçer Hara,” 127–30; van der Horst, “Note on the Evil Inclination,” 61. 
21
 Moo, Romans, 409; cf. Stendahl, “Introspective Consequence,” 212; Wilckens, Brief an die Römer, 
100; Fee, God’s Empowering Presence, 509n.110. 
22
 Schreiner, Romans, 358; cf. Romanello, “Impotence of the Law,” 512–13. 
23
 Käsemann, Romans, 192. He acknowledges that the Torah is also referenced in vv.16b and 22 later 
in his commentary (ibid., 199). Cf. Bornkamm, “Sin, Law and Death,” 95. 
24
 The literature debating the identity of the evgw , is massive. For reviews see Lambrecht, Wretched “I”, 
59–91; Lichtenberger, Das Ich Adams; Middendorf, The “I” in the Storm, 15–51, 133–225; Jewett, 
Romans, 441–45. 
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concept.25 In reality, though, Paul’s arguments often involve a complex relationship 
between several issues, in this case, Sin and the law and their impact on the human agent. 
The argument of 7.7–25 cannot be reduced to either anthropology or Torah.26 The former 
overlooks vv.7–12, while the latter misses crucial elements in vv.7–12 and cannot explain 
the anthropological focus in vv.14–21. When both issues are allowed equal weight, it 
emerges that the question of the relationship between the law and sin is answered by 
describing how the human relates to each. Throughout 7.7–25 the argument is advanced 
by Paul’s characterization of the inability of a human to obey the divine will revealed in 
the Torah. He is not “develop[ing] an abstract doctrine of the law” but rather explaining 
how the relationship between the holy, just, and good law and Sin impacts the life of the 
human being.27 He answers the question about the relationship between the law and Sin 
through anthropology. 
When more factors are introduced into the mix, 7.7–25 not only becomes more 
coherent, it also begins to make sense in the unfolding argument of Romans. Byrne 
rightly identifies 6.1–8.13 as a single unit concerned with the issue of obedience.28 Here 
Paul takes up various objections to his law-free gospel, objections that were first voiced 
in 3.8.29 Paul has set p i,st ij  Cri st o u/ against “works of the law” (3.20, 22), and whatever 
these phrases mean precisely, they indicate a fundamental contrast between Christ and the 
Torah. Paul’s disparaging remark in 5.20–21 further distances the Christian from the 
Torah. The issue raised in the ethical argument of 6.1–8.13, then, is whether this Torah-
less proclamation can actually produce an obedient people. That is, does the dismissal of 
                                                 
25
 Take, for example, Räisänen, Paul and the Law, 112–13: “[I]t should be remembered that the 
passage is not really meant to be an anthropological lecture. It is concerned with the law, and it is hardly 
safe to base any other Pauline ‘doctrines’ on it.” Also Sanders, Law, 77. 
26
 Cf. Weber, “Geschichte des Gesetzes.” 
27
 Quote from Jewett, Romans, 440. He continues, “but rather to clarify its bearing on the situation of 
the Roman church.” My description asks what is Paul saying, while Jewett’s asks what is Paul doing. The 
two need not be in conflict. 
28
 Byrne, “Living out,” 562–63. For the place of chapter 7 in the context of the letter, see 
Schnackenburg, “Römer 7 in Zusammenhang des Römerbriefes;” and Catchpole, “Who and Where.” Both 
trace the influence of the Adam-Christ typology of 5.12–21 on 7.7–25. 
29
 Dillon, “Spirit as Taskmaster.” Cf. Campbell, “Romans III,” 259–60. 
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the Torah have as its inevitable result wickedness (6.14–15)?30 In the view of Paul’s 
Jewish contemporaries, it certainly does. Paul seeks to demonstrate that it does not. 
Paul argues in 6.1–23 that obedience is possible because Christians are identified 
with Christ through baptism. This act of initiation re-enacts Christ’s death and 
resurrection, which indicates that believers are freed from Sin’s control. They now 
become slaves to God rather than Sin, and Paul instructs them to produce in their lives the 
righteousness that God has given by faith in Christ. Freedom from the law, then, does not 
result in wickedness because one now becomes enslaved to Christ. This point is 
reinforced through the marriage analogy in 7.1–6. Paul’s point is simply that death brings 
freedom from the law and enables service to God.  
Within this broader context, Paul argues in 7.7–25, contrary to other Jews, that 
obedience is not possible within the realm of the Torah. Paul turns the objection against 
the Gospel on its head: rather than his law-free message producing wickedness, the 
attempt to live by the Torah has as its inevitable outcome the doing of evil. Placing the 
Torah at the centre of one’s existence means that one comes under Sin’s rule. Sin 
deceives the human and causes his desire to obey the Torah to be manifest as evil. Indeed, 
this is the only outcome possible according to the speaker (v.21). Rather than making 
obedience possible, as Paul’s objectors claimed, the Torah actually makes the problem 
worse. 
Romans 7.7–25 must be read as the negative counterpart to 8.1–13.31 In the latter, 
Paul explains how obedience will finally be possible. Verses 1–4 do not simply provide 
the solution to the speaker’s plea for redemption. They are rather the key component in 
explaining what makes obedience possible. God’s act in Christ and his Spirit destroys 
Sin’s hold on the human. The ethical impossibility described in 7.7–25 becomes a 
possibility because God has acted.32 8.5–13 then elaborate on how obedience becomes a 
                                                 
30
 Theobald, “Concupiscentia,” 262–63. 
31
 Byrne compares the two sections to “panels of a diptych” (Romans, 213) and suggests that Paul is 
employing “his favorite rhetorical technique of antithesis” (p.209). 
32
 See Byrne’s headings to Rom 7.14–25, “Life Under the Law—Ethical ‘Impossibility’,” and 8.1–13, 
“Life in the Spirit—Ethical ‘Possibility’” (Romans, 224, 234). 
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daily possibility. Those found in Christ and given the Spirit are empowered to fulfil the 
righteous requirement of the Torah (v.4). The life that the e vgw, sought through the law is 
now given by the Spirit of life. Set in contrast to 7.7–25, Paul argues that obedience is 
possible not in the realm of the law but in the realm of the Spirit. Those who seek life 
through the law will fail because they have oriented their lives around the wrong nexus, 
but those found in Christ will have life and be obedient.  
The argument of 7.7–25 is about far more than the Torah. It is a crucial part of Paul’s 
argument for how the Gospel, on the one hand, “is the power of God unto salvation for all 
who believe, to the Jew first and to the Greek” (1.16) and on the other hand, produces 
among Gentiles (and Jews) an “obedience of faith” (1.5; cf. 16.26). 7.7–8.13 is 
fundamentally about the capacity of the human agent to produce an adequate obedience, 
an obedience that is ultimately “pleasing to God” (8.8). 
 
In Romans 7.7–25 Paul describes the human encounter with the Torah. He models 
this encounter after the human agent of the two-ways tradition. At the conclusion of his 
sermon to the people of Israel, Moses exhorts the people “Choose life in order that you 
might live” (Deut 30.19). He has immediately prior to this call told the people that if they 
obey, God will give them the land and many days, but if they disobey and worship other 
gods, their days will be short (vv.16–18). This text provides the Scriptural foundations for 
the two-ways soteriological pattern that appears in other OT texts and early Jewish 
writings.33 This pattern has already been observed in Ben Sira who provides the classic 
Jewish rendition of it: 
God created (the) man from the beginning, and he gave him into the hand of his 
inclination. If you choose, you may keep the commandment, and you will understand 
to do his will. . . . Before a man are life and death, and whichever he chooses will be 
given to him. (Sir 15.14–17) 
This statement, as Ben Sira expounds in his work, emphasises human agency. There are 
two key aspects to the two-ways paradigm of the divine-human relationship:  
                                                 
33
 Cf. Josh 24.14–28; Jer 21.8; 1 En. 94.1–5; Pss. Sol. 9.1–5; 4 Ezra 7.3–24, 127–29. 
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1) The means to life is through Torah observance. Moses sets this forth in his appeal 
to the people to obey, and some later Jewish interpreters rely upon this text as 
their scriptural basis for their own arguments about the necessity of law 
observance for covenant blessings.  
2) The human possesses within himself the capacity to act morally. This is to be 
assumed by Moses’ exhortation (Deut 30.15–20), but it is clearly stated by Ben 
Sira when he writes that God places the human “into the hand of his inclination” 
(Sir 15.14). He uses the verb “to choose” three times in vv.15–17 to indicate that 
humans can determine their own destiny. The individual can choose for himself 
or herself whether to obey the commandments or not (v.15). The withdrawal of 
the divine presence further undergirds the idea that humans are morally capable. 
In Paul’s narrative, the Torah appears on the scene, and the human, who had been 
experiencing life, is now confronted with the divine demand “do not covet.” This 
commandment was given for the human’s life, but in actuality it brought Sin to life and 
resulted in the human’s death. Sin found in the Torah the means to assert its deadly rule 
over humanity, and through deception it twisted the human’s right intent to obey the 
Torah into the production of evil. Sin took up residence in the human and made the 
human a prisoner of war, a slave to its own demands. Sin’s rule over the human is 
manifest daily as the human attempts to do good but learns that all he or she produces is 
evil. Death is revealed in this frustrated attempt to keep the Torah, and death will be the 
final result of the human who attempts to live under and through the Torah. Paul is not 
just engaging with the Torah in itself but with the two-ways tradition as evidenced in Ben 
Sira. According to the two-ways tradition, law observance is straightforward once the 
commandments are known. According to Paul, knowing the law is exactly when the 
problems begin.34 
                                                 
34
 Seifrid argues that Romans 7 is modelled on the penitential prayers found in the OT and Second 
Temple texts (“Subject of Rom 7:14–25,” 322–23). The prayers, especially in the Hodayot, focus on the 
individual. All the passages describe the person “from a limited perspective determined by group or 
personal guilt,” but they set this within a larger context “which is dependent upon divine mercies” (322). In 
these texts, the human is portrayed “from the limited perspective of his or her intrinsic soteriological 
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What Paul describes in this passage is a “narrative of disillusionment.”35 The e vgw, 
represents anyone, most particularly a Jewish person (cf. 7.1), who lives under the Torah 
and strives to keep its commandments. As contemporary Jewish texts indicate, those who 
obeyed the Torah would be given life. Paul, however, challenges this depiction by 
arguing that experience and theology do not cohere. Whereas his contemporaries claimed 
that life was a possibility through the Torah, Paul argues that the one who exists under the 
law experiences only death. Whatever rational and theological arguments could be put 
forward are contradicted by the reality that the human, whose identity is found in and 
through the Torah, is experiencing death daily and only has eschatological death for a 
future.   
When reading Romans 7.7–25 it is helpful to distinguish two levels of reading. The 
first is Paul’s level. At this level one seeks to understand what Paul is doing with the 
words and argument of the passage. What is Paul’s depiction of human agency? How 
does Paul understand the impact of Sin and the law on the human agent? This is the level 
at which most commentators are working since most are interested in how this section fits 
within Paul’s broader argument and how Paul views the Torah and human (in)ability. 
Another level can be added to this one: the view of the e vgw,. At this level one is interested 
in how the e vgw, views his ability and responsibility. Does he think he can keep the law? 
How does he understand his existence before and after the law comes? These two levels 
are not exclusive, for the views of the e vgw, are controlled by Paul.36 Nevertheless, the two 
                                                                                                                                                  
resources” (323). It is unclear, though, how a penitential prayer would function within the context of 
Romans 6–8. 
35
 I owe this phrase to Prof. Francis Watson. 
36
 This reading strategy is employed simply to help bring out the particularities of the narrative and 
does not imply that Paul would exclude himself from the situation of the speaker. Attempts to separate Paul 
from the situation described are numerous and flawed. Most recently Stowers’ suggestion that Paul employs 
prosopopoiia, which “is a rhetorical and literary technique in which the speaker or writer produces speech 
that represents not himself or herself but another person or type of character” (“Romans 7.7–25,” 180), has 
received wide support (e.g. Witherington, Romans, 179–80; Das, Solving, 227–31; Jewett, Romans, 443–
44). Stowers supported his reading by appealing to Origen’s interpretation of this passage as prosopopoiia, 
and he concluded that Paul could not be describing himself since the rhetorical device did not allow it 
(“Romans 7.7–25,” 193–98; Rereading Romans, 264–69). His appeal to Origen, however, is uncritical 
since, as Thurén notes, Stowers does not account for Origen’s own historical context and his desire to 
present Saint Paul without any defects (“Romans 7 Derhetorized,” 423–24, 428–30). Additionally, Jewett 
has demonstrated how this rhetorical device can be combined with the suggestion that Paul is writing 
autobiographically (Romans, 443–73; cf. Holland, “Self against Self,” 268–71). Watson is probably correct 
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levels can be distinguished, which may help clarify some of the exegetical problems in 
this section. 
A. The Death of the e vgw, 
The two-ways paradigm consists of two aspects. First, life is contingent on law 
observance. Second, the human possesses the moral capacity to obey the Torah, and God 
does nothing to intervene or influence the human. Each of these can be seen in Paul’s 
characterization of the e vg w,. 
i. The Law and Life 
Although Paul focuses throughout the narrative on the law’s relationship to death, he 
does explicitly state that the commandment was intended for life in v.10: “the 
commandment which is unto life” (e i vj  z wh,n). Only three other times does Paul mention 
the law’s relationship with life (Gal 3.12, 21; Rom 10.5). In two of these he cites 
Leviticus 18.5. Here in Romans 7 the scriptural background is not Leviticus 18.5 but 
Deuteronomy 30.15, the scriptural foundation for the two-ways tradition.37 The four terms 
“life,” “death,” “good” and “evil” used throughout Romans 7 are drawn from this text. As 
in Ben Sira’s interpretation of Deuteronomy 30.15, Paul views “life” and “death” as 
alternative outcomes available from law observance. “Good” and “evil” are not further 
descriptors of the outcomes of obedience or transgression, but “the modes of conduct” 
that the law defines as “good” or “evil.”38 Paul’s interest in Deuteronomy 30.15–20 
                                                                                                                                                  
that Paul, now in Christ, takes up the persona of one “under the law” (cf. 1 Cor 9.20), and his description of 
this way of life has validity because he had at one time been under the law (Paul, Judaism, and the 
Gentiles2, 290). Philippians 3.4–6 does not contradict this reading since there Paul is describing his situation 
from within Judaism, while in Romans 7.7–25 he is reflecting back from his Christian position. The 
rhetorical differences between the texts are ignored by those who deny that Paul includes himself within the 
identity of the evgw , in Romans 7. 
37
 Luck, “Das Gute und das Böse,” 225–26. Cf. Ziesler, Romans, 188; Seifrid, “Romans,” 632–33. 
38
 Watson, Paul and the Hermeneutics of Faith, 506. Bultmann argued that in vv.14–25 “good” and 
“evil” are synonyms of  “life” and “death” respectively. What one sought through keeping the law was life, 
and what one attained by disobedience was death. In vv.14–25, then, “the object of the ‘willing’ is not the 
fulfilling of the ‘commandments,’ but ‘life’ (zw h ,). What is really willed in all our doing is ‘life’; but what 
comes out of all our doing is ‘death’ (q a ,na t oj)” (“Romans 7,” 152; idem, Theology of the New Testament, 
248. He is followed by Käsemann, Romans, 202–04; Bornkamm, “Sin, Law and Death,” 96; Furnish, 
Theology and Ethics, 141–43; Meyer, “Worm at the Core,” 74–75; Luck, “Das Gute und das Böse,” 233–
34). The verbs poie,w and pra ,s sw do not support this reading. The evgw , does not simply desire good (life) 
  
163 
 
connects him with the two-ways tradition. While life and law observance is not confined 
solely to the two-ways tradition, it is this interest in Deuteronomy 30.15–20 that suggests 
that the two-ways tradition is the appropriate background.39 
Like the other texts that bring the law and life together, the relationship between law 
and life in Romans 7.10 is debated. Dunn accurately summarises the two current options 
when he asks: “Does Paul mean that the commandment was intended to bring about life, 
to lead to life (NEB, NJB), that is, a life not yet possessed, or to promote life, to regulate 
and prosper life already possessed?”40 The traditional reading has followed the former 
option—that law observance leads to life. Representatives associated with the New 
Perspective, following Sanders’ description of the role of the law in Palestinian Judaism, 
have argued for the latter position. The law does not give life (cf. Gal 3.21) but explains 
how the covenant member should act within the covenantal relationship.41 
The narrative description of the speaker’s encounter with the law is complex, but the 
evidence points to the idea that the law was intended to lead to life. Prior to the giving of 
the law, the speaker claims to possess life (v.9). Following Sanders’ description of 
covenantal nomism, this life could be equated with existence in the covenant. Life, 
therefore, would be a gracious gift from God, and the giving of the law, also a gift, would 
be intended to regulate the speaker’s life. His obedience would be the natural response of 
one given such a wonderful gift from God. 
Despite the coherence of this reading and admittedly its potential to account for the 
speaker’s claim to possess life prior to the law, the picture of the human agent is far more 
complicated than this explanation allows. Two points should be noted, both of which 
suggest that the purpose of the law is to bring about life. First, the parallel clause e i vj  
                                                                                                                                                  
and hate evil (death), but instead he desires to do good and hates that he does evil. The emphasis is on 
deeds. 
39
 On Lev 18.5 in Second Temple Judaism and Paul, see Sprinkle, Law and Life. 
40
 Dunn, Romans, 1:384 (emphasis original). 
41
 Jervis argues that the commandment in view is “the commandment inherent to life in Christ” (“Sin’s 
Use,” 196; emphasis removed). Part of her justification for this view is that Paul would not write that the 
Torah was “unto life” (cf. Gal 3.21) (204–205). She ignores the OT and Jewish background that Paul draws 
upon in this statement and his citation of Lev 18.5 in Rom 10.5 and Gal 3.12. He denies that the law does 
actually give life in Rom 7.7–25; 10.5; and Gal 3.12, but he can repeat the view of Leviticus and his 
contemporaries. 
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qa ,na t o n must mean that the law leads to death (v.10),42 and this clause cannot be 
dismissed as easily as Dunn implies.43 Death throughout this passage is condemnation. 
This suggests that the life connected with the law is also eschatological. Just as the law 
can lead to final death, it also can lead to eternal life. Second, the e vgw, dies because of his 
disobedience. His repeated failure (vv.15–20) results in the sombre conclusion “I died” 
(v.10a) and causes him to cry out in desperation “Who will redeem me from the body of 
this death?” (v.24). Apparently, the “life” he possessed prior to the arrival of the law was 
insufficient to guarantee his future destiny. His ultimate destiny, therefore, is determined 
not by his state prior to his encounter with the law, but by how well he succeeds in 
keeping the commandment. Accordingly, life is contingent on the speaker’s law 
observance not God’s grace. These points indicate that law observance does not merely 
regulate one’s existence. It is the means to life if the commandment is kept.44 
The perspective on obedience described in Romans 7.7–25 does not cohere with 
Sanders’ interpretation of obedience in Judaism. Against the description of Judaism as 
crass legalism, Sanders argued that law observance did not earn salvation. Election, 
which in Sanders’ model equals salvation, is based entirely on God’s mercy.45 While 
humans should obey the law, their obedience did not ultimately affect whether they were 
in or out of the covenant. Their place in the covenant depends solely on God. Sanders 
claimed that the intent to keep the Torah was sufficient. He writes, “God made the 
condition for remaining in the covenant the free intent to obey the commandments, not 
their successful fulfilment.”46 Only those who deliberately rejected the covenant would be 
condemned.47 Deliberate rejection is indicated by the refusal to keep the covenant 
stipulations. Within this scheme salvation is based entirely on God’s grace, while 
condemnation is ascribed to the human who refuses to obey. Actual obedience, while 
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 Moo, Romans, 439n.58. 
43
 Dunn, Romans, 1:384. 
44
 Cf. Thurén, Derhetorizing Paul, 113–14. 
45
 Cf. Enns, “Expansions of Scripture,” 98; Westerholm, Perspectives, 344–46. 
46
 Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism, 93 (emphasis original); cf. 107–10. 
47
 Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism, 94. 
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desired, is not necessary for the intent to obey is sufficient to indicate one’s desire to 
please God. 
Sanders’ interpretation of obedience within Judaism does not match the experience 
and thought of the e vgw,. The e vgw, sought to obey the law. He desired to do the good, but 
constantly produced evil (vv.18–19). He did not deliberately reject the law, and even at 
the end claims that in his mind he serves God’s law (v.25). He intended to keep the law. 
His intent, however, was insufficient to secure his life. He unwillingly disobeyed, and the 
result was death. The intent to obey, which according to Sanders is all that is required of 
the human to enjoy covenantal blessings, is not enough for the e vgw,. It is on account of the 
actual act of obedience that the covenantal blessings are given, not mere intent. 
Throughout Romans 7.7–25 Paul establishes a symmetrical relationship between life 
and law observance. The one who obeys lives, and the one who disobeys dies. His 
description of the function of law observance coheres with the position taken in the two-
ways paradigm. Like Ben Sira’s description of the human agent (Sir 15.14–17), the e vgw, 
stands at a junction between life and death. God has set before him “the commandment 
which is unto life,”48 and his decision whether to accept or reject it will determine 
whether he has life or death. If he obeys then life is given; if he disobeys then death. As 
with Ben Sira’s view, the law contains within it the instructions necessary for life, and the 
one who obeys will receive life from God. 
The e vgw, strives to keep the commandment since he knows that his very life depends 
on it. Contrary to advocates of the two-ways pattern and the e vgw,  Paul denies in Romans 7 
that the law is successful in accomplishing its goal. Rather than giving life, the law 
empowers Sin, and death comes to the e vgw,. As will be seen, Paul’s view about the 
introduction of Sin through the law critiques the widely-held Jewish view that life could 
be found through obedience to the Torah. 
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 Compare Ben Sira’s description of the law as “the law of life” (Sir 17.11; 45.5). Also Pss. Sol. 14.2; 
4 Ezra 14.29–30. 
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ii. Moral Optimism 
The fact that the options between life and death are set before humans indicates, for 
the two-ways tradition, that humans possess within themselves the capacity to obey the 
Torah. In Romans 7.7–25 the e vgw, is portrayed as thinking that he possesses the capacity 
to obey the law. In vv.7, 9 the speaker describes himself as ignorant of sin and he assumes 
that he possesses life, and in vv.15–20 his attempts to obey the law imply that he thinks 
he has the ability to keep it. 
Ignorant of Sin and disobedience (v.7c), the human considers himself to be alive 
(v.9a). The two statements, “I would not have known Sin” and “I was alive once apart 
from the law,” have caused significant problems for interpreters. Most interpreters are 
concerned at this point with the identity of the e vgw,  but this issue is less important than 
the claims made by the speaker. He perceives of himself as possessing some form of 
innocence since he has no knowledge, whether experientially or purely noetic, of Sin. 
Reminiscent of 3.20, one task of the law is to define what sin is. The idea likely extends 
beyond simple knowledge of sin to include the actual experience of sin. 49 Jewett captures 
the sense well: “The verb gi nw,skw refers to knowledge gained through experience, thus 
implying that without the presence of a law, he would have been unaware of sin.”50 There 
may be in this statement the added notion of Sin as power: only through the law can one 
experience this ruling power. Regardless of when and how the e vgw, has come to 
understand Sin, it must be noted that for a time period he thinks of himself as innocent. 
While from Paul’s perspective the e vgw, was still a sinner even without the law (cf. 1.18–
32; 2.12; 3.9–18; 5.13–14), from his own view the speaker considers himself as sinless. 
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 So Moo, Romans, 433–34; Schreiner, Romans, 366–68. Contrast Cranfield, who suggests that it is a 
change in understanding not experience (Romans, 1:348), while Dunn emphasises the experiential aspect at 
the expense of the noetic (Romans, 1:378). 
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 Jewett, Romans, 446. Paul is speaking exclusively about the Torah, however. Wasserman misses the 
force of this statement when she compares the speaker’s encounter with the Torah to the view that giving a 
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The second clause, “I was alive once apart from the law” in v.9a, has been at the 
centre of the debate concerning the identity of the e vgw, since it does not fit well any of the 
standard descriptions, expect perhaps Adam.51 What is important for our purposes is not 
the identity of the e vgw,  but the claim that he makes. While some commentators think 
otherwise,52 it seems highly likely that the speaker thinks he possesses eschatological life. 
Being alive means “the fullness of human existence—the life ultimately to be enjoyed as 
‘eternal life’.”53 This interpretation of z a ,w matches a vp o qnh ,skw and is consistent with 
other uses of the verb and noun (z wh ,) throughout this part of Romans (cf. 8.1, 13).54 This 
understanding of “life” coheres well with the claim of ignorance in v.7c.55 The speaker 
does not share Paul’s assertion that “all are under Sin” (Rom 3.9) or the pessimistic 
anthropology of the Hodayot, 4 Ezra, or 2 Baruch. The confusion over the meaning of 
z a,w arises, in part, because the perspective of the e vgw, is not distinguished from Paul’s. 
Reducing “life” to simply existence is only necessary when one interjects Paul’s claims 
about the human agent as a sinner. The e vgw,  however, does not (yet) share Paul’s view. 
Verses 15–20 are marked by extreme pessimism. The e vgw, repeatedly notes that what 
he desires to accomplish he fails to do, and what he desires to avoid he actually does. 
Often lost in the overwhelming negative impression of the passage, though, is the 
speaker’s underlying assumption that he can be obedient. His repeated attempts to keep 
the commandments indicate that he thinks he possess the ability to obey. He assumes that 
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 For the identification of the speaker as Adam, see e.g. Käsemann, Romans, 261; Dunn, Romans, 1: 
381–83; Hofius, “Schatten Adams;” Lichtenberger, Das Ich Adams; Watson, Paul, Judaism, and the 
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 Cranfield, Romans, 1:351–52; Moo, “Israel,” 125, 132n.29; Middendorf, The “I” in the Storm, 80. 
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 Davies describes this period when Sin is dead (v.8) and Paul is alive as “the age of innocence” (Paul 
and Rabbinic Judaism, 24). The claim that this is the period before the bar mitzvah (so Davies, Paul and 
Rabbinic Judaism, 24–25; Gundry, “Moral Frustration,” 232–33; Burnett, Salvation of the Individual, 192–
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what he wishes to do he can accomplish. His optimism is made in direct contrast to his 
acknowledgement that he is “fleshly, enslaved to Sin” (v.14). Sin’s rule is not considered 
comprehensive. It can be resisted and overcome.     
The description of the e vg w, mirrors the portrait of the human in Sirach 15.11–20. 
According to Ben Sira, the options of life and death are set before each human, and the 
human possesses within himself or herself the ability to determine one’s own destiny. 
Like Ben Sira’s description of the human agent, the speaker of Romans 7.7–25 thinks he 
can obey the Torah and thereby acquire the life that it offers. The reality of his death is 
not cemented in his mind, for he thinks that life is still available and therefore that death 
is also an option.56 In these verses, he actively pursues the life offered by the Torah by 
choosing to obey its commandments. He recognises at the outset that his life is marked 
with repeated failure, but he nevertheless remains confident that if he tries he can 
succeed.57  
As the description of his condition progresses throughout the section (vv.15–20), the 
speaker becomes more and more aware of his inability. Verse 15b states the contradiction 
that exists between the speaker’s willing and doing, and it is this disjunction between 
thought and action that he wants to understand. He acknowledges in v.17 that Sin dwells 
within him and causes him to act contrary to his will. This leads to the confession that 
“good does not dwell within me, that is in my flesh” (v.18a).58 His acceptance that Sin 
dwells within him (v.17) contrasts with his acknowledgement that good does not dwell 
within him (v.18).59 Where Sin is, good cannot be. Yet, despite realising that good does 
not reside within his being, he continues to pursue “the good” (vv.18b-19). He holds out 
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 Middendorf argues that the evg w , does not pursue “righteousness” through the law because “he has no 
doubt about the futility of pursuing ‘a Law of righteousness’ (9:31)” since acquiring righteousness “by 
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57
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are the tests of Wisdom so that as long as he continued striving to obey, Lady Wisdom would eventually 
reward him with her presence and gifts (cf. Sir 4.11–20; 6.18–37; 14.20–15.10). His failure and frustration 
are only temporary. 
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hope that he can overcome the power of Sin that has affected his flesh. Again, though, the 
reality of Sin’s rule turns the speaker’s good desires into evil, and rather than obeying the 
Torah, he breaks it and does evil. Repeating the sombre conclusion of v.17, the speaker 
declares in v.20 that Sin dwells within him. He has learned the full extent of his death, 
realising now that he is incapable of putting his intentions into action. Verse 21 
encapsulates the speaker’s problem as a rule of life: “when I will to do the good, evil is 
present with me” (v.21). Confidence has given way to disillusionment as the reality of 
death has settled in. 
The moral optimism of the human agent is also highlighted through the absence of 
the divine agent. Throughout the narrative of Romans 7.7–25, the e vgw, acts on his own. 
God is not mentioned as the e vgw, struggles to transform his willing into doing. While the 
divine hand can be seen at various points, for example in giving the law and presumably 
in creating the e vgw,  he offers no assistance to the human agent. Despite the contention to 
the contrary by some prominent commentators, the divine Spirit is not mentioned as 
assisting the e vgw, to fight against Sin.60 The e vgw, stands in a similar place as the human 
described by Ben Sira in Sirach 15.11–20. Having been created with the ability to choose 
life or death, the human agent stands alone at the junction. It is his decision which path to 
take, and God will not interfere since “he [God] gave him into the hand of his inclination” 
(v.14b). Likewise, the e vg w, stands alone, and when faced with the choice of life or death, 
he chooses life. As he pursues this path, he finds that he must walk it alone, just as Ben 
Sira said. 
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 Cranfield, Romans, 1:359–60; Dunn, “Rom. 7,14–25,” 262; Packer, “‘Wretched Man’ Revisited,” 
80; Garlington, Faith, Obedience, and Perseverance, 126–29. Laato asserts that Paul’s silence means 
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Ben Sira claimed, though, that Wisdom would eventually assist those who endured 
her trials (Sir 4.11–19; 6.18–37; 14.20–15.10). The discipline was only temporary, and 
afterwards the human would enjoy all Wisdom’s benefits. Paul, however, denies this 
aspect. No divine Spirit, no Wisdom, not even the Torah can assist the e vgw, as he attempts 
with all his will and might to keep the divine law that promises to reward him with life. 
Having been placed in the service of Sin, the law cannot help the e vgw, escape Sin’s 
enslavement nor can it assist him to obey the commandments. The e vgw, is truly alone. 
To summarise: In Romans 7.7–25 Paul engages with the two-ways tradition. He 
models the human agent, identified as e vgw,  after the human described in, among other 
places, Sirach 15.14–17. Here Ben Sira develops ideas found in Moses’ exhortation to the 
people in Deuteronomy 30.15–20. Life and death are set before the human in the form of 
the Torah, and all that is required is for one to obey its commandments. The human 
possesses the capacity to obey for God has given him free will. God himself assures that 
the human can determine his or her own destiny by leaving the human to himself or 
herself. Like this description of the human agent, the speaker of Romans 7 is offered the 
law that leads to life. He thinks that he can obey it as his repeated attempts to obey reveal 
(vv.15–20). God himself, just as Ben Sira said (Sir 15.15), leaves the human alone to 
determine for himself what path to take. 
Having adopted this understanding of the human agent, however, Paul proceeds to 
expose its fallacies. The e vgw, does not possess the ability to obey because Sin has taken it 
from him. The result of all his efforts to obey is nothing less than death, for under Sin’s 
control he has chosen the path of death. The law that was supposed to give him life, in 
reality, becomes the instrument of death. 
B. Sin’s Takeover of Human Capacity  
In Romans 7.7–25 Paul depicts life under the law and in the process critiques the 
view of the law held by some of his Jewish contemporaries. Specifically, he targets the 
two-ways theology advocated by Ben Sira and others and based in a particular reading of 
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Deuteronomy 30.15–20.61 It was already noted how Paul’s description of the e vgw, is 
similar to the human of Sirach 15.11–20. Both are created with “free will” and the 
capacity to obey; both are confronted with the “law of life;” and both are left by God to 
determine their own destinies. Obedience to the law is the means to life, which while 
defined differently is the goal for both. Paul and Ben Sira are both dependent on 
Deuteronomy 30.15–20. These parallels suggest that Paul has something similar to Ben 
Sira’s view in mind as he writes Romans 7.7–25. Against this optimistic analysis of 
human capacity, Paul argues that it fails to account for the radical nature of Sin (a`m a rt i,a). 
In this context Sin stands not simply for wrongdoing or inappropriate, base desires. 
Rather, Sin is a demonic-like being that invades the human realm, asserts its rule over the 
human, infects his flesh, and leads to his demise. With the introduction of this third agent, 
Paul charges that the two-ways scheme as exemplified by Ben Sira is too simplistic. 
Although the e vgw, thinks he possesses freedom and has the ability to obey, Paul denies 
that he can act because he is ruled by Sin. The introduction of this third actor leads to a 
re-evaluation of the human’s moral capacity. 
i. The Concept of Sin 
There is virtual agreement among scholars that Paul personifies a `m a rt i,a in most of 
its occurrences in Romans 5–7. In the view of many commentators, Paul’s description of 
a `m a rt i,a is linked with an “apocalyptic” background and understood as more than the act 
of disobedience or wrongdoing. “Sin” (with a capital S) is a cosmic power, even a 
personal being, with its own agency that invades the human realm and works against God. 
Comparing “sin” with Satan’s deceptive tactics (cf. 2 Cor 11.14), Käsemann writes about 
“sin” in Romans 7.7–13, “Here sin is a power. . . . It has a demonic character.”62 a`m a rt i,a 
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is not the act of wrongdoing, but a personal being that deceives, enslaves, and ultimately 
kills. 
This widely adopted view has been challenged in recent years. Kaye notes that the 
instances in which a `m a rti ,a is described in personal terms in Romans 5.12-21 and 7.7-25 
are consistent with the literary style of the passages and do not require the conclusion that 
a `m a rt i,a is a power.63 Additionally, he maintains that throughout Romans a `m art i,a refers 
to human’s actively doing wrong. Wasserman has recently claimed “that proponents of 
this theory have done little to defend it in historical terms and that they deny Paul the use 
of metaphor and personification.”64 Yet, the literary arguments made by Kaye are not 
conclusive and obvious parallels appear across a range of Jewish literature in which a 
demonic being is described as ruling over and through human agents.65 
The description of Sin as a personal being has significant parallels with the account 
of personal, cosmic beings in the Dead Sea Scrolls. The Two-Spirits Treatise describes 
the rule of two cosmic beings, the Prince of Lights and the Angel of Darkness, that wage 
war against each other and its assigned lot of humanity (1QS 3.13–4.26). Although 
cosmic beings, they are also described as dwelling within each individual. While some 
have used this statement to eliminate any cosmic notions, the claim likely attempts to 
explain why humans act wickedly. They are not only under the lordship of a wicked 
cosmic being, this same being also invades and dwells within each individual, including 
the righteous, causing all to act wickedly. In attributing the evil deeds to the spirit 
dwelling within and ruling over each individual, the authors do not absolve the individual 
of his or her deeds. The human is still guilty, even though the Angel of Darkness causes 
one to disobey. 
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 Paul’s description of “Sin” as a personal being compares with the description of 
“Mastema” (hmjXmh) and “Belial” (l[ylb) as personal beings in many Jewish texts. The 
words hmjXm and l[ylb mean “enmity” and “worthlessness” respectively, but in the 
literature they are also names for real beings that rule over “demonic” armies and assert 
their rule in the human realm by causing humans to act wickedly (cf. Jub. 11.5; 1QS 2.5–
9; 1QM 1.1; 13.2–4; 4Q286 7 ii). Whether the author is referring to the actions of enmity 
or worthlessness or the Beings designated by these names is unclear at times (e.g. 1QS 
10.21; 1QHa 10.22). Nevertheless, in some texts personal beings are identified by these 
names. Like the authors of these texts, Paul could portray “sin” in a general way as 
disobedience, and he can also use the same word to describe a personal being that rules 
over humanity apart from Christ.  
Another analogous concept is the Rabbinic teaching on the “Evil Inclination” (rcy 
[rh).66 The rabbis generally described sin as rebellion against God and in a concrete form 
as disobedience to the Torah.67 They surmised that the cause of sin was the human’s 
impulse to evil.68 The Evil Inclination was part of the human nature because it was 
created by God.69 Alongside this anthropological understanding of the Evil Impulse, the 
Rabbis personified it.70 At times the Rabbis went beyond mere personification to equate 
the Evil Inclination with Satan and the Angel of Death: “Resh Lakish said: Satan, the evil 
prompter, and the Angel of Death are all one” (b. B. Bat. 16a [Soncino]). The Evil 
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Impulse from this perspective is more than the human inclination toward evil or even a 
personification of the passions. The Evil Inclination has become a personal being with its 
own agency. In the interpretation of Genesis 4.7 in Gen. Rab. 22.6, the Evil Inclination is 
identified as the Tempter who lies behind Cain’s murder of Abel. The movement from 
inclination to personal being is available already in the biblical text which describes sin as 
crouching at the door. To be sure, the Rabbis typically describe the Evil Inclination in 
impersonal terms, but they can also speak of it as a personal being. This provides a clear 
historical parallel to Paul’s use of a `m a rt i,a as a description of human wrongdoing and as a 
power that reigns over and in each human.71 A background for interpreting Paul’s 
language of “sin” as referring to a personal being is there despite Wasserman’s hasty 
dismissal of it.  
Kaye’s arguments against the “power” reading are more serious than Wasserman’s 
since his actually deal with Paul’s statements. He claims that “sin” always refers to the act 
of wrongdoing in Romans and that the depiction of “sin” as a personal being is the result 
of the personal tone of 5.12-21 and 7.7-25. Neither argument, however, is conclusive. 
First, Kaye is correct that “sin” refers to acts of evil at times in Romans (cf. 5.20). Those 
who seek to distance “Sin” as a power from the act of sinning, as if Paul had no interest in 
disobedience, are mistaken.72 Nevertheless, the focus on the act of sinning does not rule 
out the possibility that Paul conceived of a power known as “Sin” being the cause of 
disobedience. The either/or mentality is not helpful. Second, Kaye rightly notes the 
personal tone of 5.12–21 and 7.7–25, but his argument assumes that the literary form 
caused Paul to describe “sin” in a personal manner. Yet, could Paul not have used the 
personalised literary form because he needed it to express the personal nature of Sin? 
Which came first, the form or the concept? There is no reason to assume that Paul only 
portrayed Sin so personally because of the literary form. Indeed, with an apocalyptic 
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 Several scholars have argued that Paul is working with the two impulses teaching in Romans 7 
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background in mind, it is likely that Paul could portray Sin in such personal terms 
because it had become something that had its own agency.73 It is a being with its own 
history and actions.74 
These objections to the interpretation of “Sin” as a cosmic power in Romans 7.7–25 
are unfounded. It is most likely that Paul did perceive of “Sin” here as a quasi-personal 
being with its own agency.75 Sin is a foreigner to the human realm, and it invaded this 
realm because of Adam’s transgression (5.12). True to its name, Sin acts in the human 
realm to cause humans to do evil deeds that are contrary to the Torah. Sin’s stranglehold 
over the individual must not be divorced from the actual act of sinning, for it is when 
humans sin that they reveal themselves to be under Sin’s control. 
ii. Sin’s Destructive Reign 
Paul’s statements about Sin in 7.7–25 assume the prior depiction of Sin as a ruling 
power associated with the old era found in 5.12–6.23. It always opposes God and his will 
and manifests its rule over humanity when individuals act wickedly. Sin, Paul claims, 
entered the world through Adam’s transgression, and it brought death in its wake (5.12). 
Paul establishes from the beginning of human history the connection between Sin and 
death (cf. v.21). He describes in chapter 6 how Sin enslaves humans. It acts like a master 
dictating to its slaves how they should use their bodies to obey “its desires” (6.12) and to 
act in lawlessness (v.19). With Sin as their master, humans were free from righteousness. 
Sin works contrary to God’s will and opposes grace, obedience, and righteousness. 
In 7.7–25 the picture darkens. Whereas in chapters 5–6 Sin appears as an outside 
force working with humans, in 7.7–25 it enters into the human.76 Paul envisions the 
power designated by the name Sin taking up residence within the individual human. From 
its internalised position, it frustrates one’s will and determines his or her actions. The 
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description of Sin’s rule also intensifies in 7.7–25. In chapter 6, Paul uses master-slave 
language to describe Sin’s relationship to humanity. Throughout chapter 7, he describes 
the human’s relationship to Sin through military terminology. The human is sold into 
slavery to Sin (p e p ram e,no j  u`p o. t h .n a `m a rti,a n) (v.14). The law of Sin “wages war” 
(a vnt i st rat e u,o m ai) against the law in the speaker’s mind and takes him as a prisoner of 
war (a i vcm a l wt i,z w) (v.23). The human loses the battle that he attempted to wage against 
Sin (vv.15–20) and becomes a slave and a prisoner. 
In vv.9–10 Paul writes that Sin was dead at one point but became alive after the 
entrance of the law into history. The arrival of the law is, for Paul, a historical event with 
drastic consequences for the life of Israel. While Sin entered the world after Adam’s 
transgression and brought death along with it (5.12), it is not reckoned apart from the law 
(v.13). However the parenthetical comment in vv.13–14 be interpreted, Paul establishes 
the law as a separate event in human history and prepares for the statements in 7.7–11. 
The statement that Sin is not counted compares with the statement that Sin is dead apart 
from the law. Describing Sin as dead does not mean non-existent, but rather powerless.77 
With the arrival of the law, Sin gains a new lease on life, just as it had when Adam 
transgressed the commandment. With the arrival of the law, Sin acquires its own agency. 
Sin uses its new found power to wreak havoc in the life of the individual who seeks 
life through the law. It finds in the law a “bridgehead” (vv.8, 11) from which to wage its 
deadly attacks. The law becomes “the power of Sin” (1 Cor 15.56), and it provides no 
assistance to the human to free oneself from Sin’s enslavement.78 It is powerless against 
Sin (cf. 8.3). In the speaker’s current situation, the Torah is outside him, imposing its 
demands but offering nothing to assist him to satisfy them, while Sin dwells within him, 
issuing its own commands and bringing them to fruition.79 
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Sin’s reign over the speaker is oppressive and destructive. Paul’s description of the 
human encounter with Sin emphasises how the human has no control. Under Sin the 
human lacks the ability to do as one pleases. Hofius notes that the liberation documents 
given to a slave stated that the slave was now able to do as he or she pleased (e vp o i w/n o [ ka  
qe ,l h |). Paul’s statements in vv.15–19 parallel this expression, and in the negative form, 
they “indicate for the slave that he is not lord of himself or his doings.”80 Based on this 
connection, Paul’s description of the speaker’s inability further highlights his bondage to 
Sin and emphasises that he is “not the free subject of his activity.”81 
The human’s inability is highlighted through the speaker’s claim that the evil he does 
was not done by himself but by “Sin dwelling in me” (7.17, 20). Along with the military 
terminology employed in vv.14, 23, this admission indicates that, contrary to Garlington, 
Sin’s attack on the human cannot be reduced to mere oppression.82 The e vgw, is entirely 
incapable of bringing his will to do good to its desired end because Sin dwells within him. 
This statement in vv.17, 20 is often viewed as Paul’s admission that the evgw, is not guilty 
of his sins. However, Paul does not absolve the e vgw, of his responsibility. Instead, the 
claim serves to enhance the picture of Sin’s all-encompassing control. The human under 
Sin’s rule is incapable of bringing his will to its intended goal, and he merely serves as a 
pawn in Sin’s destructive game.83 The human will indeed be judged for his 
transgressions, as the cry for help indicates (v.24), but he also realises that he remains 
helpless in the situation. Sin’s rule is comprehensive and deadly. 
Sin’s indwelling rule does not mean that the e vgw, ceases to act. The human still acts 
on his will to do good, but through Sin’s deception (v.11), he is tricked into doing evil.84 
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The ethical categories of “good” and “evil” have been reversed due to Sin’s deception.85 
This has the practical result that when the speaker thinks he is doing the law he actually is 
acting contrary to the commandment.86 Perhaps the closest analogy is Paul’s persecution 
of the church (Gal 1.13; 1 Cor 15.9; Phil 3.6).87 In seeking to annihilate the church, Paul 
was actually working against God and his Messiah. He was sinning against God while 
seeking to keep the Torah. This confusion over the meaning of “good” and “evil” is in 
direct conflict with the two-ways tradition. This tradition holds that God himself made 
known to humans the difference between “good” and “evil.” Moses said, “See I have put 
before you today life and death, good and evil” (Deut 30.15 LXX). Similarly, when 
describing the creation of humanity, Ben Sira thinks that God himself gave humans 
knowledge and “showed to them good and evil” (Sir 17.7). God’s first commandment is 
“beware of all evil” (v.14). Against this tradition, though, Paul claims that although God 
revealed good and evil in the Torah, Sin has deceived the human. The content of each 
category has been switched so that what God defines as evil, the human now calls good 
and what God says is good, the human identifies as evil. The two-ways tradition collapses 
when the human cannot tell the difference between good and evil as God defines them. 
Sin’s deception appears in the speaker’s confusion over why his attempt to do good 
manifests evil (Rom 7.15–20). Having been enslaved to Sin (v.14b), the speaker 
unwilling produces evil.88 Haacker’s contention that “sin” means “weakness,” that is the 
failure to act on one’s good intentions, confuses the definition of sin with the problem 
created by one’s enslavement to sin, namely, the inability to manifest one’s good 
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intentions as one pleases.89 The problem described in vv.15–20, as Meyer argues, “is not 
simple frustration of good intent, but good intention carried out and then surprised and 
dumbfounded by the evil it has produced.”90 The production of evil, despite the intent and 
attempt to do good, is positive proof that the human’s agency has been lost to Sin, so that 
his actions are now ascribed to “Sin dwelling in me” (vv.17, 20). Meyer’s statement 
indicates an important point that is often overlooked. The speaker did not actively choose 
evil. He intended to do good and actually put his intention into action. It is only when that 
intention is manifest that he realises he has done evil. Sin’s deceptive work is revealed not 
by causing the human to consciously do evil but by manifesting his intention to do good 
as evil. The speaker can, therefore, summarise his condition as: “So then I find the ‘law’ 
that, when I will to do the good, evil is present with me” (v.21).91 Evil manifests itself in 
the very act of trying to do good because the ethical categories have been reversed. It is 
not just the case that evil is simply present when the speaker desires to do good. Rather, 
“evil is close at hand precisely as I seek the good.”92 As Watson argues:  
[T]he relationship between willing the good and doing the evil is not a merely 
contingent one. Rather, Paul’s law is that willing the good has doing the evil as its 
necessary consequence. The attempt to make one’s conduct conform to God’s law, in 
full recognition that what the law prescribes is holy and just and good, generates only 
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evil: that is the desperate situation of the person who is under the law of Moses and 
who delights in it and acknowledges its goodness.93 
Despite the speaker’s belief, evil and good are not two possible outcomes of his decision 
to keep the commandment. Evil will always be the outcome of his decision and attempt to 
observe the law. The e vgw, cannot escape evil for it manifests itself each time that he 
attempts to obey the Torah. 
With the point that the speaker did not consciously choose to disobey, we are at some 
distance from the akrasia (weakness of the will) tradition that many have identified as the 
background to vv.15–20.94 In Greek literature, Euripides has Medea say, 
Yet I am conquered by evils. And I understand the deeds I am about to do are evil, 
But anger is greater than my resolves. Anger, the cause for mortals of the greatest 
evils. (Medea 1077b-1080)95 
The idea is even clearer in Ovid’s retelling of the Medea story: 
But some strange power draws me against my will, and desire persuades me one 
way, and my mind another. I see the better and approve, but I follow the worse. (Met. 
7.20–21 [Miller, LCL]) 
The conflict between knowing what is right but doing what is evil expressed in these 
statements reappears in a variety of philosophical contexts as the philosophers debate the 
reason for this conflict. The Stoic tradition claimed that the person does evil because he or 
she lacks knowledge of what is right.96 The Platonic tradition maintained that the problem 
results from a conflict between the rational and irrational parts of a human.97 The account 
in Romans 7.15–20 is thought to describe an inner conflict between the speaker’s mind 
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and his base desires.98 His mind wills to follow God’s law, but his base desires, which are 
located in his flesh, overwhelm him and cause him to do evil. He does not take 
responsibility for his actions but attributes the evil to the “passions [a`m a rt i,a] dwelling in 
me” (vv.17, 20). Stowers concludes, then, that the speaker suffers from a “moral 
schizophrenia.”99 
It seems clear that Paul is at least familiar with this perception on human ability, but 
recent attempts to align Paul with either philosophical interpretation or with the tradition 
as a whole underestimate the differences between Paul and the tradition. Paul’s view does 
not square with either of the standard positions, which indicates that other issues have 
influenced his view.100 The reference to deception (v.11) and the speaker’s confusion over 
what is happening (v.15) could indicate that the issue is one of knowledge.101 These two 
themes might connect Paul with the Stoic position. The speaker’s problem, however, is 
not one of knowledge since he knows the law and what is expected of him.102 He even 
recognises after further reflection that the outcome of his willing, despite his intention, is 
evil. Verse 15 describes the speaker’s failure to grasp the full extent to which he is 
enslaved to Sin. Indeed, contrary to the Stoic position, it is precisely because good and 
evil are made known to the speaker in the Torah that he begins to sin (vv.7–11). 
Paul’s statements are closer to the Platonic position, but it is not clear that a `m a rti,a 
should be understood as “passion” or “desire.” While Paul does write about “sinful 
passions” (t a . p a qh,m a t a  t w/n a `m a rti w/n) (v.5) and the fundamental error committed by the 
e vgw, is evp i qum i,a (v.7; cf. 6.12), his use of a `m a rt i,a is distinct. a`m a rti,a causes one to have 
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e vp i qumi,a: “But Sin (h ` a `m a rt i,a), receiving an opportunity through the commandment, 
worked in me all kinds of desire (p a /sa n e vp i qum i,a n)” (7.8). Similarly, in 6.12 Paul 
instructs the readers not to submit to Sin’s lordship by allowing their “mortal bodies” to 
obey “its desires” (t a i/j  e vp i qum i,a i j  a uvt o u/).103 Sin expresses its reign by causing people to 
have inappropriate desires, but Sin is not identical to the desires. The e vgw,’s problem is not 
desire, but the rule of Sin that causes him to desire.104 While Paul is overtly interested in 
how “sin” expresses itself as “desire,” his understanding of “sin” cannot be reduced to the 
irrational, appetitive desires. The attempt to situate Paul within the Platonic perspective 
confuses the result of Sin’s impact on the e vgw, with the actual problem from which the e vgw, 
suffers. 
Regardless of whether Paul’s statements mirror either perspective of the akrasia 
tradition, his overall presentation of the e vgw, differs at one crucial point, namely, the e vgw, 
does not actively choose to sin. According to the akrasia tradition, while the person 
desires to do good he or she actively chooses the evil. This is clear in Medea’s statement: 
“I see the better and approve, but I follow the worse” (Ovid, Met. 7.20–21 [Miller, LCL]). 
Despite knowing what is correct, she, of her own volition, chooses to do evil. The akrasia 
tradition requires that one interpret the speaker of Romans 7 as consciously willing the 
good and consciously choosing the evil. In Paul’s description of the e vgw,  however, this 
person desires the good but had his desire to do good twisted into evil by Sin. He has a 
single desire: to obey God’s will as revealed in the Torah.105 This alone occupies his mind 
and is what he attempts to do. The e vgw, does not consciously engage in evil. It is instead 
the consequence of Sin’s deceptive use of the law (v.11). There is no division in his 
desire.106 The e vgw,’s failure to actualise his desire to obey the Torah is the consequence of 
Sin dwelling within him (vv.17, 20, 23). Sin prevents him from doing the good that he 
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sought by twisting his otherwise right desire to obey the Torah into transgressing the 
Torah. The conflict between “willing” and “doing” refers to the conflict between the e vgw, 
and Sin, with the latter always turning the former’s thoughts into the practice of evil.107 
The similarity between Paul’s statements and the akrasia tradition shows that he was 
aware of this perspective on the relationship between willing and doing.108 The attempt to 
place Paul within this tradition as it developed in the philosophical debates, however, 
leads to distortions in Paul’s argument in Romans 7.7–25.109 Fundamental differences 
exist, which should not be minimised, and these differences are significant enough to 
indicate that Paul rejects the standard Greco-Roman philosophical solutions to the 
problem of human inability. He stands as a critic of this conception of human agency.  
With the introduction of this third actor, Paul attacks the foundations of the two-ways 
paradigm. No longer is it just God and the individual. Now other agents are involved in 
the relationship, agents for which the two-ways scheme cannot account. Paul’s criticism 
is not just of the worldview held by the two-ways tradition. His criticism has a practical 
effect on the daily lives of those who attempt to live by the two-ways perspective. 
Fundamental to the two-ways tradition is the claim that the human can of his or her own 
volition decide to follow the law and having made that decision put his or her will into 
action. In his debate with other positions, Ben Sira makes human freedom and the 
capacity to obey central to his argument. God has left the human to determine his own 
destiny (Sir 15.14). He has the ability to keep the commandment (v.15). When the human 
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comparing Paul with the philosophical schools. Also, the author of 4 Maccabees thinks the law instructs the 
mind in what to avoid, but Paul holds that the law actually empowers Sin to bring about desire (Huggins, 
“Alleged Classical Parallels, 159). Cf. also the use of the Tenth commandment by Philo in Decal. 142–153, 
173–174, and Spec. 4.79–131. 
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sins, this is the result of his own will. God has certainly not caused the human to sin 
(vv.11–12), and since God is the only other agent in Ben Sira’s two agent drama, the 
human alone is to blame.  
In contrast to Ben Sira, for whom the human agent must choose to sin, Paul asserts 
that the human agent will sin because he is a servant of Sin. Sin’s reign over the human 
results in a different understanding of human capacity than that set forth by Ben Sira.110 
The human has no “free will” that allows him to choose between obedience or 
disobedience, life or death. Whereas in Ben Sira’s view “ought” implies “can,” in Paul’s 
view “can” does not follow from “ought.” As Martyn argues, 
[W]ith a third actor in the drama, it is an understatement to say that the assumption of 
human moral competence cannot be maintained in its old and simple form. That is to 
say, with a third actor having power to set up its own “rule”—under God’s ultimate 
sovereignty, to be sure—we obviously have a moral drama in which God’s 
commandeering “ought” is far indeed from implying a simple “can” on the part of 
the human agent. Indeed in the Apocalyptic Moral Drama generally there is no 
human autonomy, for the human agent and his activity can be separated neither from 
the activity of God nor from the activity of the third actor.”111 
Life under the law, for Paul, is an existence without agency, for the human loses to 
Sin his or her ability. Under the law, human agency is illusionary. From Paul’s 
perspective, those who adopt the two-ways pattern have failed to comprehend the depth 
of the human condition. They do not apprehend the true heinousness of Sin and the 
disastrous consequences it has for the human being. 
C. Conclusion 
In Romans 7.7–25, Paul critiques the widely-held view that one can attain life 
through obedience to the Torah. The e vgw, represents anyone who attempts to live by the 
law and to acquire eschatological blessings through it. Particularly, he corresponds to Ben 
Sira’s description of the human agent (Sir 15.11–20). Both look to the Torah as the means 
to life and both attempt to obey it. For Ben Sira the human is fully capable. Paul, 
however, portrays the human as incapable and continuously committing the evil he 
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sought to avoid. His life is marked by failure and frustration and ultimately results in 
death. Sin reigns in his body, and while he resists with his mind, he finds that Sin 
ultimately determines his actions. He is a prisoner caught in Sin’s web of death. Paul’s 
conclusion is diametrically opposed to Ben Sira’s: Attempting to acquire life through the 
Torah only results in death. 
Whereas Ben Sira sought to defend human freedom and responsibility with his 
argument that the human can respond to the divine demand, Paul argues that human 
freedom and ability are illusionary when one lives under the law. There is no 
correspondence between ought and ability for the person under the law according to Paul. 
The human agent who desires to order his or her life according to the commandments of 
the Torah will always fail. The law, then, cannot be the means to redemption from Sin’s 
hold. Life cannot come through the Torah since the path of the Torah is a dead end—
literally. 
2. Obedience Accomplished through the Spirit (8.1–13) 
In Romans 6.1–8.13 Paul addresses the issue of whether his law-free gospel can 
manifest itself in obedient people. In 7.7–25 he argued that a prominent Jewish view on 
human agency, the two-ways tradition, cannot produce an adequate obedience. The 
human agent only disobeys. In 8.1–13 he adopts another Jewish pattern of human agency, 
which he modifies in light of his Christological conceptions. In this other perspective, 
obedience is made possible when God resolves the human problem and gives his Spirit as 
a source of empowerment. This results in the creation of human moral capacity and 
ultimately in the human being obedient. 
Paul has often been portrayed as a maverick Jew, whose ideas find no home in the 
Jewish world. This is the case particularly when scholars describe Paul’s soteriology. All 
other Jews, it has been claimed, held that salvation came through obedience, but Paul 
realised that salvation came through faith. In his rebuttal of this reading of Judaism, 
Sanders, according to some, failed to integrate Paul, and the picture of Paul as an anomaly 
within a grace-oriented Judaism sparked the New Perspective. The attempt by Dunn and 
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other New Perspective proponents to integrate Paul into Sanders’ Judaism, however, has 
come at a great price. We have already seen how in Romans 7.7–25 Paul critiques a 
common view of the divine-human relationship held by some Jews. The New Perspective, 
at this point, has sacrificed both Ben Sira’s claims and Paul’s criticisms in the attempt to 
make Paul fit a certain perspective on Judaism. Against Ben Sira only, Paul’s perspective 
does make him a maverick who has radicalised divine action and eliminated human 
agency. Yet, the perspective offered by Ben Sira, while a (the?) dominant Jewish view of 
divine and human agency, was not the only Jewish explanation of the divine-human 
relationship available. The pattern of divine and human action developed in Romans 8.1–
13 bears a remarkable similarity to that of the Hodayot: both present divine action as the 
solution to the human dilemma, and both emphasise the indwelling and empowering 
presence of the divine Spirit. 
In the Hodayot, the hymnist develops an extremely pessimistic anthropology. He 
describes humans as sinful creatures bound by their very nature to disobedience. As 
“creatures of clay,” they are ruled by their perverse spirits, and they only and always 
displease God. The solution to this problem is divine intervention. Among the various 
divine actions undertaken to alter the human’s evil disposition, the constant thread uniting 
them all is the divine Spirit. Temporally speaking, the first divine action is election. God 
decides prior to creation who will receive his grace and mercy. These God assigns to walk 
righteous paths, and he gives them his Spirit. God’s pre-temporal decision is manifest in 
history by the imparting of his Spirit, who liberates the human from one’s perverse spirits. 
The Spirit gives knowledge to the elect, which enables the human to obey the Torah. The 
Spirit empowers the human to obey. 
Paul shows a familiarity with this tradition in two or three ways. First, the Hodayot 
explicitly connect the Spirit with predestination. As the argument of Romans 8 
progresses, Paul moves from the Spirit (v.27) to predestination (v.29; cf. 9.1–29). Paul 
does not connect directly the Spirit with predestination, but the movement from one to the 
other may indicate that Paul had some familiarity with this Jewish tradition. Second, Paul 
and the Hodayot share an emphasis on the divine Spirit as the means to obedience. The 
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Spirit empowers one to fulfil God’s will. Moreover, both authors have derived their 
understanding of the Spirit from Ezekiel. A third possible connection could be the 
pessimistic anthropology. Both texts highlight human incapacity, but the Hodayot 
expresses a much more negative evaluation of the creatureliness of humanity.  
While it is impossible to know if Paul had read the Hodayot or encountered a 
Hodayot-like theology prior to or after his conversion, the similarities in thought, 
especially regarding the Spirit, indicate that Paul was not a maverick Jew, who had no 
knowledge of Palestinian traditions. Indeed, the similarities suggest the exact opposite: in 
Romans 7.7–8.13 Paul participates in an intra-Jewish debate over the divine-human 
relationship and specifically the human capacity to obey. In contrast to the two-ways 
paradigm advocated by Ben Sira, Paul follows a tradition described in the Hodayot that 
highlights divine action at every point and views this as the source for human action. The 
Spirit is imparted to humans as the enabling agent, and his presence establishes human 
agency. 
A. The Christological Modification 
The centre of Paul’s thought emerges in the alterations he makes to this pattern of 
divine intervention. Christ’s death on the cross is the decisive point when God broke into 
the age of the flesh (7.5) to resolve the human dilemma created by Sin and exacerbated by 
the law.112 Paul modifies the pattern of the divine-human relationship to account for this 
event (1) by making it, rather than the pre-temporal decision of God, the point at which 
God intervenes and (2) by redefining the divine identity around Christ. 
Whereas the Torah was incapable of dealing with Sin, “God condemned Sin in the 
flesh” of his Son, who was sent in “the likeness of sinful flesh and for sin” (v.3). Three 
points should be noted about this verse. First, God has acted with the specific purpose of 
destroying Sin’s hold over humanity. With a sense of irony, Paul writes that “God 
condemned Sin.” The expression is striking, for the very act (sin) and Being (Sin) that 
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lead to the e vgw, deserving condemnation (v.1; cf. 1.18) is now charged by God and bears 
the full weight of his wrath. ka t a kri,nw is always used in a forensic sense in the NT and 
LXX to denote the reality that punishment will come on those guilty of sinning.113 In 
some occurrences, the term has the added notion of not only passing sentence, but also 
bringing about that sentence.114 This double sense appears here.115 In condemning Sin 
itself, God at the same time breaks its strangle-hold over the human agent.116 
The irony continues: whereas Sin brought death to the e vgw, (7.11; cf. 1.32; 5.17), it is 
by another’s death that Sin is condemned.117 “In the flesh” (8.3) refers to Jesus’ physical 
body as the place where the condemnation takes place. It is in the very place that Sin had 
exercised its deadly rule (7.14, 18) that it itself is finally killed.118 There is also a reversal 
of roles here. The death that the e vgw, experienced in his body is transferred to the Son 
who, having embodied Sin in his flesh, assumes the e vgw,’s death for him. The 
condemnation that all individuals deserve (cf. 5.18) is removed from them. As the act of 
baptism symbolises (6.3–7), believers are identified with Christ in his death and 
resurrection with the result that they no longer live to Sin. The transition from being 
“fleshly” and under the law happens not in the absence of death, but through death (cf. 
7.4). What is avoided is the death (that is, the condemnation) due because of one’s 
sinfulness since this is taken up by the Son who, being “in the likeness of sinful flesh,” 
had Sin condemned in his flesh.119 
Second, the Son participates in the human dilemma when he comes “in the likeness 
of sinful flesh” (e vn o `m o i w,m a ti  sa rko.j  a `m a rt i,a j). The phrase “sinful flesh” recalls the 
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claim, “I am fleshly, sold into slavery under Sin” (Rom 7.14). The combination of the two 
terms “flesh” and “sin” as descriptive of both the e vgw, and the Son signifies the Son’s full 
identity with the situation of the e vgw,.120 The difficulty of this phrase is the noun o `m o i,wm a, 
which can express complete identity (Phil 2.7) or similarity (Rom 1.23; 5.14; 6.5). Many 
reject the idea of complete identification in 8.3 because this would indicate that Christ 
himself sinned and would be deserving of punishment.121 Yet, as Bell correctly points out, 
Paul is not referring to “Jesus committing sins; rather he is saying that Jesus fully 
participated in the sphere of humanity where a sinful existence is inevitable.”122 The Son 
took the same identity as other humans, a flesh ruled by Sin and subject to death, but 
unlike other humans he did not succumb to Sin’s rule.123 He conquered Sin by being 
obedient to the point of death, the divine will for his life (Phil 2.7; cf. Heb 5.8–9). As 
Fitzmyer writes, 
He came in a form like us in that he became a member of the sin-oriented human 
race; he experienced the effects of sin and suffered death, the result of sin, as one 
“cursed” by the law (Gal 3:13). Thus in his own self he coped with the power of sin. 
Paul’s use of the phrase sarx hamartias denotes not the guilty human condition, but 
the proneness of humanity made of flesh that is oriented to sin.124 
God’s solution to the human problem is for his own Son to become human, and this 
action, rather than protecting the divine from the human problem caused by Sin, identifies 
the divine as truly participating in it.125 
Third, God’s ability to solve the human problem is set in direct contrast with the 
Torah. The Torah is incapable of dealing with Sin not because of some inherent fault, but 
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rather because it is weakened by the more powerful flesh. God, working through his Son 
and his Spirit (v.2), however, destroys Sin’s hold on the human when the Son appears in 
flesh. The seemingly powerful flesh that weakened the law turns out to be weak itself. 
This contrast between the Torah and God serves to heighten the significance of divine 
action in Paul’s thought. Whereas the Torah left the human to confront the power of Sin 
on his or her own, God invades the human realm to destroy Sin’s power.126 
The Christological modification extends also to the concept of God.127 First, what 
God did in Christ defines who he is. He is “the one who raised Christ from the dead” 
(v.11b; cf. 4.24). God is now to be understood as God the Father and his Son is the one 
who he raised from the dead (1.4). God is also to be understood as the one who invaded 
the world by sending his Son to condemn Sin (8.3). In each of these statements, Paul’s 
understanding of God and his activity is connected with the Christ-event. The events of 
Jesus’ life, especially his death and resurrection, define who God is. 
Second, this redefinition of the divine identity manifests itself in Paul’s 
understanding of the Spirit. While in the OT and Second Temple Judaism the Spirit is 
associated with God alone, Paul claims that the Spirit must also be associated with the 
person and activities of Jesus. The Spirit is not simply the “Spirit of God.” He is now 
known as “the Spirit of him who raised Jesus from the dead” (v.11a) and the “Spirit of 
Christ,” the one resurrected and exalted by God.128 Although often overlooked Paul only 
rarely speaks of the Spirit as being “of Christ” (Rom 8.9; Gal 4.6; Phil 1.19; cf. 2 Cor 
3.17).129 Dunn misunderstands the phrase “Spirit of Christ” (Rom 8.9) to mean an 
identification of the risen and exalted Christ with the Spirit. He writes, “As is generally 
recognized, Cri st o ,j [in v.10] is used here synonymously with p ne u/m a  qe o u/ = p ne u/m a  
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Cri st o u/.”130 While Paul undoubtedly links the Spirit and Christ together, it is not clear 
that he intends the two to be identified as one.131 First, in other passages Paul clearly 
maintains a distinction between the Spirit and Jesus (e.g. 1 Cor 12.4–6; 2 Cor 13.14; Eph 
4.4–6).132 These passages should be borne in mind when discussing the three passages 
that link the Spirit and Christ with a genitive. Second, Christ’s relationship to the Spirit is 
analogous to God’s relationship to his Spirit. The Spirit is the presence and experience of 
God, but not the full embodiment of the person of God. That the Spirit is distinct from 
God the Father is clear because it is through the Spirit that one addresses God as Father 
(v.15).133 Just as the “Spirit of God” is not God (the Father) himself, neither is the “Spirit 
of Christ” the risen Christ. He is the presence and experience of Christ, which is why Paul 
can write “Christ in you” (v.10a), but not Christ himself. Paul is not identifying the Spirit 
as the risen Christ, but he is attempting to express his understanding of God in light of his 
understanding of God’s action in Christ. In so doing, he views the “Spirit of God” as the 
“Spirit of Christ,” for he has already related God and Jesus as Father and Son (1.3–4; 8.3). 
Identifying the Spirit with both the Father and Son is simply a further extension of Paul’s 
attempt to redefine the Jewish concept of God around Jesus. 
Third, the linking of the Spirit with Christ not only signals a drastic redefinition of 
God, but also distinguishes Paul’s conception of divine empowerment from his 
contemporaries. While other Jews pointed to the Spirit as the means to obedience, Paul 
insists that the Spirit must be connected with Christ. It is not enough to claim that the 
Spirit of God helps one. Rather, the Spirit that assists must be the Spirit of Christ.  
This Christological modification to the pattern of the divine-human relationship 
already found in the Hodayot is significant. Whereas in the Hodayot, God’s acts of 
deliverance were attributed to the outworking in time of his mysterious will to elect some 
unto salvation, Paul claims that God has invaded time in his Son (cf. Gal 1.4; 4.4–6). The 
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theoretical consequences are that Paul both orients God’s engagement with humanity 
around the Christ-event, and he redefines the concept of God around Jesus Christ. The 
practical result is that human agents, now free from Sin’s grasp, are able to lead, through 
the Spirit of Christ, obedient lives that emulate God’s act in Christ. 
B. The Establishment of Human Ability 
Much like the Hodayot, Paul sets forth the Spirit as the divine agent who empowers 
the human to obey God’s will. The Spirit is God’s and Christ’s presence in the 
intermediate time between Christ’s ascension and his return. As the embodiment of the 
divine presence, the Spirit’s task, according to 8.4–13, is to enable those “in Christ” to 
please God by fulfilling the righteous requirement of the Torah. In this capacity, the Spirit 
creates human agency where Sin had prevented it. 
Developing the antithesis of 7.5–6, Paul contrasts the Spirit with the flesh in 8.4–13. 
p ne u/m a is the divine Spirit imparted to believers, and sa ,rx can be understood as a personal 
power or, more likely, a sphere of influence.134 Paul’s use of the term sa ,rx is deliberately 
ambiguous. Here it likely summarises the argument of 7.7–25. Being enslaved to Sin and 
attempting to acquire life through law observance is to live according to the “mindset of 
the flesh,” which results in death (8.5–6). The Spirit-flesh dualism is used in 8.1–13 
primarily to highlight the change in aeons that has occurred because of God’s act in 
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Christ. The movement from one aeon to the next signals a change in lordship.135 The 
human who is “in Christ” no longer exists in the flesh or under Sin’s control. Now he or 
she lives in the age of Christ and under the “lordship” of the Spirit.    
Paul’s description of the Spirit is deliberately set up to contrast with the power of 
Sin. Both Sin and the Spirit are external agents that invade the human realm and take up 
residence within the human. From this internal position, Sin enslaves the human as a 
captive of war and rules over one’s actions (7.14b, 23). The human loses the ability to 
enact his or her will. Every action done is attributed to “Sin dwelling in me” (vv.17, 20). 
While Sin destroys and prevents human agency, the Spirit creates it. Like Sin the Spirit 
establishes itself in the human. The indwelling of the Spirit is repeatedly emphasised in 
8.9–11. Those who are “in the Spirit” are those in whom the Spirit resides (o ivke ,w). 
Resurrection is accomplished by God through his Spirit which dwells within believers. 
The possession language is found also in the expression “Christ in you” (v.10). Paul’s 
typical pattern is to speak of the believer being “in Christ.” Here he reverses the formula 
in order to highlight the indwelling power of God as the characteristic of the believer and 
as the source of the believer’s ability to obey. While Paul can describe both Sin and the 
Spirit as dwelling in a human, he does not think about them ruling in the same manner. 
Where Sin usurps the e vgw,’s ability, the Spirit gives ability. Sin prevents the human from 
acting upon his or her desire to obey, but the Spirit enables obedience. Paul views the 
Spirit as the enabler who establishes human agency, so that the believer is neither a 
puppet moved at God’s whim nor an independent agent capable of acting apart from the 
Spirit. 
One should take note here of the scriptural background for Paul’s understanding of 
the Spirit’s agency. Like the Hodayot, Paul’s view of the Spirit is informed by Ezekiel’s 
statements about God giving his Spirit to enable his people to obey. The Lord tells Israel 
that he will give to them a new spirit (Ezek 11.19; 36.26), which is identified as his own 
Spirit (36.27; 37.14). This new Spirit, which is the bringer of life (37.14), leads them in 
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obedience to the commandments (11.20; 36.27). Paul does not use the exact language of 
Ezekiel as the Hodayot had done, but the background should be clear enough. The Spirit 
and life are connected together throughout Romans 8.1–13. The Spirit is called the “Spirit 
of life” in v.2, and those who have “the mind of the Spirit” have “life and peace” (v.6) 
because “the Spirit is life” (v.10).136 Paul even goes so far as to attribute the future 
resurrection of believers to the Spirit’s presence in their lives (v.11).137 Paul also 
emphasises that the Spirit dwells within the believer, as just noted. Finally, he argues that 
the human is able to be obedient because of the Spirit’s empowerment (vv.4, 13). The 
believer fulfils the “righteous requirement of the law” because the Spirit resides within 
and gives the ability to obey. This is precisely what Ezekiel was told would happen to the 
people: “I will put my Spirit in you and cause you to walk in my statutes and to keep and 
do my judgments” (36.27). 
This background in Ezekiel seems rather clear, but it is sometimes conflated with 
Jeremiah’s promise of a “new covenant” (31[38].31–34).138 The two are not identical 
however. Jeremiah relates that God “will put my law in their minds and write it on their 
hearts,” which leads to obedience because each person knows the law (vv.33–34). Ezekiel 
writes that God implants his Spirit and through the Spirit one obeys the law. Paul’s 
statements are based on Ezekiel’s because he claims that the Spirit is imparted to 
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(see Barrett, Romans, 159; Dunn, Romans, 1:427; Fee, God’s Empowering Presence, 550–51; Schreiner, 
Romans, 414–15). 
137
 NA27 accepts d ia . t ou/  evn oik o u/n toj  a uv to u/ pne u, ma toj  e vn u`m i/ n at the end of v.11, which means 
“through his Spirit who is indwelling in you.” An alternative textual tradition has dia . to.  ev noik ou/ n a u vto u/ 
pne u/ma  evn u` mi/n: “because of his Spirit who is indwelling in you.” The first reading means that the Spirit is 
the agent who gives resurrection life, while the second indicates that possession of the Spirit is the reason 
God makes alive. Both variants are strongly supported, thereby making external evidence inconclusive 
(Cranfield, Romans, 1:391–92). Schreiner (Romans, 417) rightly notes, against Fee (God’s Empowering 
Presence, 543, 553), that the Spirit is the active agent who brings to life in Ezekiel 37. Those who accept 
the genitive reading typically view the Spirit as an intermediary agent in the act of resurrection (cf. Moo, 
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138
 So Bruce, Romans, 161–62; Lyonnet, “Rom 8,2–4 à la lumière de Jérémie 31 et d’Ézéchiel 38–40;” 
Zeller, Brief an die Römer, 153. 
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believers not the law. As in Romans 7, the law remains outside the human as a demand 
that must be met. Paul claims in 8.1–13 that it is met not because it is placed within each 
person but because the Spirit directs the lives of those “in Christ.” This subtle difference 
between what God puts in each person is important for Paul’s argument. He is able to 
distance himself and his gospel from the law, while also maintaining that the law is 
fulfilled by those who believe his gospel. 
The Spirit establishes human agency when it creates the possibility for obedience by 
freeing the human from Sin’s enslaving rule. “The law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus 
has set you free from the law of Sin and death” (8.2). Paul’s claims about freedom in 
chapter 6 and 7.1–6 culminate in this statement.139 It is here that the readers learn that 
their freedom has been accomplished for them by the Spirit. Paul uses the same slavery 
language (although not the military terminology) to depict the human’s service to both 
Sin and God, but, in a striking paradox, while slavery to Sin is bondage, slavery to the 
Spirit is freedom. “But having been freed from Sin, you became slaves to righteousness” 
(6.18). Again: “But now having been freed from Sin, but enslaved to God” (v.22).140 The 
freedom from Sin accomplished by the Spirit, rather than resulting in licentiousness, 
creates the possibility for the believer to obey God’s will. The Pauline conception of 
freedom is not one of an absolute freedom wherein the believer becomes an autonomous 
being. In Paul’s worldview, the human is always connected with one ruling power or 
another, either God or the agents of evil (Sin and the Flesh).141 Freedom from Sin, for 
Paul, is freedom to God, and it is when a person is united to Christ and walking by the 
Spirit that he or she is truly free. 
The Spirit not only frees the human and thereby creates the possibility for obedience. 
He also functions as the empowering agent through whom believers “please God” (8.8). 
Positively, the Spirit assists believers to do precisely what Sin had prevented, namely, 
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 Because he identifies the speaker of Romans 7 as a Christian, Cranfield is forced to take the claim 
of freedom in 8.2 in a weakened sense as indicating only partial freedom from Sin’s tyranny 
(“Sanctification as Freedom,” 38–40). 
140
 Cf. Gal 5.1, 13. 
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 Käsemann, “Primitive Christian Apocalyptic,” 136. 
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fulfil the Torah’s righteous requirement (t o . d i ka i,wm a  t o u/ no ,m o u) (v.4). A significant 
number of scholars contend that in v.4 Paul continues to describe what God has done in 
Christ for believers.142 Because of the judicial language in vv.1, 3, t o . d i ka i,wm a  t o u/ no ,m o u 
is “the righteousness required by the law” (Byrne) or “the just requirement of the law” 
(Moo), which Moo explains as “the demand for perfect obedience, or for 
righteousness.”143 Calvin and Moo argue that the law’s demand cannot be satisfied by the 
human agent. Christ, however, because of his perfectly obedient life or death (or both) 
has satisfied this requirement, which is transferred to the human when one believes in 
him.144 The Christian does not activity fulfil the law, as the passive p l h rwqh /|, which must 
be given its full weight as a divine passive, indicates.145 Unlike the e vgw, who sought to 
keep the Torah by his own volition, those in Christ, here described as those “who walk 
according to the Spirit,” have t o . d i ka i,wm a  t o u/ no , m o u fulfilled on their behalf. The 
passive indicates that God is the one who actually satisfies the d i ka i,wm a of the law. 
Käsemann pointedly writes, “God alone fulfills what he demands. He does it 
paradoxically on the cross with the sending of his Son as a sin-offering, and therefore 
apart from and even in opposition to our cooperation.”146 This is implied also by the 
participial clause that characterises those who benefit from Christ’s death. The participial 
is not conditional (“if we walk”) nor modal (“by our walking”) but descriptive of those in 
whom the law’s righteousness is fulfilled.147 Likewise, e vn h `m i /n, translated as “in us,” 
suggests that this requirement is not accomplished by believers.148 Moo summarises the 
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 E.g. Melanchthon, Romans, 166–67; Ziesler, Romans, 208; Wright, Climax, 212; Keck, Romans, 
200; Pate, Reverse of the Curse, 266–67; Lichtenberger, Das Ich Adams, 196–97. 
143
 Byrne, “Living Out,” 569; idem, Romans, 237 (cf. Fitzmyer, Romans, 487); Moo, Romans, 482, 
484. 
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 Calvin, Romans, 160; Moo, Romans, 483. 
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 Keck, “Law of Sin and Death,” 52; Byrne, “Living out,” 569; Moo, Romans, 482–84; Fitzmyer, 
Romans, 487. 
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 Käsemann, Romans, 218–19. 
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 Conditional: Fitzmyer, Romans, 488. Modal: Cranfield, Romans, 385; VanLandingham, Judgment 
and Justification, 238 (although the ultimate conclusion drawn by these two is radically different). 
Descriptive: Moo, Romans, 484. 
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thought: “[T]he law’s just demand is fulfilled in Christians not through their own acts of 
obedience but through their incorporation into Christ.”149 
Despite the theological attractiveness of this interpretation, it should be rejected. The 
passive voice does not automatically indicate divine action and preclude all human 
action.150 Rather, the passive prevents one from assuming that the human agent acts alone 
after God has freed him or her from Sin’s enslavement. Without the passive, one could 
parallel Paul’s statement to Ben Sira’s conception of Wisdom assisting the obedient. In 
Ben Sira’s view, the human remains the primary actor, and it is precisely this conception 
that Paul avoids by using the passive. The human, in Paul’s view, never acts without the 
constant reminder that it is God himself who is acting through the human to fulfil the just 
requirement.151 The Spirit is not merely an aide who comes alongside, as Wisdom was for 
Ben Sira. Instead, the Spirit indwells the human and actually brings about the fulfilment 
of the “just requirement.” Paul’s use of the passive compares with the use of the hiphil in 
the Hodayot to express the notion that God is the underlying cause of the human’s 
obedience (see 1QHa 6.13). The passive is absolutely necessary and should not be 
downplayed or ignored, but neither does it rule out human agency.152 The point of the 
passive is to make human agency actually possible by grounding it in divine action. 
The broader context further supports interpreting 8.4 as being about human action. 
The argument throughout 7.7–8.13 concerns the ability of the human to fulfil the Torah, 
and the issue in 6.1–8.13 is whether Paul’s law-free gospel results in sinful behaviour or 
obedience. His interlocutor holds that obedience is only possible when the human orders 
                                                 
149
 Moo, Romans, 484. 
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 Schreiner notes that the use of the passive of pl h r o u/n in 2 Cor 10.6, Phil 1.11, Col 1.9, and Eph 
5.18 do not exclude human activity (Romans, 405). His examples, however, are not particularly strong, for 
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his or her life around the Torah. Paul has argued that a Torah-centred existence actually 
results in disobedience (7.7–25), and he now completes the argument by claiming that 
only those in possession of (and possessed by) Christ’s Spirit fulfil the Torah. His gospel 
about Christ does result in obedience. The i [na at the beginning of 8.4 indicates that the 
purpose for God’s liberating act was to secure for himself an obedient people. Far from 
resulting in sinful behaviour (cf. 3.8), Paul’s proclamation of the gospel was intended to 
result in obedience (cf. 1.5; 15.18). The human under the law could not obey the divine 
demand placed before him and instead he “bore fruit unto death” (7.5). The believer, 
however, no longer lives under the law or in the flesh, and he or she instead bears fruit 
unto God (v.4). As 7.6 indicates the human’s transition from being in the flesh and under 
the Torah’s rule is so that one might serve God according to the Spirit. This is exactly 
what Paul expresses in 8.1–4. God has freed humans from Sin’s grasp, and this results in 
obedience. 
In 8.3–4 Paul argues that his gospel has the specific purpose of creating an obedient 
people who, with the Spirit’s enablement, fulfil the Torah’s just requirement. The issue 
remains of what t o . d i kai,wm a  t o u/ no ,m o u means. The term d i ka i,wm a is used by Paul only 
in Romans. In 1.32 and 2.26 it has the meaning “ordinance.” Significantly, in 2.26 
circumcision is excluded from “the requirements of the law” (t a . d i kai w,m a ta  t o u/ no ,m o u). 
In 5.16, 18 it is used rhetorically in contrast with ka t a,kri m a and pa rap t w,m a, and means 
“righteousness” or “righteous act.” Since Paul writes about human action in 8.4, 
d i kai,wm a cannot mean the righteousness required by the law or the life that the law 
intended to give. To accept either of these would make attaining righteousness and life 
dependent on the human agent. Paul maintains in Romans (cf. 3.20–24; 11.6) and his 
other letters (cf. Gal 2.15–16; Phil 3.9) that the human cannot attain righteousness or life 
through obedience to the law or any other human endeavour. 
The singular d i ka i,wm a is striking since it does not match Romans 2.26 nor conform 
to the Septuaginatial use. It is rarely used in the LXX with reference to a single 
commandment, and when so used the specific commandment is always identified in the 
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immediate context (cf. Ex 21.9; Num 31.21; Ruth 4.7).153 In Romans 8.4, though, no 
specific commandment is clearly identified. Watson, therefore, thinks Paul “construes the 
law not as a multiplicity of demands but as a singular, comprehensive demand” that is 
different from the gra ,m m a (cf. 7.6), and Schreiner indentifies specifically the “moral 
norms.”154 Yet this reading also attributes to d i kai,wm a a meaning that is unparalleled in 
the LXX. Although d i ka i,wm a can be used in the singular to classify multiple 
commandments as a whole, these are always identified.155 The evidence of the LXX, 
therefore, is not helpful for establishing Paul’s usage.  
The identification with the “moral norms” suggested by Schreiner is unlikely. Not 
only is the category “moral norms” anachronistic, but Paul only rarely appeals to the 
Torah’s commandments themselves for ethical instruction.156 Moreover, at points where 
Paul could have used the Torah to direct his congregations, he does not. For example, the 
situation of the man having sexual relations with his stepmother in the Corinthian church 
(1 Cor 5.1–13) could have been resolved by appealing to the Torah (cf. Deut 23.1 [22.30]; 
27.20).157 The avoidance of the Torah is significant indeed. When Paul does appeal to the 
commandments as ethical injunctions, he reduces the Ten Commandments to a single 
commandment: love your neighbour (Rom 13.8–10). Paul does not revitalise the “moral 
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 In the undisputed epistles, Paul appeals to Deut 25.4 in 1 Cor 9.8–10, but he denies the literal sense 
and interprets it allegorically. Also, 1 Cor 14.34 (if authentic) is often understood as a reference to the 
Torah. Here, however, Paul does not appear to have a specific command in view, but he makes a deduction 
from the narrative of the Torah. This verse parallels then 1 Cor 10.1–14 in which Paul appeals to events 
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commandments but narrative events. The Sinai legislation is not drawn on.  
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 Paul’s conclusion, “Purge the evil from among you” (1 Cor 5.13), is likely drawn from 
Deuteronomy (17.7; 19.19; 21.21; 22.21; 24.7; cf. 13.5). Yet this command lacks any specificity and 
functions as a refrain indicating that evil is not to be found among the people of God. In his study on 
scripture and ethics in 1 Cor 5–7, Rosner is only able to identify general motifs from the Torah that have 
influenced Paul’s argument in 5.1–13 (Paul, Scripture and Ethics, 61–93). Where he is able to locate 
specific commands that may have influenced Paul, the ideas are too widespread to claim that Paul is 
actually expecting his readers to obey the Torah’s commandments. Rosner finds no specific commandments 
that Paul tells his readers to follow. There seems to be a serious methodological flaw in Rosner’s and 
others’ works, namely if there is similarity, then Paul is dependent on the Torah and he expects his readers 
to obey it. Paul’s ethics are undoubtedly similar, but his lack of specific reference to the Torah indicates that 
he does not view the Torah as something to be done or obeyed by his congregations. 
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norms” of the Torah in his churches, and while his ethics are virtually identical to the 
Torah, he does not claim the Torah’s commandments as support for his position.158 
Elsewhere in the Pauline corpus, the verb p l h ro u/n or the noun p l h ,rwm a occur with 
the noun no ,m o j five times. Except Galatians 4.4, which is irrelevant to this discussion, and 
Romans 8.4, the law to be fulfilled is identified explicitly as the love commandment (Gal 
5.14; 13.8, 10). In Galatians 5.13, Paul exhorts the readers to not misuse their freedom to 
satisfy the flesh, but “to serve one another in love.” He continues, “For the whole law is 
fulfilled in one word, in this: love your neighbour as yourself” (v.14).159 The parallels 
with Romans 8.1–13 are clear. The Roman Christians, as with the Galatians, have been 
set free from Sin and the flesh and now they live according to the Spirit. The primary 
expression of the Spirit’s guidance in one’s life is love.160 Romans 13.8–10 is even more 
explicit. Paul writes, “For the one who loves another fulfils the law” (v.8). After listing 
several of the ten commandments, including the commandment not to covet (v.9), he 
concludes, “Love for a neighbour does not produce evil. Therefore, love is the fulfilment 
of the law” (v.10). The entire law, including the “moral norms,” is reduced to the single 
commandment “love your neighbour as yourself.”161 The love commandment functions as 
Paul’s summary of the entire ethical instruction in the Torah.162 
Although in 8.4 Paul does not explicitly mention the love commandment, the 
repetition of the fulfilment language in 13.8–10 makes the connection likely. It is not 
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 See Moo, “Law of Christ;” Westerholm, Perspectives, 408–39 (esp. 431–39). 
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 The connection between 5.14 and 6.2 is disputed. The latter reads: “Bear one another’s burdens and 
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 Ziesler argues that the “just requirement” is the tenth commandment, which the evgw , was unable to 
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 For the identification of the “just requirement of the law” as the love command, see also Bruce, 
Romans, 161; Fee, God’s Empowering Presence, 537; Kruse, “Paul, the Law, and the Spirit,” 126–27. 
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necessary for the readers to understand on the first reading of 8.4 that loving one another 
is the fulfilment of the commandments. As the letter progresses, they would make the 
connection (Paul hopes) and realise that in expressing love to one another, especially 
across the divide created between the weak and strong (14.1–15.13), they are fulfilling the 
law’s requirement. In 8.4 Paul is describing the outcome of God’s act in Christ and is not 
detailing how the community will enact the fulfilment of the law.163 The outcome of 
God’s act is that believers, in contrast to the e vgw,  will be obedient (cf. 8.8). The righteous 
requirement of the law is fulfilled as the Spirit of Christ produces in us the love that 
Christ showed in his death for us (cf. 5.5–8). 
This enactment of love is possible only because the Spirit of life dwells within 
believers and serves as a source of power. Likewise the ability to avoid committing evil 
deeds is possible only by the Spirit: “For if you live according to the flesh, you will 
certainly die. But if by the Spirit [p ne u,m at i] you put to death the practices of the body, 
you will live” (8.13). “The practices of the body” refers to the acts and thoughts of the 
flesh that are manifest in the body. To live “according to the flesh” is to perform “the 
practices of the body.” The expression connects back to the description of Sin as dwelling 
within the body (6.6) and causing the body to die (7.24; 8.10). Through the Spirit’s 
enabling guidance, one is able to kill these evil deeds. Paul likely placed p ne u,m a ti at the 
beginning of the clause for emphasis. He wants the readers to understand that they cannot 
overcome the flesh and Sin alone. Only with the Spirit’s help can this be accomplished. 
Moo rightly concludes: 
Holiness of life, then, is achieved neither by our own unaided effort—the error of 
“moralism” or “legalism”—nor by the Spirit apart from our participation—as some 
who insist that the key to holy living is “surrender” or “let go and let God” would 
have it—but by our constant living out the “life” placed within us by the Spirit who 
has taken up residence within.164 
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As with the passive voice and the reference to the Spirit in v.4, the emphatic 
placement of p ne u,m a t i reminds the readers that the obedience required for life arises from 
a unification between the divine and human agents. The presence of the divine Spirit does 
not negate human action. Rather, it enhances the importance of the human act. Paul’s 
warning is addressed to an agent who, because of Christ’s death and his indwelling Spirit, 
now possesses the ability to please God. Paul’s account of the moral capacity of those in 
Christ is radically opposed to the description of human moral capacity in 7.7–25. The 
human’s essence has been completely reformed, and now under the lordship of Christ and 
led by the Spirit, one is able to be addressed with moral demands and to fulfil them. 
The warning in v.13 should not be passed over too quickly, for it provides a crucial 
key to understanding Paul’s view of agency.165 He threatens eschatological death to any 
who, despite being united to Christ (“brothers”), continue to live according to the flesh. 
His warning also indicates that, in some manner, eternal life is dependent on obedience. 
VanLandingham argues vehemently that this verse indicates that eternal life is contingent 
solely on what the human does. He writes, “This conditional sentence indicates that life or 
death depends on what the believer does, not the Spirit.”166 While Christ’s death rectified 
the past transgressions of the believer and enables the possibility, with the Spirit’s 
inspiration, for him or her to act righteously, the outcome at the judgment is ultimately 
determined by his or her obedience.167 Whether one lives or dies is determined by his or 
her obedience or disobedience, and God’s actions in Christ and his Spirit play no part in 
determining one’s eternal destiny. 
VanLandingham’s interpretation is questionable at numerous points. He ignores the 
connections between the Spirit and life earlier in the section (vv.2, 6, 10). These 
statements culminate in the emphatic claim of v.11: those in whom the Spirit dwells will 
                                                 
165
 Warnings of this sort are fairly common in Paul’s letters, e.g. Gal 6.7–9; 1 Cor 10.1–13; 2 Cor 
13.5. See Schreiner, New Testament Theology, 573–85. 
166
 VanLandingham, Judgment and Justification, 239. 
167
 VanLandingham, Judgment and Justification, 335. VanLandingham’s entire project is deeply 
concerned with demonstrating that humans have “libertarian” free will and that the Spirit does not affect 
this. Because of this particular understanding of free will, he consistently sets the action of humans against 
God’s, and he insists that the Spirit does little more than “inspire” (meaning: encourage) obedience (cf. 
p.187, 238) 
  
203 
 
be raised, just as Jesus was. Literally, “your mortal bodies will be made alive.”168 If the 
genitive is the correct reading, then the connection between the Spirit and life is even 
greater, for it is “by his Spirit which is dwelling in you” that God makes alive. The future 
life of the believer is attributed to the presence of the “Spirit of life” within the believer. 
This reference to the “mortal body” prepares one for the phrase “practices of the body” in 
v.13 and suggests some continuity between the promise of bodily resurrection because of 
the Spirit’s presence and the act of obedience on the part of the human with the Spirit’s 
enablement. When the warning of v.13 is read within this context of the Spirit’s 
connection with life, the conclusion emerges that the believer’s act to destroy the 
practices of the body that results in life is the outworking of the Spirit’s life-giving 
presence within the believer.  
This conclusion (that obedience is the outworking of the Spirit’s act to make alive) 
does not negate the human act of obedience, not least because Paul, unlike 
VanLandingham, finds no conflict between the divine and human agents. On the contrary, 
this conclusion actually enhances the significance of obedience. The warning, on the one 
hand, prevents one from drawing the conclusion that Paul eliminates human agency with 
his emphasis on God’s invading action in Christ and the Spirit. The warning is addressed 
to the human agent, and even with the Spirit’s empowerment, the human must act in 
obedience. Believers are not mere robots controlled by the Spirit, as the non-Christian is 
under the control of Sin (7.7–25). Without the daily re-enactment of Christ’s death, the 
believer declares himself or herself to be separated from the Spirit that gives life. On the 
other hand, Paul does not reverse his claims about what God has done and is doing. As 
seen already, even the warning, with the emphatic placement of p ne u,m a t i, underscores the 
importance of divine action for human action. The warning, with its mixture of divine and 
human action, indicates that Paul’s conception of the divine-human relationship cannot be 
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reduced to an oppositional framework. The divine and human do not stand opposed to 
one another. The warning rather reveals the joining of the divine and human agents. God 
now participates in human obedience, and his engagement with the human makes human 
action all the more important.169 
Paul’s view, therefore, is at some distance from the two-ways paradigm. While Paul 
lays both “death” and “life” before the human, he does not Christianise the two-ways 
pattern.170 In the two-ways scheme, the human stands alone before life and death, and he 
or she makes the decision to follow one path or the other independent of divine action. In 
Paul’s view, however, the human agent does not stand before life and death alone. The 
Spirit of Christ dwells within him or her. The presence of the divine agent from the 
beginning is a significant difference between Paul and the two-ways scheme.171 
Additionally, it would be inaccurate to describe the believer’s obedience as a “response” 
to God’s act in Christ, as some have done who describe Paul in terms of covenantal 
nomism.172 Conceiving of obedience in this manner makes it a secondary step following 
from God’s act. For Paul, though, obedience is a continuation of God’s act. There is no 
separation between God’s deliverance of the human in Christ and God’s Spirit 
conforming believers into the image of Christ. Indeed, Christian obedience is the re-
enactment of the Christ-event in the daily lives of the individual and the community, and 
this is done when the Spirit empowers believers to “put to death the practices of the body” 
(8.13) or, stated positively, to “fulfil the righteous requirement of the Torah” (v.4).173 
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Judgment, 288–90; Dunn, Theology of Paul, 632. Each of these acknowledges that the term “covenantal 
nomism” is inaccurate, but they contend that the basic structure of covenantal nomism is identical to Paul’s 
framework. For a reply, see O’Brien, “Was Paul a Covenantal Nomist?” (although he misses some key 
issues). 
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Obedience is not simply the human’s independent response to God’s gracious deliverance 
from Sin. Rather, it is a continuation of God’s gracious work in the believer’s life. 
Like the Hodayot, Paul holds the divine and human agents together. For the hymnist, 
God’s gift of the Spirit of knowledge is the enactment of the pre-temporal decision by 
God to elect him into the community of the redeemed. This Spirit imparts knowledge to 
the human and empowers him to resist his own creaturely failings. His obedience to the 
knowledge given by the Spirit is the expression of God’s mercy working, through the 
Spirit, in him. God’s hand is seen at every stage, but this does not eliminate the need for 
the human to act upon the knowledge he receives. In fact, the failure to be obedient is a 
sign that one does not possess the Spirit and therefore is outside the bounds of God’s 
grace. 
The similarities with Paul, given the Christological modifications, are obvious. God’s 
gift of the Spirit is the continuation of his work in his Son which has brought freedom for 
the human from Sin’s control. Those freed by Christ’s death are united both with Christ 
and with others so that they form a community known as those “in Christ.” Those in 
Christ possess his Spirit, who in giving life also gives power to resist the flesh. Their 
obedience is the outworking of God’s mercy in their lives and the evidence of the Spirit in 
their lives. Just as in the Hodayot, God’s activity is clearly visible at each point. Also, as 
in the Hodayot, the failure for the human to be obedient is evidence that he or she does 
not possess the Spirit of Christ and remains under Sin’s control. 
The insistence by both the hymnist and Paul that those in their salvific communities 
lead lives pleasing to God does not collapse into “works-righteousness.” Both do make 
eternal life contingent on the human agent’s enactment of God’s work in them. But 
neither author describes human activity as independent of divine action. This is a 
significant difference from what has traditionally been understood as “works-
righteousness” or “legalism.” Legalism refers to the human agent acting apart from divine 
assistance with the goal of attaining (eternal) life or righteousness. For both Paul and the 
hymnist, any attempt to be obedient apart from divine intervention is simply impossible. 
Both hold that human action is the expression of the divine impartation of life, so that far 
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from trying to earn life, the human is revealing the life already possessed. The failure to 
obey reveals that one does not have life. The obedience of the believer, in either the 
Essene/Qumran community or the Christian community, is absolutely necessary so that 
without it salvation is impossible, but it is not the sole means to attaining salvation, even 
at the final judgment, for obedience is the outworking of the divine act.174 
3. Conclusion 
Romans 7.7–8.13 is a unified section in which Paul argues against the presumption 
that obedience is only possible when one’s life is oriented around the law. This lifestyle 
does not please God and will not result in life and blessing, for it only brings death. God 
has acted in his own Son, Jesus Christ, to destroy Sin’s hold over the human agent, and 
the result is freedom to live for God through his empowering Spirit. The Spirit leads the 
human in the act of fulfilling the righteous requirement of the law and in putting to death 
the evil practices associated with the flesh. Obedience is produced through the Spirit, and 
the charge of the interlocutor is found to be groundless. 
On the issue of divine and human agency, this section of Romans indicates that Paul 
did not set the divine and human agents in opposition to one another. Paul rejects, on the 
one hand, the model set forth in the two-ways tradition in which the human agent must be 
emphasised at the expense of the divine agent. On the other hand, while Paul’s 
pessimistic anthropology leads him to emphasise God’s act in Christ, this is not done at 
the expense of the human agent. The freedom and redemption secured through Christ 
creates the possibility for human action so that the human becomes a real agent. The 
human and the divine Spirit work together to maintain the life given because of Christ’s 
death. There is no opposition between the divine and human agent, as if when one works 
the other ceases. Rather, Paul holds both together arguing that only when both act 
together can the human obey in a manner pleasing to God. 
                                                 
174
 “Preserving ourselves is not an independent thing that is added paradoxically to the divine 
preservation. God’s preservation and our self-preservation do not stand in mere coordination, but in a 
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The conclusions drawn from this study of Romans 7.7–8.13 can be related to two 
recent debates about Paul. First, scholarship has tended to read Paul’s letters in light of a 
monolithic understanding of Judaism. More recently, however, scholars have begun to 
take the diversity of Judaism seriously,175 and in this section of Romans, Paul witnesses to 
this diversity. Here he engages in an inter-Jewish debate carried out on two fronts. In 7.7–
25 he challenges the two-ways tradition on anthropological grounds. The human cannot 
keep the law in a manner sufficient to bring about life. A divine action is required to 
resolve the human problem (v.24). Sanders dismissed the anthropological element of the 
argument by claiming that it produced excessive contradictions because the human plight 
is a deduction from Paul’s claim that God acted in Christ to redeem all.176 Paul’s real 
reason for rejecting the law, Sanders argued, is because he believed that God acted in 
Christ, not because he thought humans were incapable of keeping the law. Sanders is 
correct that Paul’s rejection of the law as God’s means of salvation arises from his 
conviction that God acted in Christ, and this point has not been adequately appreciated.177 
Nevertheless, it does not follow that Paul did not develop a coherent anthropological 
explanation for why the law is not God’s means to salvation. Paul’s pessimistic 
anthropology may be a secondary deduction drawn from his belief that God acted in 
Christ to save, but it becomes an important point in his claim against Torah observance as 
the means to divine blessing. In 7.7–25 he engages a Jewish view of law observance 
solely on Jewish premises (that is, he does not mention Christ except in a parenthetical 
comment [v.25]), and he disputes the claim that one can actually fulfil the law on 
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 Sanders, Law, 79–80. On the movement of Paul’s thought from solution to plight, see Sanders, 
Paul and Palestinian Judaism, 442–47, 474–502. Thielman claims that Paul’s thought moved from plight to 
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anthropological grounds: because the human is a servant of Sin, he or she always does 
evil and will never attain to the life promised by the law. The argument is not nearly as 
convoluted as Sanders claimed when read against the backdrop of the two-ways tradition. 
In 8.1–13 Paul challenges another Jewish perspective, although without the 
straightforward polemical engagement. This other perspective is basically that of the 
Hodayot. Paul actually has several points of agreement with this view. Both have a 
pessimistic anthropology, prioritise divine action, and claim that obedience is possible 
only through the empowering of the divine Spirit. Yet, Paul finds this option flawed 
because it lacks any reference to Jesus as the Messiah. Here Sanders’ insistence that Paul 
rejected Judaism because it lacks Jesus as the Christ is entirely accurate. Divine action for 
Paul must be understood as the Christ-event, and while Paul has a doctrine of election, 
this too must be brought into conformity with God’s action in Christ.  
This study of Romans 7.7–8.13 shows that Paul’s critique of his contemporary Jews 
cannot be limited to a single line of thought, whether that be the claim that all Jews were 
legalists, Judaism was not Christianity, or Judaism restricted God’s grace to Jews alone. 
This latter interpretation, associated with the (so-called) New Perspective, finds, in fact, 
little basis in Paul’s critique at this point of Romans.178 The New Perspective has rightly 
emphasised the social context in which early Christianity and especially Paul’s mission 
and theology developed. Nevertheless, Paul’s opposition to the law cannot be restricted to 
Jewish exclusiveness without neglecting major portions of his thought. The argument of 
Romans 7.7–8.13 makes little sense against the backdrop of ethnic pride. Paul’s problem 
with his fellow Jews is not simply that they claim that a person must obey the law nor that 
they confined salvation to only those who bore the marks of the Jewish nation. He 
certainly had problems with these issues, but more than that, he objected to any view that 
denied to Jesus the central place. 
A second point at which this interpretation of Romans 7.7–8.13 can help clarify 
recent debates is Paul’s conception of salvation and the role assigned to Paul’s antithesis 
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between faith in Christ and works of the law. It was noted at the beginning of this chapter 
how Paul’s antithesis has been interpreted in recent scholarship and how these various 
options have controlled how one interprets other aspects of Paul’s soteriological thought. 
This complex history of interpretation and the fundamental character assigned to this 
antithesis in some circles makes discussion of it difficult. Here the purpose is simply to 
offer some comments on what the antithesis and Pauline soteriology broadly might mean 
in light of the interpretation of Romans 7.7–8.13 offered previously. 
One argument typically advanced in favour of interpreting p i ,st i j  Cri st o u/ as 
Christ’s faithfulness is that the traditional reading (“faith in Christ”) accords too 
significant of a role to human faith.179 Regardless of whether the other arguments for the 
faith of Christ are persuasive, this one fails to convince. As explained above, Romans 
8.13 ascribes a major role to the human agent in the ultimate possession of eternal life. 
Justification, as with salvation broadly conceived, is grounded for Paul in divine initiative 
and sustained by divine actions, but this does not make the human agent passive. The 
divine act in Christ (the gospel) brings forth faith and obedience as the human 
acknowledgment of what God has done. Priority always belongs to God, as those who 
argue for Christ’s faithfulness correctly note, but this does not negate the human act. The 
elimination of the human agent in justification by p i,st i j  Cri sto u/ is unnecessary. While 
this point does not abolish the possibility that the faith of Christ interpretation is correct, it 
at least shows that the theological argument does not work.180 
If justification by faith alone in Christ alone is viewed as the totality of Paul’s 
soteriology, then the correct interpretation must encompass Paul’s exhortation to 
obedience and those statements where he indicates that obedience is part of the means to 
life. Bell’s claim that for Paul “salvation is not dependent on sanctification” cannot 
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 Cf. Hays, Faith2, 150–53; idem, “Paul’s Hermeneutics,” 129–30. The theological argument is 
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account for Paul’s expectation that believers’ lives be marked by obedience.181 
Additionally, Paul’s warnings that disobedient believers will be punished and may even 
lose their salvation cannot fit within Bell’s scheme. It will not suffice to claim that Paul’s 
warnings and judgment by works language only refers to rewards, since, as Romans 8.13 
makes clear, eschatological death will come even to the believer who does not “through 
the Spirit put to death the practices of the body.” 
In Paul’s broader conception of salvation, the contrast between faith and works that 
is fundamental to the justification passages cannot be read so as to exclude the human 
agent from acting within the salvation process. Faith cannot be disconnected from 
obedience since for Paul faith entails obedience. He tells the Galatians that neither 
circumcision nor un-circumcision matter. What has value is “faith working through love” 
(Gal 5.6). The goal of Paul’s missionary work is to produce among the Gentiles “the 
obedience of faith” (Rom 1.5; 16.26). However the genitival relationship be understood, 
there is a link between faith and obedience, and this connection is fundamental to Paul’s 
soteriology.182 Faith, in Paul’s thought, functions as the source, from the human 
perspective, for good deeds. Genuine faith must reveal itself in obedience to Christ’s law. 
Romans 8.4–13, along with other passages, indicates that the human must be 
obedient in order to enter into eternal life. Paul’s view, however, cannot be described as 
“legalism” or “works-righteousness” since he holds that the obedient life necessary in 
order to enter into eternal life is produced through the Spirit’s power. Schreiner aptly 
writes, “[P]erseverance is the fruit of faith and grounded in God’s sustaining and electing 
grace. Yes, works are necessary to be saved. No, this is not works righteousness, for the 
works are hardly meritorious. The grace of God is so powerful that it not only grants us 
salvation apart from our merits, but also transforms us.”183 The transformation brought 
about by the Spirit reveals itself in the human when the human acts in a manner pleasing 
to God. And this act of obedience done by the human through the Spirit is absolutely 
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necessary. Salvation cannot be reduced solely to justification. It must also encompass 
sanctification and culminate in glorification. Without obedience in this life, one will not 
enter into the next life, but entrance into the next life is solely according to God’s grace. 
Paul is not opposed to human “doing,” even within the salvation process, but he is 
opposed to a human “doing” that seeks to fulfil the law as the means to divine blessing. 
God’s blessings have already been poured forth in Jesus’ death and resurrection, which 
means that human activity is not oriented toward attaining what God himself has already 
given. Rather, human activity is the outworking of God’s transformative grace as the 
human is brought into fellowship with Christ and his body through the Spirit for the 
purpose of being conformed to the image of Christ and in the end being glorified. 
212 
CONCLUSION 
Throughout the Second Temple Period, Judaism was constantly redefining itself in 
light of various challenges that arose. Whether those issues be the return from exile, the 
Maccabbean revolt, or the Roman invasion, Jews attempted to correlate their 
understanding of God and the sacred scriptures with the immediate problem. This study 
has been principally concerned with how ancient Judaism viewed divine and human 
agency. In the introduction the question was raised about the legitimacy of this topic. It 
was argued on the basis of Josephus’s portrayal of the Jewish schools (J.W. 2.119–166; 
Ant. 13.171–173; 18.11–25) that the topic was discussed by ancient Jews and that 
different perspectives were put forth by the three schools. Plotting the schools along a 
single line, Josephus places the Essenes and Sadducees at the extremes and sits the 
Pharisees in the middle. Josephus’ model is neat and certainly masks the complexity of 
these groups, but his portrayal of the schools indicates that the topic of divine and human 
agency is not only a modern one. Josephus’ statements open the way for a study of 
ancient Jewish views on this issue. This study has not attempted to defend Josephus’ 
representation of the schools, but it has taken seriously Josephus’ claim that a diversity of 
views were put forth by Jewish thinkers. 
This study has used Sirach and the Hodayot to represent the ends of Josephus’ 
spectrum. Ben Sira opposes those who overemphasise God’s mercy or deny their 
responsibility for their sins (chapter 1). He employs the two-ways pattern to argue that the 
primary actor in the divine-human relationship is the individual human (Sir 15.14–17). 
The human possesses the moral capacity to obey and Torah observance leads to life and 
blessing. Rather than placing obedience within a covenantal context of pure grace, Ben 
Sira models the divine-human relationship after the Creator-creation relationship. In this 
relationship God is viewed as the giver of commandments and creation obeys those 
commandments. The giving and obeying of the commandments is foundational to the 
divine-human relationship not because it signifies pure electing grace, but because this is 
the way that God interacts with all of creation. In his portrayal of the divine agent, Ben 
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Sira’s primary focus is God as judge. Even here, though, his real interest lies with the 
human agent since the act of judgment is the re-action of God to what the human has 
done. Ben Sira’s view of divine and human agency prioritises human action throughout.  
At the other end of the spectrum sits the Hodayot (chapter 2). This text could hardly 
emphasise God’s gracious saving acts more. Humans are described as mere creatures, 
frail and sinful beings destined for death. God overcomes the human’s creaturely 
limitations by electing some and giving his Spirit. Predestination is stressed throughout 
the Hodayot because it brings the focus onto God and it gets behind the problem of the 
human race. Through the Spirit the human is given knowledge and purified from 
transgression. The outcome of all these divine acts is that the human can obey the Torah. 
Transformation from a creature of dust comes solely through God’s grace, and even when 
making the claim that humans obey, the hymnist’s focus remains on God. The view put 
forth in the Hodayot opposes the view taken by Ben Sira. 
This argument for the diversity among Judaism fits squarely with neither the old 
perspective claim that in general Judaism was legalistic nor Sanders’ claim that with the 
exception of 4 Ezra Judaism was a religion of grace. The perspectives on divine and 
human agency put forth by Ben Sira and the Hodayot indicate that Judaism was not 
monolithic. Attempts to discover in these texts a single pattern, such as covenantal 
nomism, will inevitably flatten out the distinctions that are visible on the surface of the 
texts. Covenantal nomism runs counter to Sirach’s insistence that life comes through 
Torah observance, and it misses out on the Hodayot’s stress on the continuing role of the 
Spirit. This study, therefore, has questioned the applicability of covenantal nomism as the 
basic soteriological structure of Second Temple Judaism. It would be too much to 
conclude from this study that covenantal nomism is nowhere found in Second Temple 
Judaism. It may capture well the ideas of some texts, but it was not the only view taken 
by Jewish thinkers. 
A return to the older claim that all of Judaism was “legalistic” is inaccurate also. On 
the one hand, the term prejudices the analysis since it has negative connotations in 
contemporary usage where it typically refers to an attempt to earn one’s salvation through 
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works which results in boasting about one’s works. Ben Sira rejects boasting and egotism, 
but he does argue that “life” is attained through obedience. In order for the discussion 
about the relationship between grace and works to move forward, scholars must realise 
that prioritising human agency is not the same as “legalistic works-righteousness.”  On 
the other hand, the charge that Judaism was legalistic cannot account for texts like the 
Hodayot. Here one finds a form of Judaism that prioritises divine agency and speaks 
primarily, almost exclusively, about grace and mercy. Election by grace is foundational to 
the Hodayot. The charge of legalism is nothing less than distortion. 
With this spectrum of views, it becomes possible to situate Paul firmly within his 
Jewish context without dismissing or downplaying his emphasis on divine grace, which 
has often been judged as distinctive. This study used Romans 7.7–8.13 as a way into 
Paul’s thought (chapter 3). In this passage Paul engages in an intra-Jewish debate about 
human ability and divine intervention. Romans 7.7–25 was paralleled to Ben Sira and the 
two-ways tradition that he used. Paul’s e vgw, is the human agent of the two-ways tradition, 
who is standing before the options of life and death and has the law of life available to 
him. Paul opposed this view through his portrayal of Sin as a malevolent power. In 
Romans 8.1–13 Paul adopted a perspective similar to the Hodayot. Paul traces all divine 
action back to the Christ event. Here God has intervened into the human dilemma by 
sending his Son to destroy Sin’s hold over humanity. In contrast to the incapable human 
of Romans 7, the human in Romans 8 is empowered by the Spirit to obey. Paul argues 
that human obedience is necessary for salvation, but this obedience is generated by the 
divine Spirit that indwells and empowers each human who believes in Christ. 
Taking the diversity of Judaism seriously allows one to place Paul within the Jewish 
spectrum. His claims about divine action do not need to be softened, nor is it necessary to 
dismiss his criticisms of obedience to the law as the means to life. The complexity of 
Paul’s view, in that it prioritises divine action while also encompassing human action, fits 
squarely within the spectrum of Jewish views during the Second Temple Period. Paul’s 
claims about Jesus as the Messiah certainly led to his Jewish contemporaries considering 
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him beyond the pale, even ascribing to him the derogatory charge of “apostate.”1 The way 
he formulates the relationship between divine and human agency, however, is not itself 
outside the spectrum of possibilities. What ultimately puts Paul beyond the tolerable 
limits of Judaism, in the minds of many of his contemporaries, is not his claims about 
grace, faith, and the relegation of works, but his placement of Christ at the centre of his 
worldview rather than the Torah.2 
In the analysis of Romans 7.7–8.13, this study has challenged attempts to limit Paul’s 
critique of Judaism solely to Christological claims, the place of Gentiles within the people 
of God, or anthropological differences. Paul argues against a Ben Sira-style theology that 
attributes salvation primarily to law observance. Paul’s critique is anthropologically 
oriented and concerns the human act of “doing.” This should not be understood as a 
blanket rejection of human obedience, but Paul does take issue with forms of human 
obedience that are motivated by the attempt to attain life. Paul’s disagreement with other 
Jews, however, is not confined solely to anthropological ideas. Had the apostle Paul read 
the Hodayot, he probably would have found much of it favourable, but his fundamental 
problem with it would have been its lack of Christological reference. Here his 
disagreement with other Jews is Christological. We have seen also that the claim by 
Dunn, Wright, and others that Paul’s principal problem with other Jews concerned the 
acceptance of Gentiles into the people of God has no basis in Romans 7.7–8.13. This may 
be the case elsewhere, but it does not explain the totality of Paul’s debate with other Jews. 
Paul’s ability to argue on multiple levels should be considered more seriously in the 
attempt to relate him to his Jewish contemporaries. 
All three texts maintain that obedience is a necessary component in salvation. Ben 
Sira argued that obedience was the means to life, while the Hodayot and Paul according 
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 See Barclay, “Paul among Diaspora Jews.” It should be noted that how Paul was viewed by his 
contemporaries is not his own view of himself.  Although rejecting certain aspects of his past (Phil 3.4–11), 
he continues to think in very Jewish terms. His ethics are Jewish even if he does not tie them to the Torah, 
he shares the same scriptures and is deeply influenced by them, and he is genuinely concerned about the 
salvation of his fellow Israelites according to the flesh (Rom 9–11). Whatever aspect of Judaism Paul 
rejects, it is not the whole structure of Judaism. See Hagner, “Paul as a Jewish Believer.” 
2
 Identifying Paul as an apostate and outside the limits of Judaism does not make him unique. The 
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to Romans 8 describe obedience as the outworking of God’s Spirit in the person’s life. No 
one can conceive of a “saved” person who does not live in obedience. Even in the case of 
the Hodayot and Paul, both of which stress the priority of divine action, the human agent 
is not portrayed as merely a passive recipient of grace. The human’s life is transformed, 
and this transformation leads to obedience. Indeed, without obedience one simply cannot 
enter into eternal life. In arguing for the necessity of obedience, Paul and the Hodayot do 
not adopt a Ben Sira-like view that ultimately attributes salvation to human deeds. They 
seek rather a unification of the divine and human agents through their stress on the divine 
Spirit as God’s empowering agent. Through the Spirit the human obeys. Any claim that 
prioritises the human must be rejected and any view that eliminates the human must also 
be dismissed. 
This latter point is significant for how one construes Pauline soteriology. It  cannot 
be reduced to the claim that salvation is accomplished solely by God apart from the 
human. Paul’s view of divine action takes up within itself the human agent. The whole of 
salvation can be attributed to neither at the expense of the other. Paul, to be certain, 
prioritises divine action, and he seeks throughout his letters to highlight God’s work and 
not his own. Yet, he never eliminates himself as an active agent. He is rather the agent 
through whom God works and simultaneously the agent at work. 
One should also note that much of the discussion about divine and human agency in 
these three texts revolved around particular scriptural passages. Ben Sira derived the two-
ways pattern (Sir 15.14–17) from his interpretation of Deuteronomy 30.15–20, and he 
showed a keen interest in the creation accounts (Sir 17.1–14). In the Praise to the Fathers 
(Sir 44–50), which is a rehearsal of scriptural traditions and is an exercise in 
interpretation, Ben Sira draws attention to the obedient lives of Israel’s heroes. The 
Hodayot relied heavily on the scriptures in its anthropological claims. Particularly of 
interest were the accounts of Adam’s creation from dust (Gen 2.7), his punishment for his 
transgression (3.19), and the traditions that reflect on these two (e.g., Pss 8; 103). Its idea 
of the Spirit as given by God was derived from Ezekiel 11 and 36–37. In his critique of 
the two-ways pattern in Romans 7.7–25, Paul engages with Deuteronomy 30.15–20 and 
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the way that it was interpreted by others. Also, Paul’s understanding of the Spirit’s 
empowerment was based on Ezekiel 11 and 36–37. All three sources consciously used the 
scriptures to formulate their views of divine and human agency. This study has not 
pursued the hermeneutical issues raised by this engagement with scripture, and profitable 
research could be carried out on this issue.3 
Another matter that would benefit from more research concerns the place of other 
Jewish texts within the spectrum of views available in the Second Temple Period. This 
study employed Ben Sira and the Hodayot to represent the end views, but it might be the 
case that a text pushes beyond these two in its prioritising of the divine or the human 
agent. One might take, for example, the Two-Spirits Treatise found in 1QS 3–4. Running 
through this text is a rigid determinism that seems to extend even beyond the statements 
about predestination in the Hodayot. The views held by Jews of this period might even be 
further apart than this study has demonstrated. A study of how the two-ways tradition was 
developed in, for example, 1 Enoch 94–104, Psalms of Solomon 9.1–5 and 4 Ezra 7.3–24, 
127–29 would also be worthwhile. Here the issue of scriptural engagement would come 
to the forefront, and one could track both how this tradition developed and changed and 
how it functioned within the broader claims about divine and human agency made by 
each author.  
Additionally, this study has focused on Palestinian Jewish views of divine and human 
agency. A wider referent that includes both Diaspora Jewish and Greco-Roman sources 
would be extremely helpful.4 The philosophical schools debated vigorously the 
relationship between fate and free will. A study of these texts that attempts to correlate 
them with Paul would help clarify Paul’s place within the Greco-Roman intellectual 
world.  
Some questions about Pauline soteriology still remain unanswered. Particularly, the 
function of the antithesis between faith in Christ and works of the law is not fully 
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4
 See the studies by Barclay on Paul and Philo (“‘By the Grace of God I am what I am’”) and 
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resolved. Some implications for how one understands the antithesis were drawn at the end 
of chapter 3, and the point was made that the importance of the antithesis may have been 
overstated by some scholars. Further study needs to address the rhetorical function of the 
antithesis as well as its overall function within Paul’s thought. Moreover, this study 
confined itself almost exclusively to Romans 7.7–8.13. The results drawn from this study, 
therefore, need to be placed into a much broader context. This broader context needs to 
discuss statements like Galatians 2.20 and Philippians 2.12–13 as well as concepts like 
grace and judgment by deeds.5 This study is a starting point for a broader statement of 
how Paul viewed divine and human agency but more work is needed. 
This study has been an initial and a limited attempt at dealing with the issue of divine 
and human agency in Second Temple Judaism. As scholarship advances beyond Sanders’ 
description of Judaism as covenantal nomism, old questions are now being reopened. The 
old answers to some of these questions may prove to be accurate, but in other instances 
new answers must be put forth. This study hopes to have brought some clarity to the 
variety of options available to Jews in the Second Temple Period and to have provided a 
way to understand Paul within that context.
                                                 
5
 See Barclay, “Grace and the Transformation of Agency in Christ.” 
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